Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions:
A fiscal program that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favorable shock to regions hit by an unfavorable one. Centralized fiscal redistribution has therefore been advocated as a way to insure individuals against region-spec...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1995
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
4992 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | A fiscal program that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favorable shock to regions hit by an unfavorable one. Centralized fiscal redistribution has therefore been advocated as a way to insure individuals against region-specific shocks. In this paper, we argue that a centralized fiscal policy, while reducing the uncertainty on the tax base, creates uncertainty on the tax rate. This occurs because regions hit by different shocks have contrasting interests on the choice of the policy instrument. Using a simple model with two regions and linear taxes, we show that the higher uncertainty on the policy instrument might more than offset the lower uncertainty on the tax base, thus making a majority of agents in each region worse off in a centralized regime. The model is a special case of a more general idea. Heterogeneous entities can reap numerous advantages from integration: mutual insurance (on which we focus), economies of scale, more bargaining power are only a few of them. However, at the same time the same process of integration can increase the unpredictability of any endogenous policy, because more diverse entities participate in the decision-making process, and therefore the opportunities for disagreement increase. In principle, this second effect might offset the advantages of integration. |
| Beschreibung: | 24 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a NBER working paper series |v 4992 | |
| 520 | |a A fiscal program that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favorable shock to regions hit by an unfavorable one. Centralized fiscal redistribution has therefore been advocated as a way to insure individuals against region-specific shocks. In this paper, we argue that a centralized fiscal policy, while reducing the uncertainty on the tax base, creates uncertainty on the tax rate. This occurs because regions hit by different shocks have contrasting interests on the choice of the policy instrument. Using a simple model with two regions and linear taxes, we show that the higher uncertainty on the policy instrument might more than offset the lower uncertainty on the tax base, thus making a majority of agents in each region worse off in a centralized regime. The model is a special case of a more general idea. Heterogeneous entities can reap numerous advantages from integration: mutual insurance (on which we focus), economies of scale, more bargaining power are only a few of them. However, at the same time the same process of integration can increase the unpredictability of any endogenous policy, because more diverse entities participate in the decision-making process, and therefore the opportunities for disagreement increase. In principle, this second effect might offset the advantages of integration. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Fiscal policy |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Risk |x Econometric models | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Perotti, Roberto |d 1961- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128379669 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Perotti, Roberto 1961- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)125845804 (DE-588)128379669 |
| author_facet | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Perotti, Roberto 1961- |
| author_role | aut aut |
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| bvnumber | BV010132558 |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)32974653 (DE-599)BVBBV010132558 |
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| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330.072 |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV010132558 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:47:05Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006729779 |
| oclc_num | 32974653 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-20 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-20 |
| physical | 24 S. graph. Darst. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | NBER working paper series |
| series2 | NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti Cambridge, Mass. 1995 24 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper series 4992 A fiscal program that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favorable shock to regions hit by an unfavorable one. Centralized fiscal redistribution has therefore been advocated as a way to insure individuals against region-specific shocks. In this paper, we argue that a centralized fiscal policy, while reducing the uncertainty on the tax base, creates uncertainty on the tax rate. This occurs because regions hit by different shocks have contrasting interests on the choice of the policy instrument. Using a simple model with two regions and linear taxes, we show that the higher uncertainty on the policy instrument might more than offset the lower uncertainty on the tax base, thus making a majority of agents in each region worse off in a centralized regime. The model is a special case of a more general idea. Heterogeneous entities can reap numerous advantages from integration: mutual insurance (on which we focus), economies of scale, more bargaining power are only a few of them. However, at the same time the same process of integration can increase the unpredictability of any endogenous policy, because more diverse entities participate in the decision-making process, and therefore the opportunities for disagreement increase. In principle, this second effect might offset the advantages of integration. Ökonometrisches Modell Fiscal policy Econometric models Risk Econometric models Perotti, Roberto 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)128379669 aut NBER working paper series 4992 (DE-604)BV002801238 4992 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2685 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Perotti, Roberto 1961- Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Fiscal policy Econometric models Risk Econometric models |
| title | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions |
| title_auth | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions |
| title_exact_search | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions |
| title_full | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti |
| title_fullStr | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti |
| title_full_unstemmed | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti |
| title_short | Economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions |
| title_sort | economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Fiscal policy Econometric models Risk Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Fiscal policy Econometric models Risk Econometric models |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2685 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alesinaalberto economicriskandpoliticalriskinfiscalunions AT perottiroberto economicriskandpoliticalriskinfiscalunions |