Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs:
This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. Formally, the problem is a sp...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1998
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| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6355 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. Formally, the problem is a special case of a multidimensional screening problem with two dimensions of unobserved attributes. In contrast to much of the optimal income taxation literature, we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low net-income individuals (through negative marginal income taxes or employment subsidies) and distorting employment downward for high net-income individuals (through positive marginal income taxes). It is also shown that workfare is only part of an optimal program if certain individuals have not access to market employment. |
| Beschreibung: | 49 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6355 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. Formally, the problem is a special case of a multidimensional screening problem with two dimensions of unobserved attributes. In contrast to much of the optimal income taxation literature, we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low net-income individuals (through negative marginal income taxes or employment subsidies) and distorting employment downward for high net-income individuals (through positive marginal income taxes). It is also shown that workfare is only part of an optimal program if certain individuals have not access to market employment. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Impôt sur le revenu |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Inkomensverdeling |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Inkomstenbelasting |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Subventions à l'emploi |2 ram | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Employment subsidies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Income tax | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Blackorby, Charles |d 1937- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128590564 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6355 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 6355 | |
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| id | DE-604.BV011808740 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:16:07Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007973575 |
| oclc_num | 38528549 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 49 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publishDateSearch | 1998 |
| publishDateSort | 1998 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Beaudry, Paul Verfasser aut Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs Paul Beaudry ; Charles Blackorby Cambridge, Mass. 1998 49 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6355 This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. Formally, the problem is a special case of a multidimensional screening problem with two dimensions of unobserved attributes. In contrast to much of the optimal income taxation literature, we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low net-income individuals (through negative marginal income taxes or employment subsidies) and distorting employment downward for high net-income individuals (through positive marginal income taxes). It is also shown that workfare is only part of an optimal program if certain individuals have not access to market employment. Impôt sur le revenu ram Inkomensverdeling gtt Inkomstenbelasting gtt Subventions à l'emploi ram Employment subsidies Income tax Blackorby, Charles 1937- Verfasser (DE-588)128590564 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6355 (DE-604)BV002801238 6355 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6355.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Beaudry, Paul Blackorby, Charles 1937- Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Impôt sur le revenu ram Inkomensverdeling gtt Inkomstenbelasting gtt Subventions à l'emploi ram Employment subsidies Income tax |
| title | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs |
| title_auth | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs |
| title_exact_search | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs |
| title_full | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs Paul Beaudry ; Charles Blackorby |
| title_fullStr | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs Paul Beaudry ; Charles Blackorby |
| title_full_unstemmed | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs Paul Beaudry ; Charles Blackorby |
| title_short | Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs |
| title_sort | taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs |
| topic | Impôt sur le revenu ram Inkomensverdeling gtt Inkomstenbelasting gtt Subventions à l'emploi ram Employment subsidies Income tax |
| topic_facet | Impôt sur le revenu Inkomensverdeling Inkomstenbelasting Subventions à l'emploi Employment subsidies Income tax |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6355.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT beaudrypaul taxesandemploymentsubsidiesinoptimalredistributionprograms AT blackorbycharles taxesandemploymentsubsidiesinoptimalredistributionprograms |