Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance:
This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, MA
1993
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
4381 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation? |
| Beschreibung: | 45 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV008269628 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20030915 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 931013s1993 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)28621137 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV008269628 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-19 |a DE-521 |a DE-188 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
| 084 | |a QX 600 |0 (DE-625)142184: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Atkeson, Andrew |d 1961- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128378166 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance |c Andrew Atkeson ; Robert E. Lucas |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, MA |c 1993 | |
| 300 | |a 45 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 4381 | |
| 520 | |a This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation? | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Resource allocation |x Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Unemployment insurance |x Mathematical models | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Lucas, Robert E. |d 1937-2023 |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124426115 |4 aut | |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 4381 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 4381 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-005462933 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804122665232891904 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- Lucas, Robert E. 1937-2023 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128378166 (DE-588)124426115 |
| author_facet | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- Lucas, Robert E. 1937-2023 |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- |
| author_variant | a a aa r e l re rel |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV008269628 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB1 |
| callnumber-raw | HB1 |
| callnumber-search | HB1 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| classification_rvk | QX 600 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)28621137 (DE-599)BVBBV008269628 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01991nam a2200361 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV008269628</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20030915 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">931013s1993 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)28621137</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV008269628</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QX 600</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)142184:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Atkeson, Andrew</subfield><subfield code="d">1961-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128378166</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrew Atkeson ; Robert E. Lucas</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, MA</subfield><subfield code="c">1993</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">45 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">4381</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation?</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Resource allocation</subfield><subfield code="x">Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Unemployment insurance</subfield><subfield code="x">Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lucas, Robert E.</subfield><subfield code="d">1937-2023</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124426115</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">4381</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">4381</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-005462933</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV008269628 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:17:29Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-005462933 |
| oclc_num | 28621137 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-188 |
| physical | 45 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1993 |
| publishDateSearch | 1993 |
| publishDateSort | 1993 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)128378166 aut Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance Andrew Atkeson ; Robert E. Lucas Cambridge, MA 1993 45 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 4381 This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation? Mathematisches Modell Resource allocation Mathematical models Unemployment insurance Mathematical models Lucas, Robert E. 1937-2023 Verfasser (DE-588)124426115 aut National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 4381 (DE-604)BV002801238 4381 |
| spellingShingle | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- Lucas, Robert E. 1937-2023 Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Mathematisches Modell Resource allocation Mathematical models Unemployment insurance Mathematical models |
| title | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_auth | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_exact_search | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_full | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance Andrew Atkeson ; Robert E. Lucas |
| title_fullStr | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance Andrew Atkeson ; Robert E. Lucas |
| title_full_unstemmed | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance Andrew Atkeson ; Robert E. Lucas |
| title_short | Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_sort | efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Resource allocation Mathematical models Unemployment insurance Mathematical models |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Resource allocation Mathematical models Unemployment insurance Mathematical models |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT atkesonandrew efficiencyandequalityinasimplemodelofefficientunemploymentinsurance AT lucasroberte efficiencyandequalityinasimplemodelofefficientunemploymentinsurance |