Individual strategy and social structure: an evolutionary theory of institutions
Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reasontheir way through even the most complex economic problems. In IndividualStrategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are so...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ
Princeton Univ. Press
1998
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Table of contents Publisher description |
Zusammenfassung: | Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reasontheir way through even the most complex economic problems. In IndividualStrategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. Itcan serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions. |
Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
Beschreibung: | XIII, 189 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 069102684X 9780691086873 0691086877 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV012009291 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 20130517 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 980617s1998 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
020 | |a 069102684X |9 0-691-02684-X | ||
020 | |a 9780691086873 |9 978-0-691-08687-3 | ||
020 | |a 0691086877 |9 0-691-08687-7 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)441135830 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV012009291 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
049 | |a DE-355 |a DE-473 |a DE-20 |a DE-19 |a DE-N2 |a DE-703 |a DE-521 |a DE-11 |a DE-188 |a DE-634 | ||
050 | 0 | |a HM131.Y64 1998 | |
080 | |a 330 | ||
082 | 0 | |a 306 21 | |
084 | |a CP 5000 |0 (DE-625)18991: |2 rvk | ||
084 | |a MS 1300 |0 (DE-625)123591: |2 rvk | ||
084 | |a QD 030 |0 (DE-625)141280: |2 rvk | ||
084 | |a QH 430 |0 (DE-625)141581: |2 rvk | ||
100 | 1 | |a Young, H. Peyton |d 1945- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)138075506 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Individual strategy and social structure |b an evolutionary theory of institutions |c H. Peyton Young |
264 | 1 | |a Princeton, NJ |b Princeton Univ. Press |c 1998 | |
300 | |a XIII, 189 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
500 | |a Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke | ||
520 | 3 | |a Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reasontheir way through even the most complex economic problems. In IndividualStrategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. Itcan serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions. | |
650 | 4 | |a Social institutions | |
650 | 4 | |a Institutional economics | |
650 | 4 | |a Evolutionary economics | |
650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Institutionenökonomie |0 (DE-588)4027208-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Organisationsökologie |0 (DE-588)4388755-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Institutionenökonomie |0 (DE-588)4027208-4 |D s |
689 | 0 | 1 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
689 | 1 | 0 | |a Institutionenökonomie |0 (DE-588)4027208-4 |D s |
689 | 1 | 1 | |a Organisationsökologie |0 (DE-588)4388755-7 |D s |
689 | 1 | 2 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
689 | 1 | |5 DE-188 | |
856 | 4 | |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/97041419.html |3 Table of contents | |
856 | 4 | |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/97041419.html |3 Publisher description | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008127079 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804126605581221888 |
---|---|
any_adam_object | |
author | Young, H. Peyton 1945- |
author_GND | (DE-588)138075506 |
author_facet | Young, H. Peyton 1945- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Young, H. Peyton 1945- |
author_variant | h p y hp hpy |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV012009291 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HM131 |
callnumber-raw | HM131.Y64 1998 |
callnumber-search | HM131.Y64 1998 |
callnumber-sort | HM 3131 Y64 41998 |
callnumber-subject | HM - Sociology |
classification_rvk | CP 5000 MS 1300 QD 030 QH 430 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)441135830 (DE-599)BVBBV012009291 |
dewey-full | 30621 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 306 - Culture and institutions |
dewey-raw | 306 21 |
dewey-search | 306 21 |
dewey-sort | 3306 221 |
dewey-tens | 300 - Social sciences |
discipline | Soziologie Psychologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03281nam a2200589 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV012009291</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20130517 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">980617s1998 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">069102684X</subfield><subfield code="9">0-691-02684-X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780691086873</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-691-08687-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0691086877</subfield><subfield code="9">0-691-08687-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)441135830</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV012009291</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-N2</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HM131.Y64 1998</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="080" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">330</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">306 21</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CP 5000</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)18991:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MS 1300</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)123591:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QD 030</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141280:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QH 430</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141581:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Young, H. Peyton</subfield><subfield code="d">1945-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)138075506</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Individual strategy and social structure</subfield><subfield code="b">an evolutionary theory of institutions</subfield><subfield code="c">H. Peyton Young</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Princeton, NJ</subfield><subfield code="b">Princeton Univ. Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1998</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XIII, 189 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reasontheir way through even the most complex economic problems. In IndividualStrategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. Itcan serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Social institutions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Institutional economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evolutionary economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Institutionenökonomie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4027208-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Organisationsökologie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4388755-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Institutionenökonomie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4027208-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Institutionenökonomie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4027208-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Organisationsökologie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4388755-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/97041419.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Table of contents</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/97041419.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Publisher description</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008127079</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV012009291 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:20:07Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 069102684X 9780691086873 0691086877 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008127079 |
oclc_num | 441135830 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-20 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-N2 DE-703 DE-521 DE-11 DE-188 DE-634 |
owner_facet | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-20 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-N2 DE-703 DE-521 DE-11 DE-188 DE-634 |
physical | XIII, 189 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 1998 |
publishDateSearch | 1998 |
publishDateSort | 1998 |
publisher | Princeton Univ. Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Young, H. Peyton 1945- Verfasser (DE-588)138075506 aut Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions H. Peyton Young Princeton, NJ Princeton Univ. Press 1998 XIII, 189 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reasontheir way through even the most complex economic problems. In IndividualStrategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. Itcan serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions. Social institutions Institutional economics Evolutionary economics Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd rswk-swf Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 gnd rswk-swf Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 s DE-188 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/97041419.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/97041419.html Publisher description |
spellingShingle | Young, H. Peyton 1945- Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions Social institutions Institutional economics Evolutionary economics Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4027208-4 (DE-588)4388755-7 |
title | Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions |
title_auth | Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions |
title_exact_search | Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions |
title_full | Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions H. Peyton Young |
title_fullStr | Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions H. Peyton Young |
title_full_unstemmed | Individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions H. Peyton Young |
title_short | Individual strategy and social structure |
title_sort | individual strategy and social structure an evolutionary theory of institutions |
title_sub | an evolutionary theory of institutions |
topic | Social institutions Institutional economics Evolutionary economics Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 gnd |
topic_facet | Social institutions Institutional economics Evolutionary economics Game theory Spieltheorie Institutionenökonomie Organisationsökologie |
url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/97041419.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/97041419.html |
work_keys_str_mv | AT younghpeyton individualstrategyandsocialstructureanevolutionarytheoryofinstitutions |