Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Louvain-la-Neuve
1995
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper
9519 |
| Beschreibung: | 10 S. |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV010435270 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 951019s1995 |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)632594405 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV010435270 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-384 | ||
| 084 | |a QB 910 |0 (DE-625)141231: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Lambson, Val E. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle |c Val E. Lambson |
| 264 | 1 | |a Louvain-la-Neuve |c 1995 | |
| 300 | |a 10 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper |v 9519 | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper |v 9519 |w (DE-604)BV007930339 |9 9519 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006953852 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804124868237590528 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Lambson, Val E. |
| author_facet | Lambson, Val E. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Lambson, Val E. |
| author_variant | v e l ve vel |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV010435270 |
| classification_rvk | QB 910 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)632594405 (DE-599)BVBBV010435270 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00956nam a2200277 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV010435270</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">951019s1995 |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)632594405</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV010435270</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QB 910</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141231:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lambson, Val E.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle</subfield><subfield code="c">Val E. Lambson</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Louvain-la-Neuve</subfield><subfield code="c">1995</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper</subfield><subfield code="v">9519</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper</subfield><subfield code="v">9519</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV007930339</subfield><subfield code="9">9519</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006953852</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV010435270 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:52:30Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006953852 |
| oclc_num | 632594405 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 |
| physical | 10 S. |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper |
| series2 | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper |
| spelling | Lambson, Val E. Verfasser aut Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle Val E. Lambson Louvain-la-Neuve 1995 10 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper 9519 Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper 9519 (DE-604)BV007930339 9519 |
| spellingShingle | Lambson, Val E. Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain>: Discussion paper |
| title | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle |
| title_auth | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle |
| title_exact_search | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle |
| title_full | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle Val E. Lambson |
| title_fullStr | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle Val E. Lambson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle Val E. Lambson |
| title_short | Optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle |
| title_sort | optimal penal codes in stochastic bertrand games and collusion over the business cycle |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV007930339 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lambsonvale optimalpenalcodesinstochasticbertrandgamesandcollusionoverthebusinesscycle |