Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax?: arbitrariness kills
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1997
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Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6255 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Beschreibung: | 17 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6255 | |
650 | 7 | |a Buitenlandse investeringen |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Corruptie |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Risico's |2 gtt | |
650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Wei, Shang-jin 1964- |
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id | DE-604.BV011794418 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:15:52Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007962127 |
oclc_num | 38069668 |
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physical | 17 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 1997 |
publishDateSearch | 1997 |
publishDateSort | 1997 |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Wei, Shang-jin 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)128616636 aut Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills Shang-Jin Wei Cambridge, Mass. 1997 17 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6255 Buitenlandse investeringen gtt Corruptie gtt Risico's gtt Ökonometrisches Modell Investments, Foreign Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6255 (DE-604)BV002801238 6255 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6255.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Wei, Shang-jin 1964- Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Buitenlandse investeringen gtt Corruptie gtt Risico's gtt Ökonometrisches Modell Investments, Foreign Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models |
title | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills |
title_auth | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills |
title_exact_search | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills |
title_full | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills Shang-Jin Wei |
title_fullStr | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills Shang-Jin Wei |
title_full_unstemmed | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? arbitrariness kills Shang-Jin Wei |
title_short | Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? |
title_sort | why is corruption so much more taxing than tax arbitrariness kills |
title_sub | arbitrariness kills |
topic | Buitenlandse investeringen gtt Corruptie gtt Risico's gtt Ökonometrisches Modell Investments, Foreign Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models |
topic_facet | Buitenlandse investeringen Corruptie Risico's Ökonometrisches Modell Investments, Foreign Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6255.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT weishangjin whyiscorruptionsomuchmoretaxingthantaxarbitrarinesskills |