Innocence lost: an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing
Our lives are such that moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable for us. We have moral responsibilities to persons which may conflict and which it is wrong to violate even when they do conflict. Christopher W. Gowans argues that we must accept this conclusion if we are to make sense of our moral ex...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Oxford Univ. Press
1994
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Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | Our lives are such that moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable for us. We have moral responsibilities to persons which may conflict and which it is wrong to violate even when they do conflict. Christopher W. Gowans argues that we must accept this conclusion if we are to make sense of our moral experience and the way in which persons are valuable to us. In defending this position, he critically examines the recent moral dilemmas debate. He maintains that what is important in this debate is not whether there are irresolvable moral conflicts, but whether there are moral conflicts in which wrongdoing is unavoidable. Though it would be incoherent to conclude moral deliberation by deciding to perform incompatible actions, he argues that there is nothing incoherent in supposing that we have conflicting moral responsibilities. In this way, he shows that it is possible to capture the intuitions of those who have defended the idea of moral dilemmas while meeting the objections of those who have rejected this idea. Gowans carefully evaluates utilitarian and Kantian analyses of moral dilemmas. He argues that these approaches eliminate genuine moral conflict only by displacing persons as direct objects of moral concern. As an alternative, he develops a more concrete account in which moral responsibilities to persons are central. On his account, we have moral responsibilities to particular persons by virtue of our appreciation of the intrinsic and unique value of each of these persons and of our connections with them. Gowans argues that when we think of our responsibilities in this way, we have reason to believe that they sometimes conflict and that it is wrong to violate them even when they do conflict. The book also includes discussions of Melville's Billy Budd, methodology in moral philosophy, moral pluralism, moral tragedy, and "dirty hands" in politics. |
Beschreibung: | XIII, 257 S. |
ISBN: | 0195085175 |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a Our lives are such that moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable for us. We have moral responsibilities to persons which may conflict and which it is wrong to violate even when they do conflict. Christopher W. Gowans argues that we must accept this conclusion if we are to make sense of our moral experience and the way in which persons are valuable to us. In defending this position, he critically examines the recent moral dilemmas debate. He maintains that what is important in this debate is not whether there are irresolvable moral conflicts, but whether there are moral conflicts in which wrongdoing is unavoidable. Though it would be incoherent to conclude moral deliberation by deciding to perform incompatible actions, he argues that there is nothing incoherent in supposing that we have conflicting moral responsibilities. In this way, he shows that it is possible to capture the intuitions of those who have defended the idea of moral dilemmas while meeting the objections of those who have rejected this idea. Gowans carefully evaluates utilitarian and Kantian analyses of moral dilemmas. He argues that these approaches eliminate genuine moral conflict only by displacing persons as direct objects of moral concern. As an alternative, he develops a more concrete account in which moral responsibilities to persons are central. On his account, we have moral responsibilities to particular persons by virtue of our appreciation of the intrinsic and unique value of each of these persons and of our connections with them. Gowans argues that when we think of our responsibilities in this way, we have reason to believe that they sometimes conflict and that it is wrong to violate them even when they do conflict. The book also includes discussions of Melville's Billy Budd, methodology in moral philosophy, moral pluralism, moral tragedy, and "dirty hands" in politics. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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---|---|
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Gowans, Christopher W. |
author_GND | (DE-588)172102731 |
author_facet | Gowans, Christopher W. |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Gowans, Christopher W. |
author_variant | c w g cw cwg |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV009832851 |
callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-label | BJ1419 |
callnumber-raw | BJ1419 |
callnumber-search | BJ1419 |
callnumber-sort | BJ 41419 |
callnumber-subject | BJ - Ethics |
classification_rvk | CC 7200 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)28424407 (DE-599)BVBBV009832851 |
dewey-full | 170 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
dewey-raw | 170 |
dewey-search | 170 |
dewey-sort | 3170 |
dewey-tens | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Book |
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indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:06:19Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0195085175 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006510297 |
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physical | XIII, 257 S. |
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spelling | Gowans, Christopher W. Verfasser (DE-588)172102731 aut Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing Christopher W. Gowans New York Oxford Univ. Press 1994 XIII, 257 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Our lives are such that moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable for us. We have moral responsibilities to persons which may conflict and which it is wrong to violate even when they do conflict. Christopher W. Gowans argues that we must accept this conclusion if we are to make sense of our moral experience and the way in which persons are valuable to us. In defending this position, he critically examines the recent moral dilemmas debate. He maintains that what is important in this debate is not whether there are irresolvable moral conflicts, but whether there are moral conflicts in which wrongdoing is unavoidable. Though it would be incoherent to conclude moral deliberation by deciding to perform incompatible actions, he argues that there is nothing incoherent in supposing that we have conflicting moral responsibilities. In this way, he shows that it is possible to capture the intuitions of those who have defended the idea of moral dilemmas while meeting the objections of those who have rejected this idea. Gowans carefully evaluates utilitarian and Kantian analyses of moral dilemmas. He argues that these approaches eliminate genuine moral conflict only by displacing persons as direct objects of moral concern. As an alternative, he develops a more concrete account in which moral responsibilities to persons are central. On his account, we have moral responsibilities to particular persons by virtue of our appreciation of the intrinsic and unique value of each of these persons and of our connections with them. Gowans argues that when we think of our responsibilities in this way, we have reason to believe that they sometimes conflict and that it is wrong to violate them even when they do conflict. The book also includes discussions of Melville's Billy Budd, methodology in moral philosophy, moral pluralism, moral tragedy, and "dirty hands" in politics. Ethiek gtt Verantwoordelijkheid gtt Ethik Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 gnd rswk-swf Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 s Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 s DE-604 Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 s |
spellingShingle | Gowans, Christopher W. Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing Ethiek gtt Verantwoordelijkheid gtt Ethik Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 gnd Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4014904-3 (DE-588)4201195-4 (DE-588)4015602-3 (DE-588)4121202-2 |
title | Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing |
title_auth | Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing |
title_exact_search | Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing |
title_full | Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing Christopher W. Gowans |
title_fullStr | Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing Christopher W. Gowans |
title_full_unstemmed | Innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing Christopher W. Gowans |
title_short | Innocence lost |
title_sort | innocence lost an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing |
title_sub | an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing |
topic | Ethiek gtt Verantwoordelijkheid gtt Ethik Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 gnd Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd |
topic_facet | Ethiek Verantwoordelijkheid Ethik Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidung Dilemma Entscheidungsprozess |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gowanschristopherw innocencelostanexaminationofinescapablemoralwrongdoing |