Representations, targets, and attitudes:
What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Distinguished philosopher of mind Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in t...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
1996
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Representation and mind
A Bradford book |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Distinguished philosopher of mind Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing to represent another) from an unprecedented angle. Instead of following the usual procedure of defending a version of "indicator" semantics, Cummins begins with a theory of representational error and uses this theory to constrain the account of representational content. Thus, the problem of misrepresentation, which plagues all other accounts, is avoided at the start. Cummins shows that representational error can be accommodated only if the content of a representation is intrinsic - independent of its use and causal role in the system that employs it Cummins's theory of error is based on the teleological idea of a "target," an intentional concept but one that differs importantly from that of an ordinary intentional object. Using this notion he offers a schematic theory of representation and an account of propositional attitudes that takes exception with some popular positions, such as conceptual role semantics, Fodor's representational theory of the mind, and Putnam's twin-earth examples |
| Beschreibung: | 153 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 026203235X |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Distinguished philosopher of mind Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing to represent another) from an unprecedented angle. Instead of following the usual procedure of defending a version of "indicator" semantics, Cummins begins with a theory of representational error and uses this theory to constrain the account of representational content. Thus, the problem of misrepresentation, which plagues all other accounts, is avoided at the start. Cummins shows that representational error can be accommodated only if the content of a representation is intrinsic - independent of its use and causal role in the system that employs it | |
| 520 | |a Cummins's theory of error is based on the teleological idea of a "target," an intentional concept but one that differs importantly from that of an ordinary intentional object. Using this notion he offers a schematic theory of representation and an account of propositional attitudes that takes exception with some popular positions, such as conceptual role semantics, Fodor's representational theory of the mind, and Putnam's twin-earth examples | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Cummins, Robert |
| author_facet | Cummins, Robert |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Cummins, Robert |
| author_variant | r c rc |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV010788043 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
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| callnumber-search | B105.R4C87 1996 |
| callnumber-sort | B 3105 R4 C87 41996 |
| callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | CC 4400 ER 640 |
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| dewey-full | 128/.220 128/.2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128/.2 20 128/.2 |
| dewey-search | 128/.2 20 128/.2 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 12 220 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Sprachwissenschaft Philosophie Literaturwissenschaft |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV010788043 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:58:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 026203235X |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007206375 |
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| physical | 153 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publishDateSearch | 1996 |
| publishDateSort | 1996 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Representation and mind A Bradford book |
| spelling | Cummins, Robert Verfasser aut Representations, targets, and attitudes Robert Cummins Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 1996 153 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Representation and mind A Bradford book What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Distinguished philosopher of mind Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing to represent another) from an unprecedented angle. Instead of following the usual procedure of defending a version of "indicator" semantics, Cummins begins with a theory of representational error and uses this theory to constrain the account of representational content. Thus, the problem of misrepresentation, which plagues all other accounts, is avoided at the start. Cummins shows that representational error can be accommodated only if the content of a representation is intrinsic - independent of its use and causal role in the system that employs it Cummins's theory of error is based on the teleological idea of a "target," an intentional concept but one that differs importantly from that of an ordinary intentional object. Using this notion he offers a schematic theory of representation and an account of propositional attitudes that takes exception with some popular positions, such as conceptual role semantics, Fodor's representational theory of the mind, and Putnam's twin-earth examples Filosofie van de geest gtt Mentale representatie gtt Représentation (Philosophie) Représentation mentale Representation (Philosophy) Mental representation Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd rswk-swf Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Cummins, Robert Representations, targets, and attitudes Filosofie van de geest gtt Mentale representatie gtt Représentation (Philosophie) Représentation mentale Representation (Philosophy) Mental representation Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4049534-6 |
| title | Representations, targets, and attitudes |
| title_auth | Representations, targets, and attitudes |
| title_exact_search | Representations, targets, and attitudes |
| title_full | Representations, targets, and attitudes Robert Cummins |
| title_fullStr | Representations, targets, and attitudes Robert Cummins |
| title_full_unstemmed | Representations, targets, and attitudes Robert Cummins |
| title_short | Representations, targets, and attitudes |
| title_sort | representations targets and attitudes |
| topic | Filosofie van de geest gtt Mentale representatie gtt Représentation (Philosophie) Représentation mentale Representation (Philosophy) Mental representation Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Filosofie van de geest Mentale representatie Représentation (Philosophie) Représentation mentale Representation (Philosophy) Mental representation Wissensrepräsentation |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT cumminsrobert representationstargetsandattitudes |