The power of separation: American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto
Jessica Korn challenges the widespread notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demonstrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant schola...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ [u.a.]
Princeton Univ. Press
1996
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Princeton studies in American politics
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Jessica Korn challenges the widespread notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demonstrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority In fact, the Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions well. Through case studies of the legislative vetoes governing the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the extensive and flexible powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policy-making |
| Beschreibung: | 178 S. |
| ISBN: | 069102135X |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV011234630 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 19970311 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 970306s1996 |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 069102135X |9 0-691-02135-X | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)34117357 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV011234630 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-188 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a JK305 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 320.47304 |2 21 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Korn, Jessica |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The power of separation |b American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto |c Jessica Korn |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton, NJ [u.a.] |b Princeton Univ. Press |c 1996 | |
| 300 | |a 178 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Princeton studies in American politics | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Jessica Korn challenges the widespread notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demonstrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority | |
| 520 | |a In fact, the Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions well. Through case studies of the legislative vetoes governing the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the extensive and flexible powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policy-making | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Séparation des pouvoirs - États-Unis | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Veto législatif - États-Unis | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Legislative veto |z United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Separation of powers |z United States | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Gewaltenteilung |0 (DE-588)4071817-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Gewaltenteilung |0 (DE-588)4071817-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007539426 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804125735050280960 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Korn, Jessica |
| author_facet | Korn, Jessica |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Korn, Jessica |
| author_variant | j k jk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV011234630 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JK305 |
| callnumber-raw | JK305 |
| callnumber-search | JK305 |
| callnumber-sort | JK 3305 |
| callnumber-subject | JK - United States |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)34117357 (DE-599)BVBBV011234630 |
| dewey-full | 320.47304 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| dewey-raw | 320.47304 |
| dewey-search | 320.47304 |
| dewey-sort | 3320.47304 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02794nam a2200433 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV011234630</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">19970311 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">970306s1996 |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">069102135X</subfield><subfield code="9">0-691-02135-X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)34117357</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV011234630</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">JK305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">320.47304</subfield><subfield code="2">21</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Korn, Jessica</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The power of separation</subfield><subfield code="b">American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto</subfield><subfield code="c">Jessica Korn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Princeton, NJ [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Princeton Univ. Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1996</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">178 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Princeton studies in American politics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jessica Korn challenges the widespread notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demonstrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In fact, the Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions well. Through case studies of the legislative vetoes governing the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the extensive and flexible powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policy-making</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Séparation des pouvoirs - États-Unis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Veto législatif - États-Unis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Legislative veto</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Separation of powers</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Gewaltenteilung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4071817-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Gewaltenteilung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4071817-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007539426</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV011234630 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:06:17Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 069102135X |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007539426 |
| oclc_num | 34117357 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-188 |
| physical | 178 S. |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publishDateSearch | 1996 |
| publishDateSort | 1996 |
| publisher | Princeton Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Princeton studies in American politics |
| spelling | Korn, Jessica Verfasser aut The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto Jessica Korn Princeton, NJ [u.a.] Princeton Univ. Press 1996 178 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Princeton studies in American politics Jessica Korn challenges the widespread notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demonstrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority In fact, the Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions well. Through case studies of the legislative vetoes governing the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the extensive and flexible powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policy-making Séparation des pouvoirs - États-Unis Veto législatif - États-Unis Legislative veto United States Separation of powers United States Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Korn, Jessica The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto Séparation des pouvoirs - États-Unis Veto législatif - États-Unis Legislative veto United States Separation of powers United States Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4071817-7 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto |
| title_auth | The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto |
| title_exact_search | The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto |
| title_full | The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto Jessica Korn |
| title_fullStr | The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto Jessica Korn |
| title_full_unstemmed | The power of separation American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto Jessica Korn |
| title_short | The power of separation |
| title_sort | the power of separation american constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto |
| title_sub | American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto |
| topic | Séparation des pouvoirs - États-Unis Veto législatif - États-Unis Legislative veto United States Separation of powers United States Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Séparation des pouvoirs - États-Unis Veto législatif - États-Unis Legislative veto United States Separation of powers United States Gewaltenteilung USA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kornjessica thepowerofseparationamericanconstitutionalismandthemythofthelegislativeveto |