International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries:
This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of in...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1996
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| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
5694 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up. |
| Beschreibung: | 41, [14] S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 5694 | |
| 520 | |a This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Internationale Politik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Defense spending |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International relations |x Econometric models | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Spolaore, Enrico |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Spolaore, Enrico |
| author_GND | (DE-588)125845804 |
| author_facet | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Spolaore, Enrico |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)35363384 (DE-599)BVBBV011148772 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV011148772 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:04:48Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007472904 |
| oclc_num | 35363384 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-11 |
| physical | 41, [14] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publishDateSearch | 1996 |
| publishDateSort | 1996 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries Alberto Alesina ; Enrico Spolaore Cambridge, Mass. 1996 41, [14] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 5694 This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up. Internationale Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Defense spending Econometric models International relations Econometric models Spolaore, Enrico Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 5694 (DE-604)BV002801238 5694 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5694.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Spolaore, Enrico International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Internationale Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Defense spending Econometric models International relations Econometric models |
| title | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries |
| title_auth | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries |
| title_exact_search | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries |
| title_full | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries Alberto Alesina ; Enrico Spolaore |
| title_fullStr | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries Alberto Alesina ; Enrico Spolaore |
| title_full_unstemmed | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries Alberto Alesina ; Enrico Spolaore |
| title_short | International conflict, defense spending and the size of countries |
| title_sort | international conflict defense spending and the size of countries |
| topic | Internationale Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Defense spending Econometric models International relations Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Internationale Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Defense spending Econometric models International relations Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5694.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alesinaalberto internationalconflictdefensespendingandthesizeofcountries AT spolaoreenrico internationalconflictdefensespendingandthesizeofcountries |