A realist conception of truth:
One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth with a work likely to claim a place at the very center of the contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. William P. Alston formulates and defends a reali...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ithaca u.a.
Cornell Univ. Press
1996
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth with a work likely to claim a place at the very center of the contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for "truth"). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Although this concept may seem quite obvious, Alston says, many thinkers hold views incompatible with it - and much of his book is devoted to a powerful critique of those views. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas he attacks Alston discusses different realist accounts of truth, examining what they do and do not imply. He distinguishes his version, which he characterizes as "minimalist," from various "deflationary" accounts, all of which deny that asserting the truth of a proposition attributes a property of truth to it. He also examines alethic realism in relation to a variety of metaphysical realisms. Finally, Alston argues for the importance - theoretical and practical - of assessing the truth value of statements, beliefs, and propositions |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 274 S. |
| ISBN: | 0801431875 |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth with a work likely to claim a place at the very center of the contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for "truth"). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Although this concept may seem quite obvious, Alston says, many thinkers hold views incompatible with it - and much of his book is devoted to a powerful critique of those views. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas he attacks | |
| 520 | |a Alston discusses different realist accounts of truth, examining what they do and do not imply. He distinguishes his version, which he characterizes as "minimalist," from various "deflationary" accounts, all of which deny that asserting the truth of a proposition attributes a property of truth to it. He also examines alethic realism in relation to a variety of metaphysical realisms. Finally, Alston argues for the importance - theoretical and practical - of assessing the truth value of statements, beliefs, and propositions | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Alston, William P. 1921-2009 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)123664977 |
| author_facet | Alston, William P. 1921-2009 |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Alston, William P. 1921-2009 |
| author_variant | w p a wp wpa |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV010785343 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | BD171 |
| callnumber-raw | BD171 |
| callnumber-search | BD171 |
| callnumber-sort | BD 3171 |
| callnumber-subject | BD - Speculative Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | CC 4400 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)32922890 (DE-599)BVBBV010785343 |
| dewey-full | 121 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121 |
| dewey-search | 121 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV010785343 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:58:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0801431875 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007204118 |
| oclc_num | 32922890 |
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| physical | XII, 274 S. |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publishDateSearch | 1996 |
| publishDateSort | 1996 |
| publisher | Cornell Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Alston, William P. 1921-2009 Verfasser (DE-588)123664977 aut A realist conception of truth William P. Alston 1. publ. Ithaca u.a. Cornell Univ. Press 1996 XII, 274 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth with a work likely to claim a place at the very center of the contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for "truth"). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Although this concept may seem quite obvious, Alston says, many thinkers hold views incompatible with it - and much of his book is devoted to a powerful critique of those views. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas he attacks Alston discusses different realist accounts of truth, examining what they do and do not imply. He distinguishes his version, which he characterizes as "minimalist," from various "deflationary" accounts, all of which deny that asserting the truth of a proposition attributes a property of truth to it. He also examines alethic realism in relation to a variety of metaphysical realisms. Finally, Alston argues for the importance - theoretical and practical - of assessing the truth value of statements, beliefs, and propositions Connaissance, Théorie de la Realisme (filosofie) gtt Réalisme Vérité Waarheid gtt Knowledge, Theory of Realism Truth Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd rswk-swf Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd rswk-swf Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 s Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Alston, William P. 1921-2009 A realist conception of truth Connaissance, Théorie de la Realisme (filosofie) gtt Réalisme Vérité Waarheid gtt Knowledge, Theory of Realism Truth Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139710-1 (DE-588)4064314-1 |
| title | A realist conception of truth |
| title_auth | A realist conception of truth |
| title_exact_search | A realist conception of truth |
| title_full | A realist conception of truth William P. Alston |
| title_fullStr | A realist conception of truth William P. Alston |
| title_full_unstemmed | A realist conception of truth William P. Alston |
| title_short | A realist conception of truth |
| title_sort | a realist conception of truth |
| topic | Connaissance, Théorie de la Realisme (filosofie) gtt Réalisme Vérité Waarheid gtt Knowledge, Theory of Realism Truth Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Connaissance, Théorie de la Realisme (filosofie) Réalisme Vérité Waarheid Knowledge, Theory of Realism Truth Realismus Philosophie Wahrheit |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alstonwilliamp arealistconceptionoftruth |