The Fateful Pebble explores the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as a catalyst that helped trigger the first extraordinary political event of the 20th century, the self-generated collapse of the Soviet empire. At the dawn of the 1980s decade, the Soviet military machine seemed invincible and Moscow'...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Arnold, Anthony (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Novato, Calif. Presidio 1993
Schlagworte:	Geschichte Außenpolitik Aufklärung Afghanistan-Konflikt > 1979-1989 Sowjetunion Afghanistan > Foreign relations > Soviet Union Afghanistan > History > Soviet occupation, 1979-1989 Soviet Union > Foreign relations > 1945-1991 Soviet Union > Foreign relations > Afghanistan Afghanistan
Zusammenfassung:	The Fateful Pebble explores the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as a catalyst that helped trigger the first extraordinary political event of the 20th century, the self-generated collapse of the Soviet empire. At the dawn of the 1980s decade, the Soviet military machine seemed invincible and Moscow's expansionist designs unswervable. Intermediate-range SS-20 missiles were intimidating Western Europe, the Soviet ICBM force was at least the equal of America's, and, with the invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the Kremlin showed its willingness to project its power directly into a neighboring nonaligned country. But nearly ten years later, the last Soviet army regular units withdrew into Central Asia without ever having conquered the elusive Afghan resistance fighters who had spontaneously risen up against them. Less than three years after that retreat, the Soviet Union itself had ceased to exist. The early chapters provide unique perceptions of Russian and Afghan psychology, a historical view of how military defeat had led to earlier Russian domestic upheavals, and a description of how the Communist Party apparat, the Soviet military establishment, and the KGB had successfully defended Moscow's empire in the past. The details of the consecutive failure of each of these institutions to solve Moscow's "Afghanistan problem" show how the authority of each was seriously undermined at home and abroad. Each, as it lost its prestige with the public and its own middle-grade officers. Internally splintered, no longer mutually supportive, and resting on an eroding foundation of war-weakened public confidence, eventually the three institutions collapsed, together with the regime they supported. The book illustrates how the KGB in
Beschreibung:	XIV, 225 S. Kt.
ISBN:	0891414614