Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Bergisch Gladbach [u.a.]
Eul
1996
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie
72 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | VII, 179 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 3890125077 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Theilen, Bernd |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection |c Bernd Theilen |
| 264 | 1 | |a Bergisch Gladbach [u.a.] |b Eul |c 1996 | |
| 300 | |a VII, 179 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie |v 72 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Table of Contents
Preface ii
List of figures vi
. Introduction 1
f I lOptimal contract design in models with one principal and one agent 5
1 Models of moral hazard and adverse selection 6
1.1 Moral Hazard . 9
1.1.1 The discrete case 10
1.1.2 The continuous case 13
1.1.3 The first order approach 18
1.2 Adverse Selection 23
1.2.1 The discrete case 24
1.2.2 The continuous case 30
1.3 Conclusion 33
2 Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection 34
¦¦ 2.1 Moral hazard and adverse selection with risk neutral agents 40
| 2.2 An asymptotic solution of the general adverse selection and moral hazard
1 problem 44
1
Table of Contents iv j
1
i
2.3 Moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents 46
2.4 Conclusion 53
2.5 Appendix 55
2.5.1 Appendix 1 55
2.5.2 Appendix 2 56
2.5.3 Appendix 3 57
2.5.4 Appendix 4 58
II Contract and organizational design in multi agent relationships 59
3 Models of moral hazard and adverse selection 60
3.1 Contract design under moral hazard with many agents 63
3.1.1 The collusion free solution 65
3.1.2 Collusion 69
3.1.3 Cooperation ; 72
3.2 Contract design under adverse selection with many agents 76
3.2.1 The collusion free solution 78
3.2.2 Cooperation 84
3.3 Optimal organizational design with asymmetric information 88
3.3.1 Delegation. 88
3.3.2 Centralization versus decentralization 94
3.4 Appendix 98 i
3.4.1 Appendix 1 98 ;
3.4.2 Appendix 2 99 |
3.4.3 Appendix 3 99 I
Table of Contents v
4 Interacting moral hazard and adverse selection 101
4.1 The general moral hazard and adverse selection case 105
4.2 The pure moral hazard case 109
4.3 The pure adverse selection case 116
4.4 Conclusion 120
4.5 Appendix 121
4.5.1 Appendix 1 121
4.5.2 Appendix 2 122
4.5.3 Appendix 3 128
5 Hierarchies under asymmetric information 131
5.1 The centralized problem 136
5.2 Delegation to the adverse selection agent 142
5.3 Delegation to the moral hazard agent 148
5.4 Conclusion 153
5.5 Appendix 155
5.5.1 Appendix 1 155
5.5.2 Appendix 2 157
5.5.3 Appendix 3 162
5.5.4 Appendix 4 164
Conclusions 166
Bibliography 170
I
I
List of figures
1.1 Contractual relationship between one principal and one agent under moral
hazard 9
1.2 The possible invalidity of the first order approach 19
1.3 Contractual relationship between one principal and one agent under adverse
selection 23
1.4 Graphical illustration of the proof of result 1.8 . . . 28
2.1 Contractual relationship between the principal and one agent with simulta¬
neous moral hazard and adverse selection 37
3.1 Timing process of the contractual relationship between one principal and
many agents under moral hazard 63
3.2 Timing process of the contractual relationship between one principal and
many agents under adverse selection 76
4.1 Timing process of the contractual relationship between one principal and
two agents under moral hazard and adverse selection 103
4.2 Graphical illustration of the proof of result 4.3 Ill
4.3 Informational situation of the principal and rents of Al and A2 depending
on the underlying technology 118
4.4 Graphical illustration of the proof of result 4.6 129
5.1 Hierarchical structures under moral hazard and adverse selection 134
5.2 Timing process of the game for a centralized hierarchy 1(1) 136 :
List of figures vii
5.3 Timing process of the game for a centralized hierarchy 1(2) 138
5.4 Timing process of the game for hierarchy II 142
5.5 Timing process of the game for hierarchy III 148
|
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| id | DE-604.BV010876901 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:00:25Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 3890125077 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007272395 |
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| spelling | Theilen, Bernd Verfasser aut Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection Bernd Theilen Bergisch Gladbach [u.a.] Eul 1996 VII, 179 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie 72 Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 1995 Mathematisches Modell Letting of contracts Mathematical models Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd rswk-swf Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 s Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 s Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 s DE-604 Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie 72 (DE-604)BV023548254 72 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007272395&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Theilen, Bernd Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie Mathematisches Modell Letting of contracts Mathematical models Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
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| title | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection |
| title_auth | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection |
| title_exact_search | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection |
| title_full | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection Bernd Theilen |
| title_fullStr | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection Bernd Theilen |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection Bernd Theilen |
| title_short | Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection |
| title_sort | optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Letting of contracts Mathematical models Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Letting of contracts Mathematical models Vertrag Kontrakttheorie Moral Hazard Adverse Selektion Agency-Theorie Hochschulschrift |
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