Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game:
The goal of this paper is to explore the possibility that the costs and benefits of legal representation are structured so that each individual party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility .of b...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, MA
1993
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| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
4447 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | The goal of this paper is to explore the possibility that the costs and benefits of legal representation are structured so that each individual party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility .of being exploited. The first part of the paper shows how the structure of the incentives faced by the parties may be estimated, and the second describes the results of empirical tests in several different settings. The empirical results strongly suggest that the parties do face "prisoner's dilemma" incentives, although no attempt is made to determine whether the parties respond to these interviews. |
| Beschreibung: | 30 S. graph. Darst. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 4447 | |
| 520 | |a The goal of this paper is to explore the possibility that the costs and benefits of legal representation are structured so that each individual party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility .of being exploited. The first part of the paper shows how the structure of the incentives faced by the parties may be estimated, and the second describes the results of empirical tests in several different settings. The empirical results strongly suggest that the parties do face "prisoner's dilemma" incentives, although no attempt is made to determine whether the parties respond to these interviews. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Choice (Psychology) |x Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Lawyers |x Supply and demand |x Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Prisoner's dilemma game |x Mathematical models | |
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| id | DE-604.BV008409685 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:19:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-005539301 |
| oclc_num | 29189675 |
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| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 30 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1993 |
| publishDateSearch | 1993 |
| publishDateSort | 1993 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Verfasser (DE-588)124081886 aut Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game Orley Ashenfelter ; David Bloom Cambridge, MA 1993 30 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 4447 The goal of this paper is to explore the possibility that the costs and benefits of legal representation are structured so that each individual party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility .of being exploited. The first part of the paper shows how the structure of the incentives faced by the parties may be estimated, and the second describes the results of empirical tests in several different settings. The empirical results strongly suggest that the parties do face "prisoner's dilemma" incentives, although no attempt is made to determine whether the parties respond to these interviews. Mathematisches Modell Choice (Psychology) Mathematical models Lawyers Supply and demand Mathematical models Prisoner's dilemma game Mathematical models Bloom, David E. 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)129360104 aut National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 4447 (DE-604)BV002801238 4447 |
| spellingShingle | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Bloom, David E. 1955- Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Mathematisches Modell Choice (Psychology) Mathematical models Lawyers Supply and demand Mathematical models Prisoner's dilemma game Mathematical models |
| title | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game |
| title_auth | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game |
| title_exact_search | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game |
| title_full | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game Orley Ashenfelter ; David Bloom |
| title_fullStr | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game Orley Ashenfelter ; David Bloom |
| title_full_unstemmed | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game Orley Ashenfelter ; David Bloom |
| title_short | Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game |
| title_sort | lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner s dilemma game |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Choice (Psychology) Mathematical models Lawyers Supply and demand Mathematical models Prisoner's dilemma game Mathematical models |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Choice (Psychology) Mathematical models Lawyers Supply and demand Mathematical models Prisoner's dilemma game Mathematical models |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ashenfelterorley lawyersasagentsofthedevilinaprisonersdilemmagame AT bloomdavide lawyersasagentsofthedevilinaprisonersdilemmagame |