Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations: an application to the Urugay Round
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | German |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Kiel
Wiss.-Verl. Vauk
1995
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | X, 139 S. |
| ISBN: | 381750215X |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations |b an application to the Urugay Round |c by Philip Lynn Kennedy |
| 264 | 1 | |a Kiel |b Wiss.-Verl. Vauk |c 1995 | |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES V
LIST OF FIGURES X
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY 6
2.1 Review of the Literature *
2.2 The Theoretical Framework 9
CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS I7
3.1 Overview of the MISS Model 17
3.2 Notation Used in the MISS Model 17
3.3 Description of the MISS Model I8
3.4 Data and Model Specification 21
3.4.1 Quantity Data 21
3.4.2 Policies, Prices, and Protection Levels 26
3.4.3 Elasticities 27
3.5 Political Payoff Function Weight Estimation 3S
CHAPTER FOUR: GAME SIMULATIONS USING BASE PERIOD EXCHANGE RATES . 39
4.1 Game Theory 4.2 Game One 41
4.3 Game Two 45
4.4 Game Three 49
4.5 Game Four CHAPTER FIVE: GAME SIMULATIONS USING EXCHANGE RATE VARIATIONS 57
5.1 Trade Negotiations and the Exchange Rate 57
5.2 Game One 61
5.3 Game Two 61
5.4 Game Three 73
5.5 Game Four CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 85
ft 5
6 .1 Summary 86
6.1.1 Games Using Base Period Exchange Rates 88
6.1.2 Games Using Exchange Rate Variations 6.2 Conclusions 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY 96
APPENDIX "
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.4.1 Quantity Data for Base Years 1986 and 1990 22
Table 3.4.2 Summary of Protection Coefficients 28
Table 3.4.3 EC Producer Protection Coefficients, 1990 29
Table 3.4.4 EC Consumer Protection Coefficients, 1990 30
Table 3.4.5 US Producer Protection Coefficients, 1990 31
Table 3.4.6 US Consumer Protection Coefficients, 1990 32
Table 3.4.7 Summary of Elasticities 33
Table 3.5.1 Political Payoff Function Weights and Their
Ranking by Interest Group for the US and the
EC, Based on 1986 Data 37
Table 3.5.2 Political Payoff Function Weights and Their
Ranking by Interest Group for the US and the
EC, Based on 1990 Data 37
Table 4.2.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1986 weights 43
Table 4.2.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1990 weights 43
Table 4.2.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1986 weights 44
Table 4.2.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1990 weights 44
Table 4.3.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1986 weights 49
Table 4.3.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1990 weights 49
Table 4.3.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1986 weights 50
Table 4.3.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1990 weights 50
Table 4.4.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with 1986 data
and 1986 weights 52
Table 4.4.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with 1986 data
and 1990 weights 52
Table 4.4.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with 1990 data
and 1986 weights 53
v
Table 4.4.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with 1990 data
and 1990 weights 53
Table 4.5.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1986 weights .55
Table 4.5.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1990 weights 55
Table 4.5.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1986 weights 56
Table 4.5.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Protection Reductions with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1990 weights 56
Table 5.2.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 63
Table 5.2.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU = 1.39 us\$ 63
Table 5.2.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 64
Table 5.2.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 64
Table 5.2.5 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 US\$ 65
Table 5.2.6 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 US\$ 65
Table 5.2.7 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 US\$ 66
Table 5.2.8 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 US\$ 66
Table 5.3.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 69
Table 5.3.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 69
vi
Table 5.3.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 70
Table 5.3.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 USS 70
Table 5.3.5 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 US\$ 71
Table 5.3.6 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 USS 71
Table 5.3.7 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 US\$ 72
Table 5.3.8 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 US\$ 72
Table 5.4.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU =1.39 USS 74
Table 5.4.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU =1.39 USS 74
Table 5.4.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU = 1.39 USS 75
Table 5.4.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU = 1.39 USS 75
Table 5.4.5 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 USS 76
Table 5.4.6 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1986 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 USS 76
Table 5.4.7 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1986 weights, 1 ECU = 0.76 USS 77
Table 5.4.8 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with 1990 data
and 1990 weights, 1 ECU =0.76 USS 77
vii
Table 5.5.1 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 80
Table 5.5.2 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 80
Table 5.5.3 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 81
Table 5.5.4 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =1.39 US\$ 81
Table 5.5.5 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU = 0.76 US\$ 82
Table 5.5.6 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1986 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 US\$ 82
Table 5.5.7 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1986 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 USS 83
Table 5.5.8 Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative
US and EC Trade Liberalizations with Budget
Compensation using 1990 data and 1990 weights,
1 ECU =0.76 US\$ 83
Table 6.1.1 Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Simulations
Conducted in Games One and Two Using Actual
Exchange Rates 87
Table 6.1.2 Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Simulations
Conducted in Games Three and Four Using Actual
97
Exchange Rates Table 6.1.3 Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Simulations
Conducted in Games One and Two with a
89
Revaluation of the Dollar Table 6.1.4 Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Simulations
Conducted in Games One and Two with a
Devaluation of the Dollar Table 6.1.5 Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Simulations
Conducted in Games Three and Four with a
92
Revaluation of the Dollar viii
Table 6.1.6 Nash Equilibrium Solutions to simulations
Conducted in Games Three and Four with a
Devaluation of the Dollar 92
Appendix 4.1.1 Percent Change in World Prices for 1986
Simulations. Games One and Two 101
Appendix 4.1.2 Percent change in World Prices for 1990
Simulations. Games One and Two 102
Appendix 4.1.3 Percent change in World Prices for 1986
Simulations. Games Three and Four 103
Appendix 4.1.4 Percent Change in World Prices for 1990
Simulations. Games Three and Four 104
Appendix 4.2.1 1986 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings measured in Million
ECU'S. Game One, No Budget Compensation 105
Appendix 4.2.2 1990 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings measured in Million
ECU'S. Game One, No Budget Compensation 107
Appendix 4.2.3 1986 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings measured in Million
ECU'S. Game Three, No Budget Compensation 109
Appendix 4.2.4 1990 changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings measured in Million
ecu's. Game Three, No Budget Compensation Ill
Appendix 5.1.1 Percent Change in World Prices for 1986
Simulations with a Devaluation of the Dollar,
Games One and Two 113
Appendix 5.1.2 Percent Change in World Prices for 1990
Simulations with a Devaluation of the Dollar,
Games One and Two 114
Appendix 5.1.3 Percent Change in World Prices for 1986
Simulations with a Revaluation of the Dollar,
Games One and Two 115
Appendix 5.1.4 Percent change in World Prices for 1990
Simulations with a Revaluation of the Dollar,
Games One and Two 116
Appendix 5.1.5 Percent change in World Prices for 1986
Simulations with a Devaluation of the Dollar,
Games Three and Four 117
Appendix 5.1.6 Percent Change in World Prices for 1990
Simulations with a Devaluation of the Dollar,
Games Three and Four 118
Appendix 5.1.7 Percent Change in World Prices for 1986
Simulations with a Revaluation of the Dollar,
Games Three and Four 119
Appendix 5.1.8 Percent Change in World Prices for 1990
Simulations with a Revaluation of the Dollar,
Games Three and Four 120
ix
Appendix 5.2.1 1986 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Devaluation of
the Dollar. Game One, No Budget Compensation 121
Appendix 5.2.2 1990 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Devaluation of
the Dollar. Game One, No Budget Compensation 123
Appendix 5.2.3 1986 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Revaluation of
the Dollar. Game One, No Budget Compensation 125
Appendix 5.2.4 1990 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Revaluation of
the Dollar. Game One, No Budget Compensation 127
Appendix 5.2.5 1986 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Devaluation of
the Dollar. Game Three, No Budget Compensation . 129
Appendix 5.2.6 1990 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Devaluation of
the Dollar. Game Three, No Budget Compensation . 131
Appendix 5.2.7 1986 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Revaluation of
the Dollar. Game Three, No Budget Compensation . 133
Appendix 5.2.8 1990 Changes in Producer Quasi Rents, Consumer
Utility and Budget Savings with a Revaluation of
the Dollar. Game Three, No Budget Compensation . 135
Appendix 5.3.1 Percent Change in Domestic Prices and Quantities
Resulting from a Revaluation of the Dollar.
1986 Data with Status Quo Policies 137
Appendix 5.3.2 Percent Change in Domestic Prices and Quantities
Resulting from a Devaluation of the Dollar.
1986 Data with Status Quo Policies 138
Appendix 5.3.3 Percent change in Domestic Prices and Quantities
Resulting from a Revaluation of the Dollar.
1990 Data with Status Quo Policies 139
Appendix 5.3.4 Percent Change in Domestic Prices and Quantities
Resulting from a Devaluation of the Dollar.
1990 Data with Status Quo Policies 140
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.3.1 Budget Compensation, An Example Figure 5.1.1 Trade Liberalization Given Exchange Rate
Fluctuations, An Example Using An Export
Commodity •
x |
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| author | Kennedy, Philip Lynn |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| geographic | USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV010072367 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-02T09:06:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 381750215X |
| language | German |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006684891 |
| oclc_num | 612961190 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 DE-739 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-521 DE-11 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-739 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-521 DE-11 DE-188 |
| physical | X, 139 S. |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| publisher | Wiss.-Verl. Vauk |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Kennedy, Philip Lynn Verfasser (DE-588)128806036 aut Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round by Philip Lynn Kennedy Kiel Wiss.-Verl. Vauk 1995 X, 139 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zugl.: Diss. Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (DE-588)605909-0 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Simulation (DE-588)4055072-2 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd rswk-swf Handelsabkommen (DE-588)4158980-4 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (DE-588)605909-0 f DE-604 USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 s Simulation (DE-588)4055072-2 s Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Handelsabkommen (DE-588)4158980-4 s HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006684891&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Kennedy, Philip Lynn Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (DE-588)605909-0 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Simulation (DE-588)4055072-2 gnd Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd Handelsabkommen (DE-588)4158980-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)605909-0 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4055072-2 (DE-588)4062875-9 (DE-588)4158980-4 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round |
| title_auth | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round |
| title_exact_search | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round |
| title_full | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round by Philip Lynn Kennedy |
| title_fullStr | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round by Philip Lynn Kennedy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the Urugay Round by Philip Lynn Kennedy |
| title_short | Game theory in multilateral trade negotiations |
| title_sort | game theory in multilateral trade negotiations an application to the urugay round |
| title_sub | an application to the Urugay Round |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (DE-588)605909-0 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Simulation (DE-588)4055072-2 gnd Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd Handelsabkommen (DE-588)4158980-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Spieltheorie Simulation Verhandlung Handelsabkommen USA Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006684891&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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