The welfare state and competitiveness:
In all modern industrial countries, redistributive expenditures are a larger component of the government budget than consumption of goods and services. In this paper, we use a general equilibrium, two- country model with exportables, importables and nontradables to study redistribution across differ...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1994
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
4810 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In all modern industrial countries, redistributive expenditures are a larger component of the government budget than consumption of goods and services. In this paper, we use a general equilibrium, two- country model with exportables, importables and nontradables to study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. We show that an increase in transfers to, say, retirees, financed by distortionary taxation, can generate a loss of competitiveness (defined as an increase in relative unit labor costs for tradable goods), an appreciation of the relative price of nontradables, and a decrease in employment in all sectors of the domestic economy. The same qualitative effects would also obtain in the case of an increase in transfers towards the unemployed even if financed by non-distortionary taxation. Moreover, all these effects of labor taxation depend in a nonlinear way on the degree of centralization of the wage setting process in the labor market. We then estimate the effects of labor taxation on unit labor costs and the relative price of nontradables in a sample of 14 OECD countries. We find considerable empirical support for the model. |
| Beschreibung: | 49 S. |
Internformat
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| 520 | |a In all modern industrial countries, redistributive expenditures are a larger component of the government budget than consumption of goods and services. In this paper, we use a general equilibrium, two- country model with exportables, importables and nontradables to study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. We show that an increase in transfers to, say, retirees, financed by distortionary taxation, can generate a loss of competitiveness (defined as an increase in relative unit labor costs for tradable goods), an appreciation of the relative price of nontradables, and a decrease in employment in all sectors of the domestic economy. The same qualitative effects would also obtain in the case of an increase in transfers towards the unemployed even if financed by non-distortionary taxation. Moreover, all these effects of labor taxation depend in a nonlinear way on the degree of centralization of the wage setting process in the labor market. We then estimate the effects of labor taxation on unit labor costs and the relative price of nontradables in a sample of 14 OECD countries. We find considerable empirical support for the model. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Transfer payments |x Costs | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Transfer payments |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Wages |x Econometric models | |
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| id | DE-604.BV009904098 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:42:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006559238 |
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| physical | 49 S. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 1994 |
| publishDateSearch | 1994 |
| publishDateSort | 1994 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | NBER working paper series |
| series2 | NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut The welfare state and competitiveness Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti Cambridge, Mass. 1994 49 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper series 4810 In all modern industrial countries, redistributive expenditures are a larger component of the government budget than consumption of goods and services. In this paper, we use a general equilibrium, two- country model with exportables, importables and nontradables to study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. We show that an increase in transfers to, say, retirees, financed by distortionary taxation, can generate a loss of competitiveness (defined as an increase in relative unit labor costs for tradable goods), an appreciation of the relative price of nontradables, and a decrease in employment in all sectors of the domestic economy. The same qualitative effects would also obtain in the case of an increase in transfers towards the unemployed even if financed by non-distortionary taxation. Moreover, all these effects of labor taxation depend in a nonlinear way on the degree of centralization of the wage setting process in the labor market. We then estimate the effects of labor taxation on unit labor costs and the relative price of nontradables in a sample of 14 OECD countries. We find considerable empirical support for the model. Herverdeling gtt Verzorgingsstaat gtt Ökonometrisches Modell Competition, International Fiscal policy Econometric models Transfer payments Costs Transfer payments Econometric models Wages Econometric models Perotti, Roberto 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)128379669 aut NBER working paper series 4810 (DE-604)BV002801238 4810 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2685 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Perotti, Roberto 1961- The welfare state and competitiveness NBER working paper series Herverdeling gtt Verzorgingsstaat gtt Ökonometrisches Modell Competition, International Fiscal policy Econometric models Transfer payments Costs Transfer payments Econometric models Wages Econometric models |
| title | The welfare state and competitiveness |
| title_auth | The welfare state and competitiveness |
| title_exact_search | The welfare state and competitiveness |
| title_full | The welfare state and competitiveness Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti |
| title_fullStr | The welfare state and competitiveness Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti |
| title_full_unstemmed | The welfare state and competitiveness Alberto Alesina ; Roberto Perotti |
| title_short | The welfare state and competitiveness |
| title_sort | the welfare state and competitiveness |
| topic | Herverdeling gtt Verzorgingsstaat gtt Ökonometrisches Modell Competition, International Fiscal policy Econometric models Transfer payments Costs Transfer payments Econometric models Wages Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Herverdeling Verzorgingsstaat Ökonometrisches Modell Competition, International Fiscal policy Econometric models Transfer payments Costs Transfer payments Econometric models Wages Econometric models |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2685 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alesinaalberto thewelfarestateandcompetitiveness AT perottiroberto thewelfarestateandcompetitiveness |