Information and economic efficiency:
Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the oth...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1993
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Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
4533 |
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the government can do that the market cannot. |
Beschreibung: | 16 S. |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Information and economic efficiency |c Richard Arnott ; Bruce Greenwald ; Joseph E. Stiglitz |
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490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 4533 | |
520 | |a Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the government can do that the market cannot. | ||
650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
650 | 4 | |a Equilibrium (Economics) | |
650 | 4 | |a Welfare economics |x Mathematical models | |
700 | 1 | |a Greenwald, Bruce C. N. |d 1946- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128423714 |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Stiglitz, Joseph E. |d 1943- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)120068524 |4 aut | |
830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 4533 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 4533 | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-005936386 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Arnott, Richard 1949- Greenwald, Bruce C. N. 1946- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1943- |
author_GND | (DE-588)115055746 (DE-588)128423714 (DE-588)120068524 |
author_facet | Arnott, Richard 1949- Greenwald, Bruce C. N. 1946- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1943- |
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id | DE-604.BV008986566 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:28:00Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-005936386 |
oclc_num | 29579893 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
physical | 16 S. |
publishDate | 1993 |
publishDateSearch | 1993 |
publishDateSort | 1993 |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Arnott, Richard 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)115055746 aut Information and economic efficiency Richard Arnott ; Bruce Greenwald ; Joseph E. Stiglitz Cambridge, Mass. 1993 16 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 4533 Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the government can do that the market cannot. Mathematisches Modell Equilibrium (Economics) Welfare economics Mathematical models Greenwald, Bruce C. N. 1946- Verfasser (DE-588)128423714 aut Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1943- Verfasser (DE-588)120068524 aut National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 4533 (DE-604)BV002801238 4533 |
spellingShingle | Arnott, Richard 1949- Greenwald, Bruce C. N. 1946- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1943- Information and economic efficiency National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Mathematisches Modell Equilibrium (Economics) Welfare economics Mathematical models |
title | Information and economic efficiency |
title_auth | Information and economic efficiency |
title_exact_search | Information and economic efficiency |
title_full | Information and economic efficiency Richard Arnott ; Bruce Greenwald ; Joseph E. Stiglitz |
title_fullStr | Information and economic efficiency Richard Arnott ; Bruce Greenwald ; Joseph E. Stiglitz |
title_full_unstemmed | Information and economic efficiency Richard Arnott ; Bruce Greenwald ; Joseph E. Stiglitz |
title_short | Information and economic efficiency |
title_sort | information and economic efficiency |
topic | Mathematisches Modell Equilibrium (Economics) Welfare economics Mathematical models |
topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Equilibrium (Economics) Welfare economics Mathematical models |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT arnottrichard informationandeconomicefficiency AT greenwaldbrucecn informationandeconomicefficiency AT stiglitzjosephe informationandeconomicefficiency |