The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy:
In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In the first account of the Schlesinger Doctrine to be based on newly declassifie...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ithaca [u.a.]
Cornell Univ. Press
1995
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cornell studies in security affairs
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In the first account of the Schlesinger Doctrine to be based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred. According to Terriff, Schlesinger himself argued that "assured destruction," which called for a massive retaliatory nuclear attack to destroy the Soviet Union, could lead to a devastating counterstrike against U.S. cities. The new strategy added a range of limited nuclear options in order to reduce the potential for counterattacks against non-military targets. Schlesinger also stressed that the policy change was necessary because, with the Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity, the American nuclear defense of Western Europe was no longer a credible deterrent. Terriff concludes that the new targeting policy was influenced by strategic concerns other than those Schlesinger publicly expressed and that it was further shaped by political, budgetary, and technological considerations. The author examines why policymakers believed that targeting practices needed to be revised, what they sought to achieve, and how they went about devising the new policy. |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 252 S. |
| ISBN: | 0801430828 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV011139585 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20100805 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 970109s1995 |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 0801430828 |9 0-8014-3082-8 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)31709623 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV011139585 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-19 |a DE-188 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a UA23 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 355.02/17/0973 |2 20 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Terriff, Terry |d 1953- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)141848340 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy |c Terry Terriff |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ithaca [u.a.] |b Cornell Univ. Press |c 1995 | |
| 300 | |a XVI, 252 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Cornell studies in security affairs | |
| 520 | 3 | |a In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In the first account of the Schlesinger Doctrine to be based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred. According to Terriff, Schlesinger himself argued that "assured destruction," which called for a massive retaliatory nuclear attack to destroy the Soviet Union, could lead to a devastating counterstrike against U.S. cities. The new strategy added a range of limited nuclear options in order to reduce the potential for counterattacks against non-military targets. Schlesinger also stressed that the policy change was necessary because, with the Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity, the American nuclear defense of Western Europe was no longer a credible deterrent. Terriff concludes that the new targeting policy was influenced by strategic concerns other than those Schlesinger publicly expressed and that it was further shaped by political, budgetary, and technological considerations. The author examines why policymakers believed that targeting practices needed to be revised, what they sought to achieve, and how they went about devising the new policy. | |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1974 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Armes nucléaires - États-Unis | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Dissuasion (Stratégie) | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Kernwapens |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Militaire politiek |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Deterrence (Strategy) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nuclear weapons |z United States | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Atomstrategie |0 (DE-588)4003431-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a États-Unis - Politique et gouvernement - 1969-1974 | |
| 651 | 4 | |a États-Unis - Politique militaire | |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 651 | 4 | |a United States |x Military policy | |
| 651 | 4 | |a United States |x Politics and government |y 1969-1974 | |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Atomstrategie |0 (DE-588)4003431-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1974 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007465517 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804125631905005568 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Terriff, Terry 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)141848340 |
| author_facet | Terriff, Terry 1953- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Terriff, Terry 1953- |
| author_variant | t t tt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV011139585 |
| callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
| callnumber-label | UA23 |
| callnumber-raw | UA23 |
| callnumber-search | UA23 |
| callnumber-sort | UA 223 |
| callnumber-subject | UA - Armies |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)31709623 (DE-599)BVBBV011139585 |
| dewey-full | 355.02/17/0973 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 355 - Military science |
| dewey-raw | 355.02/17/0973 |
| dewey-search | 355.02/17/0973 |
| dewey-sort | 3355.02 217 3973 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| era | Geschichte 1974 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1974 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03145nam a2200529 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV011139585</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20100805 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">970109s1995 |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0801430828</subfield><subfield code="9">0-8014-3082-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)31709623</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV011139585</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">UA23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">355.02/17/0973</subfield><subfield code="2">20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Terriff, Terry</subfield><subfield code="d">1953-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)141848340</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy</subfield><subfield code="c">Terry Terriff</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ithaca [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Cornell Univ. Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1995</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XVI, 252 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cornell studies in security affairs</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In the first account of the Schlesinger Doctrine to be based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred. According to Terriff, Schlesinger himself argued that "assured destruction," which called for a massive retaliatory nuclear attack to destroy the Soviet Union, could lead to a devastating counterstrike against U.S. cities. The new strategy added a range of limited nuclear options in order to reduce the potential for counterattacks against non-military targets. Schlesinger also stressed that the policy change was necessary because, with the Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity, the American nuclear defense of Western Europe was no longer a credible deterrent. Terriff concludes that the new targeting policy was influenced by strategic concerns other than those Schlesinger publicly expressed and that it was further shaped by political, budgetary, and technological considerations. The author examines why policymakers believed that targeting practices needed to be revised, what they sought to achieve, and how they went about devising the new policy.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1974</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Armes nucléaires - États-Unis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Dissuasion (Stratégie)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Kernwapens</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Militaire politiek</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Politik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Deterrence (Strategy)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear weapons</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Atomstrategie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003431-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">États-Unis - Politique et gouvernement - 1969-1974</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">États-Unis - Politique militaire</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Military policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Politics and government</subfield><subfield code="y">1969-1974</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Atomstrategie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003431-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1974</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007465517</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | États-Unis - Politique et gouvernement - 1969-1974 États-Unis - Politique militaire USA United States Military policy United States Politics and government 1969-1974 USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | États-Unis - Politique et gouvernement - 1969-1974 États-Unis - Politique militaire USA United States Military policy United States Politics and government 1969-1974 |
| id | DE-604.BV011139585 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:04:38Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0801430828 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007465517 |
| oclc_num | 31709623 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-188 |
| physical | XVI, 252 S. |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| publisher | Cornell Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cornell studies in security affairs |
| spelling | Terriff, Terry 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)141848340 aut The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy Terry Terriff Ithaca [u.a.] Cornell Univ. Press 1995 XVI, 252 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cornell studies in security affairs In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In the first account of the Schlesinger Doctrine to be based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred. According to Terriff, Schlesinger himself argued that "assured destruction," which called for a massive retaliatory nuclear attack to destroy the Soviet Union, could lead to a devastating counterstrike against U.S. cities. The new strategy added a range of limited nuclear options in order to reduce the potential for counterattacks against non-military targets. Schlesinger also stressed that the policy change was necessary because, with the Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity, the American nuclear defense of Western Europe was no longer a credible deterrent. Terriff concludes that the new targeting policy was influenced by strategic concerns other than those Schlesinger publicly expressed and that it was further shaped by political, budgetary, and technological considerations. The author examines why policymakers believed that targeting practices needed to be revised, what they sought to achieve, and how they went about devising the new policy. Geschichte 1974 gnd rswk-swf Armes nucléaires - États-Unis Dissuasion (Stratégie) Kernwapens gtt Militaire politiek gtt Politik Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear weapons United States Atomstrategie (DE-588)4003431-8 gnd rswk-swf États-Unis - Politique et gouvernement - 1969-1974 États-Unis - Politique militaire USA United States Military policy United States Politics and government 1969-1974 USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Atomstrategie (DE-588)4003431-8 s Geschichte 1974 z DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Terriff, Terry 1953- The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy Armes nucléaires - États-Unis Dissuasion (Stratégie) Kernwapens gtt Militaire politiek gtt Politik Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear weapons United States Atomstrategie (DE-588)4003431-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003431-8 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy |
| title_auth | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy |
| title_exact_search | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy |
| title_full | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy Terry Terriff |
| title_fullStr | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy Terry Terriff |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy Terry Terriff |
| title_short | The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy |
| title_sort | the nixon administration and the making of u s nuclear strategy |
| topic | Armes nucléaires - États-Unis Dissuasion (Stratégie) Kernwapens gtt Militaire politiek gtt Politik Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear weapons United States Atomstrategie (DE-588)4003431-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Armes nucléaires - États-Unis Dissuasion (Stratégie) Kernwapens Militaire politiek Politik Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear weapons United States Atomstrategie États-Unis - Politique et gouvernement - 1969-1974 États-Unis - Politique militaire USA United States Military policy United States Politics and government 1969-1974 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT terriffterry thenixonadministrationandthemakingofusnuclearstrategy |