Rationality and coordination:
This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behavior. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge u.a.
Cambridge Univ. Press
1993
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Publisher description Table of contents |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behavior. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of attaining coordination. The solution to coordination and cooperation is for agents to learn about each other. The author concludes that rationality must be supplemented by models of learning and by an evolutionary account of how social order (i.e., spontaneous coordinated behavior) can persist . This major new book will be of particular interest not only to philosophers but to decision theorists, political scientists, economists, and researchers in artificial intelligence |
| Beschreibung: | XIII, 270 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0521381231 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behavior. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise | |
| 520 | |a If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of attaining coordination. The solution to coordination and cooperation is for agents to learn about each other. The author concludes that rationality must be supplemented by models of learning and by an evolutionary account of how social order (i.e., spontaneous coordinated behavior) can persist | ||
| 520 | |a . This major new book will be of particular interest not only to philosophers but to decision theorists, political scientists, economists, and researchers in artificial intelligence | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804123935476809728 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Bicchieri, Cristina 1950- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)133874338 |
| author_facet | Bicchieri, Cristina 1950- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Bicchieri, Cristina 1950- |
| author_variant | c b cb |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV009593323 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB144 |
| callnumber-raw | HB144.B53 1993 |
| callnumber-search | HB144.B53 1993 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 3144 B53 41993 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| classification_rvk | CM 2500 MR 2200 QC 020 QH 430 |
| classification_tum | MAT 920f SOZ 260f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)27150238 (DE-599)BVBBV009593323 |
| dewey-full | 658.4/0320 658.4/03 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4/03 20 658.4/03 |
| dewey-search | 658.4/03 20 658.4/03 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4 13 220 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Soziologie Psychologie Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV009593323 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:37:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521381231 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006341327 |
| oclc_num | 27150238 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-384 DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-20 DE-521 DE-83 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-384 DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-20 DE-521 DE-83 DE-188 |
| physical | XIII, 270 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1993 |
| publishDateSearch | 1993 |
| publishDateSort | 1993 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory |
| spelling | Bicchieri, Cristina 1950- Verfasser (DE-588)133874338 aut Rationality and coordination Cristina Bicchieri 1. publ. Cambridge u.a. Cambridge Univ. Press 1993 XIII, 270 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behavior. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of attaining coordination. The solution to coordination and cooperation is for agents to learn about each other. The author concludes that rationality must be supplemented by models of learning and by an evolutionary account of how social order (i.e., spontaneous coordinated behavior) can persist . This major new book will be of particular interest not only to philosophers but to decision theorists, political scientists, economists, and researchers in artificial intelligence Coördinatie gtt Decisión - Teoría Equilibrio (Economía política) Groepsdynamica gtt Handelingstheorie gtt Rationaliteit gtt Speltheorie gtt Game theory Equilibrium Decision making Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd rswk-swf Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 gnd rswk-swf Gleichgewichtspunkt Spieltheorie (DE-588)4213477-8 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit (DE-588)4070864-0 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 s DE-604 Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit (DE-588)4070864-0 s Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 s Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 s DE-188 Gleichgewichtspunkt Spieltheorie (DE-588)4213477-8 s http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam025/92041219.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/92041219.html Table of contents |
| spellingShingle | Bicchieri, Cristina 1950- Rationality and coordination Coördinatie gtt Decisión - Teoría Equilibrio (Economía política) Groepsdynamica gtt Handelingstheorie gtt Rationaliteit gtt Speltheorie gtt Game theory Equilibrium Decision making Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 gnd Gleichgewichtspunkt Spieltheorie (DE-588)4213477-8 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit (DE-588)4070864-0 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4121202-2 (DE-588)4121553-9 (DE-588)4213477-8 (DE-588)4138606-1 (DE-588)4070864-0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Rationality and coordination |
| title_auth | Rationality and coordination |
| title_exact_search | Rationality and coordination |
| title_full | Rationality and coordination Cristina Bicchieri |
| title_fullStr | Rationality and coordination Cristina Bicchieri |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rationality and coordination Cristina Bicchieri |
| title_short | Rationality and coordination |
| title_sort | rationality and coordination |
| topic | Coördinatie gtt Decisión - Teoría Equilibrio (Economía política) Groepsdynamica gtt Handelingstheorie gtt Rationaliteit gtt Speltheorie gtt Game theory Equilibrium Decision making Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 gnd Gleichgewichtspunkt Spieltheorie (DE-588)4213477-8 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit (DE-588)4070864-0 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Coördinatie Decisión - Teoría Equilibrio (Economía política) Groepsdynamica Handelingstheorie Rationaliteit Speltheorie Game theory Equilibrium Decision making Entscheidungsprozess Rationale Erwartung Gleichgewichtspunkt Spieltheorie Entscheidungstheorie Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit Spieltheorie |
| url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam025/92041219.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/92041219.html |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bicchiericristina rationalityandcoordination |