Projective probability:
This book presents a novel theory of probability and judgements of probability: strong coherentist subjectivism. James Logue combines three claims in his exposition of this theory. The first states that probabilities may be treated as the degrees of partial belief of (ideally rational) agents, best-...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Clarendon Press
1995
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Oxford philosophical monographs
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book presents a novel theory of probability and judgements of probability: strong coherentist subjectivism. James Logue combines three claims in his exposition of this theory. The first states that probabilities may be treated as the degrees of partial belief of (ideally rational) agents, best-established by the examination of behaviour. Thus, probability is personalist. The second claim contends that only such degrees of belief can be construed as probabilities: on this strongly subjectivist view the notion of objective chance is, if not conceptually impossible, at any rate redundant. The third, coherentist, claim maintains that minimal coherence of probability-beliefs is all that is necessary for those beliefs to be rational; on this view, weak coherence of a set of beliefs is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the rationality of those beliefs. |
| Beschreibung: | Teilw. zugl.: Oxford, Univ., Diss., 1989 |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 171 S. |
| ISBN: | 0198239599 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a This book presents a novel theory of probability and judgements of probability: strong coherentist subjectivism. James Logue combines three claims in his exposition of this theory. The first states that probabilities may be treated as the degrees of partial belief of (ideally rational) agents, best-established by the examination of behaviour. Thus, probability is personalist. The second claim contends that only such degrees of belief can be construed as probabilities: on this strongly subjectivist view the notion of objective chance is, if not conceptually impossible, at any rate redundant. The third, coherentist, claim maintains that minimal coherence of probability-beliefs is all that is necessary for those beliefs to be rational; on this view, weak coherence of a set of beliefs is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the rationality of those beliefs. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804124780803129344 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Logue, James |
| author_facet | Logue, James |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Logue, James |
| author_variant | j l jl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV010356677 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | BC141 |
| callnumber-raw | BC141 |
| callnumber-search | BC141 |
| callnumber-sort | BC 3141 |
| callnumber-subject | BC - Logic |
| classification_rvk | CC 3300 CC 4400 SG 700 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)31243126 (DE-599)BVBBV010356677 |
| dewey-full | 121/.63 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121/.63 |
| dewey-search | 121/.63 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 263 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Mathematik Philosophie |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV010356677 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:51:07Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0198239599 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006895274 |
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| physical | XII, 171 S. |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| publisher | Clarendon Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Oxford philosophical monographs |
| spelling | Logue, James Verfasser aut Projective probability James Logue Oxford Clarendon Press 1995 XII, 171 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Oxford philosophical monographs Teilw. zugl.: Oxford, Univ., Diss., 1989 This book presents a novel theory of probability and judgements of probability: strong coherentist subjectivism. James Logue combines three claims in his exposition of this theory. The first states that probabilities may be treated as the degrees of partial belief of (ideally rational) agents, best-established by the examination of behaviour. Thus, probability is personalist. The second claim contends that only such degrees of belief can be construed as probabilities: on this strongly subjectivist view the notion of objective chance is, if not conceptually impossible, at any rate redundant. The third, coherentist, claim maintains that minimal coherence of probability-beliefs is all that is necessary for those beliefs to be rational; on this view, weak coherence of a set of beliefs is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the rationality of those beliefs. Logic Probabilities Realism Subjectivity Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd rswk-swf Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie (DE-588)4079013-7 gnd rswk-swf Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 s Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 s DE-604 Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie (DE-588)4079013-7 s |
| spellingShingle | Logue, James Projective probability Logic Probabilities Realism Subjectivity Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie (DE-588)4079013-7 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4137007-7 (DE-588)4079013-7 (DE-588)4045791-6 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Projective probability |
| title_auth | Projective probability |
| title_exact_search | Projective probability |
| title_full | Projective probability James Logue |
| title_fullStr | Projective probability James Logue |
| title_full_unstemmed | Projective probability James Logue |
| title_short | Projective probability |
| title_sort | projective probability |
| topic | Logic Probabilities Realism Subjectivity Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie (DE-588)4079013-7 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Logic Probabilities Realism Subjectivity Wahrscheinlichkeit Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie Philosophie Hochschulschrift |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT loguejames projectiveprobability |