Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence: theory and evidence
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
1994
|
| Ausgabe: | 2. print. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 496 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262031981 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804125568524877824 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface xvii
1 Introduction 1
1 Motives for Monetary Expansion under Perfect Information
2 Overview of Part I 15
2.1 Introduction 15
2.2 Why Do Governments Inflate?—Alternative Aspects of
Dynamic Inconsistency 16
2.3 Why Do Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? 22
2.4 Seigniorage, Political Instability, and the Structure of
the Economy 23
2.5 Adjustable Pegs as a Partial Commitment Device and
European Monetary Unification 24
3 The Employment Motive for Monetary Expansion 27
3.1 Introduction 27
3.2 The Inflationary Bias of Monetary Policy—A Basic Model 28
3.3 Commitment as a Device to Eliminate the Inflationary
Bias 32
3.4 A Multiperiod Extension 33
3.5 A Critical Look at the Economic Structure Underlying the 34
Inflationary Bias Result
3.6 Alternative Foundations for the Employment Motivated
Inflationary Bias 38
3.7 The Social Welfare versus the Political Approach to
Central Bank Behavior 43
4 The Revenue Motive for Monetary Expansion 47
4.1 Introduction 47
4.2 The Cagan Bailey Analysis and the Seemingly Irrational
Behavior of High Inflation Governments 50
4.3 A Seigniorage Related Dynamic Inconsistency of
Monetary Policy under Discretion and the Effect of
Precommitments 53
viii Contents
4.4 Nominal Debt and Dynamic Inconsistency 56
4.5 Seigniorage, Political Instability, and the Structure of
the Economy 59
4.6 Determination of the Efficiency of the Tax System and
Its Effect on Seigniorage 64
4.7 Evidence on Seigniorage, Economic Structure, and
Political Instability 67
4.8 Concluding Remarks 76
Appendixes 79
5 The Mercantilistic or Balance of Payments Motive for
Monetary Expansion 83
5.1 Introduction 83
5.2 A Simple Game between the Central Bank and a Union in
the Presence of a Balance of Payments Motive 84
5.3 Factors Affecting the Size of the Devaluation Bias 90
5.4 Precommitments versus Discretion 92
5.5 Applicability of the Model 93
5.6 Extensions and Qualifications 94
6 Comparison of Policy Outcomes under a System of
Adjustable Pegs with Outcomes under a Commonly
Managed Currency System and Its Consequences for
European Monetary Unification 97
6.1 Introduction 97
6.2 Policy Outcomes under an Adjustable Peg System 99
6.3 Policy Outcomes under a Commonly Managed Currency
System 102
6.4 Comparison of the Probability of Reneging under a
CMCS with This Probability under an AP System 106
6.5 Implications for the Desirability of a Stage Two in
European Monetary Unification 107
6.6 Comparison of Mean Inflation under an AP System and a
CMCS 108
6.7 Concluding Remarks H2
Appendixes * ^
Contents ix
7 The Financial Stability Motive, Interest Rate Smoothing,
and the Theory of Optimal Seigniorage 117
7.1 Introduction 117
7.2 The Financial Stability Motive as an Explanation for
Interest Rate Smoothing 118
7.3 Central Bank Behavior and the Structure of the Financial
Sector 121
7.4 The Trade off between Financial Stability and Price
Stability as an Inducement for Interest Rate Smoothing 125
7.5 The Theory of Optimal Seigniorage and Its Implications
for the Behavior of Interest Rates 130
7.6 The Financial Stability Motive versus the Optimal
Seigniorage Hypothesis as Positive Theories of
Interest Rate Behavior 132
7.7 Concluding Remarks 135
II Asymmetric Information and Changing Objectives under
Discretion
8 Overview of Models of Monetary Policy with Private
Information 139
8.1 Introduction 139
8.2 Private Information about the Ability to Commit 143
8.3 Private Information about the Relative Emphasis on
Employment versus Price Stability with Fixed Types 144
8.4 Changing Emphasis on Alternative Objectives—A Basic
Framework 145
8.5 Mandatory Announcements and the Interaction of Private
Information with Central Bank Independence 149
8.6 Private Information about Money Demand and Changing
Objectives 152
8.7 Private Forecasts about the State of the Economy and the
Persistence of Inflation 154
8.8 Alternative Notions of Credibility and Reputation 156
8.9 Ambiguity in Monetary Policy 157
8.10 Concluding Reflections 158
x Contents
9 The Employment Motive in the Presence of a Minimal
Information Advantage about Objectives 161
9.1 Introduction 161
9.2 Shifting Objectives and the Structure of Information 165
9.3 Timing of Moves, Public s Beliefs, and the Equilibrium
Concept 167
9.4 Derivation of the Policymakers Decision Rule and Proof 170
of the Rationality of Beliefs
9.5 A Benchmark—The Policymakers Strategy under
Symmetric Information 172
9.6 Comparison of the Distributions of Inflation with and
without Asymmetric Information 174
9.7 A Measure of Credibility under Asymmetric Information 176
9.8 The Confusion between Persistent Changes in Objectives
and Transitory Control Errors 178
9.9 The Distribution of Monetary Growth under Asymmetric
Information 179
9.10 Concluding Remarks 180
Appendixes 181
10 An Extended Information Advantage about Central Bank
Objectives 185
10.1 Introduction 185
10.2 Central Bank Objectives and Its Extended Information
Advantage 186
10.3 The Equilibrium Concept 187
10.4 The Public s Beliefs and the Expected Rate of Monetary
Expansion 187
10.5 Derivation of Government s Decision Rule and Proof of
the Rationality of Expectations 189
10.6 Speed of Learning, Activism, Credibility, and Their
Determinants 191
10.7 The Distribution of Monetary Inflation and Its
Determinants with and without Asymmetric Information 195
10.8 Reputation and Its Determinants 197
Appendixes 198
Contents xi
11 Alternative Notions of Credibility and Reputation 205
11.1 Introduction 205
11.2 Alternative Notions of Credibility 205
11.3 Establishing Credibility through Deterrence 207
11.4 A Critical Look at Deterrence via Trigger Strategies as a
Model of Reputation 209
11.5 Reputation as Learning versus Reputation as a Deterrence
Mechanism 210
11.6 Private Information about Revenue and
Balance of Payments Objectives 211
12 The Politically Optimal Level of Ambiguity 213
12.1 Introduction 213
12.2 The Politically Optimal Level of Ambiguity in the
Presence of a Minimal Information Advantage 215
12.3 The Magnitude of Common Knowledge and the
Inclination for Ambiguity 219
12.4 Friedman s Rule and the Political Value of an
Information Advantage 219
12.5 Concluding Remarks 221
Appendix 222
III Velocity Shocks, Politics, Signaling, Inflation Persistence,
and Accommodation
13 Private Information about Money Demand and Credibility 225
13.1 Introduction 225
13.2 Central Bank s Objectives, Instruments, and Information 226
13.3 The Public s Information Set and the Timing of Moves 227
13.4 The Equilibrium Concept and the Behavior of the Money
Supply 228
13.5 Derivation of the Public s Expectation and of the Central
Bank s Decision Rule 229
13.6 Characterization and Discussion of the Solution and of
the Public s Inference Problem 231
13.7 The Value of Private Information to the Central Bank 232
xii Contents
13.8 Reputation and the Deterring Effect of Learning 233
13.9 Determinants of the Degree of Activism 234
13.10 Determinants of the Speed of Learning about Large
Changes in Objectives 236
13.11 Inflation Uncertainty and Its Determinants 237
13.12 Credibility and Its Determinants 238
Appendixes 240
14 Partial Disclosure of Policy and Its Effect on Policy
Outcomes 245
14.1 Introduction 245
14.2 Monetary Targets, Central Bank Objectives, and the
Formation of Expectations 247
14.3 The Policymakers Decision Rule and Proof of the
Rationality of Expectations 250
14.4 The Effects of the Precision of Disclosure on Activism and
the Distribution of Inflation 252
14.5 The Credibility of Preannounced Policy Plans 255
14.6 Partial Disclosure, I riedman s Rule, and Monetary
Uncertainty 257
14.7 Concluding Remarks and Applications 262
Appendixes 264
15 Why Does Inflation Persist?—Theories of Monetary
Accommodation and of Inflation Cyclicality under
Discretion 273
15.1 Introduction 273
15.2 A Minimal Information Advantage about Natural
Employment 275
15.3 Persistent Unemployment and Asymmetric Information as
Causes for Inflationary Persistence 281
15.4 Does a Countercyclical Behavior of Inflation Imply That
Employment Motivated Monetary Temptations Are
Unimportant? 284
15.5 Determinants of Inflation, the Speed of Learning, and
Activism 288
Contents xiii
15.6 Inflation Persistence due to Overlapping Wage Contracts
under Discretion 290
15.7 Concluding Reflections and Some Evidence 295
Appendixes 298
16 Signaling and Private Information about the Ability to
Commit and about Objectives with Time Invariant Types 309
16.1 Introduction 309
16.2 Private Information about the Ability to Precommit 310
16.3 Private Information about Objectives—Vickers Model 315
16.4 Strength as Commitment Ability versus Strength as
High Concern about Price Stability 323
16.5 Concluding Remarks and Extensions 325
Appendixes 328
17 Political Parties and Monetary Policy 333
17.1 Introduction 333
17.2 The Alesina Sachs Political Monetary Cycle 335
17.3 The Havrilesky Partisan Offset Theory of Monetary
Policy 341
17.4 Empirical Evidence on Partisanship Effects in Monetary
Policy 343
17.5 Concluding Observations 345
IV Central Bank Independence and Policy Outcomes:
Theory and Evidence
18 Aspects of Central Bank Independence and Their Impact on
Policy Outcomes and the Distribution of Inflation 349
18.1 Introduction 349
18.2 Central Bank Independence, Political Time Preference,
and Policy Outcomes 351
18.3 Central Bank Independence in the Presence of Differences
in Emphasis on Alternative Objectives 355
18.4 Private Information about Central Bank Independence 359
18.5 Concluding Remarks 364
Appendixes 364
xiv Contents
19 The Measurement of Central Bank Independence 369
19.1 Introduction 369
19.2 Measures of Legal Central Bank Independence and Their
Coding 371
19.3 Aggregation of Legal Variables and Ranking of Central
Banks by Legal Independence 378
19.4 The Turnover Rate of Central Bank Governors as a Proxy
for Actual Independence 383
19.5 Characterization of Central Bank Independence by
Answers to a Questionnaire 386
19.6 Interrelationships between Alternative Indices of Central
Bank Independence 391
19.7 Additional Dimensions of Central Bank Independence 393
Appendixes 396
20 Inflation and Central Bank Independence 415
20.1 Introduction 415
20.2 Inflation and Disaggregated Measures of Central Bank
Independence 416
20.3 Inflation, Aggregate Measures of Legal Independence,
Compliance, and Turnover 419
20.4 Comparison with Previous Evidence 422
20.5 Inflation and Central Bank Independence as Proxied by
Questionnaire Variables during the 1980s 425
20.6 Instrumental Variables Estimation and the Issue of
Two Way Causality between Inflation and Central Bank
Independence 427
20.7 Granger Causality between Inflation and Central Bank
Independence as Proxied by Turnover 429
20.8 Concluding Reflections 430
21 Ranking of Central Banks by an Overall Index of
Inflation Based Central Bank Independence 433
21.1 Introduction 433
21.2 Ranking by Overall Independence 433
21.3 Outliers and Rule Countries 436
Contents xv
22 The Mean and the Variance of Inflation, Central Bank
Credit, and Central Bank Independence 439
22.1 Introduction 439
22.2 The Cross sectional and Cross Period Distribution of
Inflation and of Its Variance and Their Relation to Central
Bank Independence 439
22.3 Central Bank Credit to the Public Sector and Central
Bank Independence 441
23 The Determinants of Central Bank Independence 445
23.1 Introduction 445
23.2 Political Instability and Legal Central Bank Independence 445
23.3 The Effect of Inflation on Central Bank Independence 448
23.4 Other Determinants of Central Bank Independence 449
23.5 Rules versus Central Bank Independence as Alternative
Methods for the Achievement of Price Stability 452
23.6 The Different Meanings of Legal Independence in
Developed and in Developing Countries 453
23.7 The Effect of Successful Stabilizations on Central Bank
Independence 454
Notes 457
References 473
Index 485
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Cukierman, Alex 1938- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124152465 |
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| dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
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| dewey-search | 332.1/1 332.1/1 20 |
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| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 2. print. |
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| id | DE-604.BV011077549 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:03:38Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262031981 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007421132 |
| oclc_num | 258019515 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-N2 DE-384 DE-521 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-N2 DE-384 DE-521 DE-188 |
| physical | XIX, 496 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1994 |
| publishDateSearch | 1994 |
| publishDateSort | 1994 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Cukierman, Alex 1938- Verfasser (DE-588)124152465 aut Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence Alex Cukierman 2. print. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 1994 XIX, 496 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Ökonometrisches Modell Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models Monetary policy -- Econometric models Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd rswk-swf Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd rswk-swf Inflation (DE-588)4026887-1 gnd rswk-swf Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd rswk-swf Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 s Inflation (DE-588)4026887-1 s Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 s DE-604 Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 s 1\p DE-604 2\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007421132&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Cukierman, Alex 1938- Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence Ökonometrisches Modell Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models Monetary policy -- Econometric models Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd Inflation (DE-588)4026887-1 gnd Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4042669-5 (DE-588)4019902-2 (DE-588)4130528-0 (DE-588)4026887-1 (DE-588)4043212-9 |
| title | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence |
| title_auth | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence |
| title_exact_search | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence |
| title_full | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence Alex Cukierman |
| title_fullStr | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence Alex Cukierman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence theory and evidence Alex Cukierman |
| title_short | Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence |
| title_sort | central bank strategy credibility and independence theory and evidence |
| title_sub | theory and evidence |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models Monetary policy -- Econometric models Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd Inflation (DE-588)4026887-1 gnd Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models Monetary policy -- Econometric models Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Notenbank Geldpolitik Notenbankpolitik Inflation |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007421132&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT cukiermanalex centralbankstrategycredibilityandindependencetheoryandevidence |