Korean arms control: political military strategies, studies, and games
This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections re...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
Rand
1994
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Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula),the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other. |
Beschreibung: | XIII, 178 S. |
ISBN: | 0833015893 |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula),the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other. | |
650 | 4 | |a Arms control |z Korea | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Darilek, Richard E. Wendt, James C. |
author_facet | Darilek, Richard E. Wendt, James C. |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Darilek, Richard E. |
author_variant | r e d re red j c w jc jcw |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV010262212 |
callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
callnumber-label | JX1974 |
callnumber-raw | JX1974 |
callnumber-search | JX1974 |
callnumber-sort | JX 41974 |
callnumber-subject | JX - International Law |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)31168518 (DE-599)BVBBV010262212 |
dewey-full | 327.1/74/09519 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
dewey-raw | 327.1/74/09519 |
dewey-search | 327.1/74/09519 |
dewey-sort | 3327.1 274 49519 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
format | Book |
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geographic | Korea (DE-588)4032466-7 gnd |
geographic_facet | Korea |
id | DE-604.BV010262212 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:49:26Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0833015893 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006825481 |
oclc_num | 31168518 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-83 |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-83 |
physical | XIII, 178 S. |
publishDate | 1994 |
publishDateSearch | 1994 |
publishDateSort | 1994 |
publisher | Rand |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Darilek, Richard E. Verfasser aut Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games Richard E. Darilek, James C. Wendt Santa Monica, Calif. Rand 1994 XIII, 178 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula),the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other. Arms control Korea Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd rswk-swf Korea (DE-588)4032466-7 gnd rswk-swf Korea (DE-588)4032466-7 g Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 s DE-604 Wendt, James C. Verfasser aut |
spellingShingle | Darilek, Richard E. Wendt, James C. Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games Arms control Korea Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4115804-0 (DE-588)4032466-7 |
title | Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games |
title_auth | Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games |
title_exact_search | Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games |
title_full | Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games Richard E. Darilek, James C. Wendt |
title_fullStr | Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games Richard E. Darilek, James C. Wendt |
title_full_unstemmed | Korean arms control political military strategies, studies, and games Richard E. Darilek, James C. Wendt |
title_short | Korean arms control |
title_sort | korean arms control political military strategies studies and games |
title_sub | political military strategies, studies, and games |
topic | Arms control Korea Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Arms control Korea Rüstungsbegrenzung Korea |
work_keys_str_mv | AT darilekricharde koreanarmscontrolpoliticalmilitarystrategiesstudiesandgames AT wendtjamesc koreanarmscontrolpoliticalmilitarystrategiesstudiesandgames |