Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation:
William Long uses three pertinent historical incentive cases to develop an original theory of how trade and technology incentives work to affect interstate cooperation. Moreover, these cases provide some practical guidelines for policymakers regarding when incentives work and the factors that enhanc...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Ann Arbor
Univ. of Michigan Press
1996
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Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | William Long uses three pertinent historical incentive cases to develop an original theory of how trade and technology incentives work to affect interstate cooperation. Moreover, these cases provide some practical guidelines for policymakers regarding when incentives work and the factors that enhance or limit their success This book develops a two-level explanation of how economic incentives can alter the structure of a state's external payoffs and affect its internal preferences and choices to induce cooperation by the recipient. Externally, according to Long, incentives offer an exchange of economic gains from trade and technology transfer for political concessions and are compelling first when the sender has market power in the traded goods; second, when both recipient and sender stand to gain from economic relations; and third, when the recipient's total utility for the gains from trade remains positive Internally, incentives shape state preferences in a cooperative direction by building alliances with actors in the recipient state who will benefit from the incentives; by creating support for the incentives in the sending state among actors who will benefit from the incentives and, unlike sanctions, by not encouraging the recipient state to find ways to evade the impact of the action or to filter out the message behind the incentives. This book contributes to the scholarly literature on international cooperation and economic statecraft. It will also engage policymakers and practitioners involved in a wide range of issues where incentives are an option |
Beschreibung: | X, 151 S. |
ISBN: | 047210747X |
Internformat
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264 | 1 | |a Ann Arbor |b Univ. of Michigan Press |c 1996 | |
300 | |a X, 151 S. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
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520 | 3 | |a William Long uses three pertinent historical incentive cases to develop an original theory of how trade and technology incentives work to affect interstate cooperation. Moreover, these cases provide some practical guidelines for policymakers regarding when incentives work and the factors that enhance or limit their success | |
520 | |a This book develops a two-level explanation of how economic incentives can alter the structure of a state's external payoffs and affect its internal preferences and choices to induce cooperation by the recipient. Externally, according to Long, incentives offer an exchange of economic gains from trade and technology transfer for political concessions and are compelling first when the sender has market power in the traded goods; second, when both recipient and sender stand to gain from economic relations; and third, when the recipient's total utility for the gains from trade remains positive | ||
520 | |a Internally, incentives shape state preferences in a cooperative direction by building alliances with actors in the recipient state who will benefit from the incentives; by creating support for the incentives in the sending state among actors who will benefit from the incentives and, unlike sanctions, by not encouraging the recipient state to find ways to evade the impact of the action or to filter out the message behind the incentives. This book contributes to the scholarly literature on international cooperation and economic statecraft. It will also engage policymakers and practitioners involved in a wide range of issues where incentives are an option | ||
648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1950-1996 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
650 | 7 | |a Internationale economische betrekkingen |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Kennisoverdracht |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Veiligheidspolitiek |2 gtt | |
650 | 4 | |a Weltwirtschaft | |
650 | 4 | |a International cooperation | |
650 | 4 | |a International economic relations | |
650 | 4 | |a International trade | |
650 | 4 | |a Technology transfer |x Economic aspects | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Nonproliferation |0 (DE-588)4331181-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Kernwaffe |0 (DE-588)4003434-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Technologietransfer |0 (DE-588)4059277-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
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689 | 0 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1950-1996 |A z |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
689 | 1 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
689 | 1 | 1 | |a Kernwaffe |0 (DE-588)4003434-3 |D s |
689 | 1 | 2 | |a Nonproliferation |0 (DE-588)4331181-7 |D s |
689 | 1 | 3 | |a Technologietransfer |0 (DE-588)4059277-7 |D s |
689 | 1 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1950-1996 |A z |
689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007665926 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Long, William J. |
author_facet | Long, William J. |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Long, William J. |
author_variant | w j l wj wjl |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV011403175 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HC79 |
callnumber-raw | HC79.T4 |
callnumber-search | HC79.T4 |
callnumber-sort | HC 279 T4 |
callnumber-subject | HC - Economic History and Conditions |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)34850058 (DE-599)BVBBV011403175 |
dewey-full | 338/.064 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
dewey-raw | 338/.064 |
dewey-search | 338/.064 |
dewey-sort | 3338 264 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
era | Geschichte 1950-1996 gnd |
era_facet | Geschichte 1950-1996 |
format | Book |
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isbn | 047210747X |
language | English |
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spelling | Long, William J. Verfasser aut Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation William J. Long Ann Arbor Univ. of Michigan Press 1996 X, 151 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier William Long uses three pertinent historical incentive cases to develop an original theory of how trade and technology incentives work to affect interstate cooperation. Moreover, these cases provide some practical guidelines for policymakers regarding when incentives work and the factors that enhance or limit their success This book develops a two-level explanation of how economic incentives can alter the structure of a state's external payoffs and affect its internal preferences and choices to induce cooperation by the recipient. Externally, according to Long, incentives offer an exchange of economic gains from trade and technology transfer for political concessions and are compelling first when the sender has market power in the traded goods; second, when both recipient and sender stand to gain from economic relations; and third, when the recipient's total utility for the gains from trade remains positive Internally, incentives shape state preferences in a cooperative direction by building alliances with actors in the recipient state who will benefit from the incentives; by creating support for the incentives in the sending state among actors who will benefit from the incentives and, unlike sanctions, by not encouraging the recipient state to find ways to evade the impact of the action or to filter out the message behind the incentives. This book contributes to the scholarly literature on international cooperation and economic statecraft. It will also engage policymakers and practitioners involved in a wide range of issues where incentives are an option Geschichte 1950-1996 gnd rswk-swf Internationale economische betrekkingen gtt Kennisoverdracht gtt Veiligheidspolitiek gtt Weltwirtschaft International cooperation International economic relations International trade Technology transfer Economic aspects Nonproliferation (DE-588)4331181-7 gnd rswk-swf Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd rswk-swf Technologietransfer (DE-588)4059277-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Technologietransfer (DE-588)4059277-7 s Geschichte 1950-1996 z DE-604 Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 s Nonproliferation (DE-588)4331181-7 s |
spellingShingle | Long, William J. Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation Internationale economische betrekkingen gtt Kennisoverdracht gtt Veiligheidspolitiek gtt Weltwirtschaft International cooperation International economic relations International trade Technology transfer Economic aspects Nonproliferation (DE-588)4331181-7 gnd Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Technologietransfer (DE-588)4059277-7 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4331181-7 (DE-588)4003434-3 (DE-588)4059277-7 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
title | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation |
title_auth | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation |
title_exact_search | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation |
title_full | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation William J. Long |
title_fullStr | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation William J. Long |
title_full_unstemmed | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation William J. Long |
title_short | Economic incentives and bilateral cooperation |
title_sort | economic incentives and bilateral cooperation |
topic | Internationale economische betrekkingen gtt Kennisoverdracht gtt Veiligheidspolitiek gtt Weltwirtschaft International cooperation International economic relations International trade Technology transfer Economic aspects Nonproliferation (DE-588)4331181-7 gnd Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Technologietransfer (DE-588)4059277-7 gnd |
topic_facet | Internationale economische betrekkingen Kennisoverdracht Veiligheidspolitiek Weltwirtschaft International cooperation International economic relations International trade Technology transfer Economic aspects Nonproliferation Kernwaffe Technologietransfer USA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT longwilliamj economicincentivesandbilateralcooperation |