Realistic rationalism:
In Realistic Rationalism, Jerrold J. Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. Realism here means that the objects of study in mathematics and other formal sciences are abstract; rationalism means that our knowledge of them is not empirical. Katz uses this posit...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
1998
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Schriftenreihe: | Representation and mind
A Bradford book |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | In Realistic Rationalism, Jerrold J. Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. Realism here means that the objects of study in mathematics and other formal sciences are abstract; rationalism means that our knowledge of them is not empirical. Katz uses this position to meet the principal challenges to realism. In exposing the flaws in criticisms of the antirealists, he shows that realists can explain knowledge of abstract objects without supposing we have causal contact with them, that numbers are determinate objects, and that the standard counterexamples to the abstract/concrete distinction have no force. Generalizing the account of knowledge used to meet the challenges to realism, he develops a rationalist and nonnaturalist account of philosophical knowledge and argues that it is preferable to contemporary naturalist and empiricist accounts. The book illuminates a wide range of philosophical issues, including the nature of necessity, the distinction between the formal and natural sciences, empiricist holism, the structure of ontology, and philosophical skepticism. Philosophers will use this fresh treatment of realism and rationalism as a starting point for new directions in their own research. |
Beschreibung: | XXXIV, 226 S. |
ISBN: | 0262112299 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | REALISTIC RATIONALISM JERROLD J. KATZ A BRADFORD BOOK THE MIT PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS LONDON, ENGLAND CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IX
INTRODUCTION XI CHAPTER 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PRELIMINARIES 1 CHAPTER 2 THE
EPISTEMIC CHALLENGE TO REALISM 25 CHAPTER 3 THE EPISTEMIC CHALLENGE TO
ANTIREALISM 63 CHAPTER 4 THE SEMANTIC CHALLENGE TO REALISM 85 CHAPTER 5
THE ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO REALISM 117 CHAPTER 6 TOWARD A REALISTIC
RATIONALISM 177 REFERENCES 213 INDEX 219
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Katz, Jerrold J. 1932-2002 |
author_GND | (DE-588)118560654 |
author_facet | Katz, Jerrold J. 1932-2002 |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Katz, Jerrold J. 1932-2002 |
author_variant | j j k jj jjk |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV011931917 |
callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-label | B835 |
callnumber-raw | B835 |
callnumber-search | B835 |
callnumber-sort | B 3835 |
callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
classification_rvk | CC 3200 CC 4400 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)37260975 (DE-599)BVBBV011931917 |
dewey-full | 149/.2 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 149 - Other philosophical systems and doctrines |
dewey-raw | 149/.2 |
dewey-search | 149/.2 |
dewey-sort | 3149 12 |
dewey-tens | 140 - Specific philosophical schools |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Book |
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:18:44Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0262112299 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008065211 |
oclc_num | 37260975 |
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physical | XXXIV, 226 S. |
publishDate | 1998 |
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publisher | MIT Press |
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series2 | Representation and mind A Bradford book |
spelling | Katz, Jerrold J. 1932-2002 Verfasser (DE-588)118560654 aut Realistic rationalism Jerrold J. Katz Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 1998 XXXIV, 226 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Representation and mind A Bradford book In Realistic Rationalism, Jerrold J. Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. Realism here means that the objects of study in mathematics and other formal sciences are abstract; rationalism means that our knowledge of them is not empirical. Katz uses this position to meet the principal challenges to realism. In exposing the flaws in criticisms of the antirealists, he shows that realists can explain knowledge of abstract objects without supposing we have causal contact with them, that numbers are determinate objects, and that the standard counterexamples to the abstract/concrete distinction have no force. Generalizing the account of knowledge used to meet the challenges to realism, he develops a rationalist and nonnaturalist account of philosophical knowledge and argues that it is preferable to contemporary naturalist and empiricist accounts. The book illuminates a wide range of philosophical issues, including the nature of necessity, the distinction between the formal and natural sciences, empiricist holism, the structure of ontology, and philosophical skepticism. Philosophers will use this fresh treatment of realism and rationalism as a starting point for new directions in their own research. Realisme (filosofie) gtt Realism Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd rswk-swf Realismus (DE-588)4048680-1 gnd rswk-swf Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd rswk-swf Realismus (DE-588)4048680-1 s DE-604 Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 s Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 s GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008065211&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Katz, Jerrold J. 1932-2002 Realistic rationalism Realisme (filosofie) gtt Realism Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd Realismus (DE-588)4048680-1 gnd Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4139710-1 (DE-588)4048680-1 (DE-588)4129164-5 |
title | Realistic rationalism |
title_auth | Realistic rationalism |
title_exact_search | Realistic rationalism |
title_full | Realistic rationalism Jerrold J. Katz |
title_fullStr | Realistic rationalism Jerrold J. Katz |
title_full_unstemmed | Realistic rationalism Jerrold J. Katz |
title_short | Realistic rationalism |
title_sort | realistic rationalism |
topic | Realisme (filosofie) gtt Realism Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd Realismus (DE-588)4048680-1 gnd Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Realisme (filosofie) Realism Realismus Philosophie Realismus Rationalismus |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008065211&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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