Knowledge and argument:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Lanham u.a.
Univ. Press of America
1984
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | XVI, 234 S. |
ISBN: | 0819142034 0819142026 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Titel: Knowledge and argument
Autor: Iseminger, Gary
Jahr: 1984
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: ARGUMENTS
Two sample arguments are given (p.l). An
argument is a sequence of statements (p.3),
concerning which it is claimed that the last (the
final conclusion) follows from those which are
taken for granted in the argument (the premises)
(p.3).
Arguments may be described or explained; I
shall be concerned rather with their assessment
(p.4), from a cognitive rather than a rhetorical
point of view (p.5). One of the three main
aspects of the cognitive assessment of an argument
is an assessment of the inference(s) involved as
regards their validity (p.6). Another aspect of
the cognitive assessment of an argument is the
assessment of its premises as regards their truth,
plausibility, or belief (p.7). The final main
aspect of the cognitive assessment of an argument
is the interpretation of a text through
regimentation and paraphrase (p.9).
The cognitive assessment of arguments is not
tied to any particular language (p.11). I shall
concentrate on arguments in written form (p.12).
Being able to assess arguments, though not the
whole, is a crucial part of being able to discover
or invent them (p.12). I shall consider the
assessment of inferences, the assessment of
premises, and interpretation in that order, but
the cognitive assessment of arguments does not
proceed in that, or any other linear, order
(p.13).
CHAPTER II: INFERENCES
A form of an argument is a pattern containing
blanks fillable according to a key in such a way
as to generate the argument as an example of the
form (p.15). Forms to be considered first must
contain predicate-blanks and may also contain
ix
name-blanks (p.l6). A counter-example to a form
Is an example all of whose premises are true and
whose conclusion is false (p.21). A validating
form is a form which can have no counter-examples
(p.26). A valid argument is an argument which
exemplifies a validating form (p.29).
An invalid argument is not just an argument
which exemplifies some form which is not a
validating form (p.3D. An invalid argument is
rather an argument which exemplifies no validating
form, and to show that an argument exemplifies no
validating form you must show that an adequately
revealing form which it exemplifies is not a
validating form (p.33).
Arguments can proceed from premises to the
final conclusion by means of intermediate
conclusions (p.40). Forms can be of different
types, depending on whether they contain
predicate-blanks (possibly along with name-blanks)
or they contain sentence-blanks (p.46). The
question whether to remain at the level of
sentence-blanks or rather to show more structure
by means of predicate-blanks (and, possibly,
name-blanks) is another aspect of the problem of
choosing an adequately revealing form (p.53).
Applying these techniques for deciding about
validity to actual arguments depends on being able
to produce interpretations which make forms
manifest (p.60). [Those who know techniques of
modern logic may use them to assess forms as
validating or not (p.62).]
The assessment of the inferences in the
original examples is displayed in a recommended
format (p.66).
x
CHAPTER III: PREMISES
Once an argument is determined to be valid,
cognitive assessment focuses on its premises
(p.73).
Premises may be assessed in terms of truth or
belief or plausibility (p.73). Truth is not
person-relative; while belief and plausibility
are (p.74) ? Belief is not only person-relative
but it is also subjective; on the other hand,
plausibility, while person-relative, is not
subjective (p.78). Truth and belief are not
comparative, while plausibility is (p.80).
Truth, belief, and plausibility are
independent of one another (p.82). Many common
terms of cognitive assessment are ambiguous as to
whether they concern truth, belief, or
plausibility; others unambiguously involve two or
three of these concepts at once (p.84).
A valid argument even one of whose premises
is neither true not believed by an appropriate
person nor plausible for an appropriate person
fails to show anyone anything about its conclusion
(p.87). An argument which is valid and all of
whose premises are true shows (to someone who
knows these facts about it independent of any
assessment of its conclusion) that its conclusion
is true (p.88). An argument which is valid, one
(some) of whose premises is (are jointly)
plausible to a certain degree for a person, and
the remainder of whose premises (if any) are true,
shows that its conclusion is plausible to that
degree for that person (p.91). An argument which
is valid, one (some) of whose premises is (are)
believed by a person, and the remainder of whose
premises (if any) are true, shows that that person
is committed to its conclusion (p.93). An
argument which is valid, one (some) of whose
premises is (are) believed by a person, one (some)
of whose premises is (are jointly) plausible to a
certain degree for a (possibly different) person,
and the remainder of whose premises (if any) are
true, shows that it is plausible to that degree
xi
for the second person that the first person is
committed to its conclusion (p.96).
If your verdict is that the argument succeeds
in showing something about its conclusion,
conclude your assessment by asking £ o what?
(p.99).
Whether or not a premise is believed by
someone is determined by listening to or reading
what he or she says or writes, trying to
understand it, and then judging the sincerity with
which it is said or written (p.100). That a
premise is plausible for someone or true may
sometimes be shown by displaying the premises as
the conclusion of a prior valid argument whose
premises have the appropriate status (p.101), but
you must also be able to assess at least some
premises directly as plausible or true (p.102).
Direct assessments of premises as plausible or
true are not argued for, but they are subject to
challenge and must be defended against
counter-arguments (p.103). Sometimes you will be
incompetent to assess a premise in any way; then
you should admit your ignorance and make any
verdict you might issue a conditional one, and, if
you still want to pursue the topic, try to remedy
your ignorance (p.104).
An assessment of the premises of the original
two sample arguments is set out in a recommended
format (p.106).
CHAPTER IV: INTERPRETATIONS
Interpreting texts which express arguments
typically requires regimentation and paraphrase
(p.109). The first question to ask about a text
is whether or not it expresses an argument
(p.109).
In regimenting a text which expresses an
argument, the first task is to identify the final
conclusion (p.ll6). The next task is to identify
the premises (p.119). If premises must be
xii
supplied, they should be premises which, first of
all, help to make the argument valid (p.120).
Supplied premises should also, as far as possible,
be true or be believed by or plausible for
appropriate people (p.121). To complete a
regimented (but unparaphrased) interpretation,
insert intermediate conclusions as appropriate,
making sure that in the final version all steps
but the final conclusion are used in getting to
the final conclusion (p.124).
Regimented but unparaphrased versions of each
of the two original sample texts are given
(p.126).
One aim of paraphrase is to make possible the
assessment of inferences by exhibiting form, that
is, by reflecting sameness and difference in
statements, names, and predicates by sameness and
difference in sentences, words, and phrases
(p.129). [Those who know modern logic will be
able to turn paraphrases into well-formed formulas
of sentential or predicate logic (p.133).] Another
aim of paraphrase is to make possible the
assessment of premises by clarifying what they say
(p.133).
For each step in your final regimented and
paraphrased interpretation, you will claim either
that it is quoted from the text, that it is
paraphrased from the text, or that it is supplied
(p.136).
Complete assessments of the original sample
arguments are finally given (p.139).
CHAPTER V: EXAMPLES
Several examples will be assessed and many
more provided for you to assess (p.149).
An ancient sceptical argument is assessed
(p.149). An argument about the limits of
scientific inquiry is assessed as an illustration
of ethical argument (p.164). This argument also
xiii
illustrates the use of suppositions in conditional
arguments and in indirect arguments (also known as
negative arguments, reductio ad absurdum
arguments, or arguments by contradiction) (p. 175).
This argument can also be used to illustrate the
use of relation-blanks (p.182). An inductive
argument is assessed according to the recommended
pattern (p.188).
Some arguments are presented for you to
assess (p.199): an argument against naive
realism (p.200), a famous argument for the
existence of a non-denumerably infinite set
(p.200), an argument by Charles Darwin for the
principle of natural selection (p.202), an
argument about natural means of controlling
harmful organisms (p.203), an argument against
soclobiology and a rejoinder to it (p.204), an
argument about the correlation between success and
genetic endowment, together with a rebuttal
(p.205), an argument about animal intelligence and
a rejoinder to it (p.207), an argument against a
behavioristic account of language (p.209), an
argument against the view that music expresses the
composer s feelings and a rejoinder to it (p.210),
an argument about the relation of score to
performance in music (p.212), an argument about
the economic interpretation of literature (p.213),
an argument from literature (p.214), an argument
against unilateral disarmament (p.215), an
argument that the United States committed genocide
under international law in the Vietnamese war
(p.216), an argument about the legitimacy of
judging people as members of groups and a reply to
it (p.217), an argument against the corporate
income tax (p.219), an argument about respect for
precedent in judicial decision-making (p.219), two
arguments about the exclusionary rule, which
prevents illegally gathered evidence from being
used in court (p.221), an argument about the
appeal to legislative intent in the interpretation
of statutes by courts (p.222), an argument about
the legal situation when medical personnel
discontinue life-support (p.224), two arguments
about abortion (p.224), a rejoinder to the
argument discussed earlier against the presumed
xiv
right to health care (p.227), a selection from
Plato, criticizing a proposed definition of piety
(p.228), Anselra s famous argument for the
existence of God (p.230), a classical atheistic
argument (p.232), an attack on determinism
(p.232), and, finally, an argument that may raise
a doubt about the notion of validity used in this
book (p.233).
xv
|
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author | Iseminger, Gary |
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spelling | Iseminger, Gary Verfasser aut Knowledge and argument Lanham u.a. Univ. Press of America 1984 XVI, 234 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Raisonnement Reasoning Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Evaluation (DE-588)4071034-8 gnd rswk-swf Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 gnd rswk-swf Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 s Evaluation (DE-588)4071034-8 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=004161944&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Iseminger, Gary Knowledge and argument Raisonnement Reasoning Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Evaluation (DE-588)4071034-8 gnd Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4071034-8 (DE-588)4002899-9 |
title | Knowledge and argument |
title_auth | Knowledge and argument |
title_exact_search | Knowledge and argument |
title_full | Knowledge and argument |
title_fullStr | Knowledge and argument |
title_full_unstemmed | Knowledge and argument |
title_short | Knowledge and argument |
title_sort | knowledge and argument |
topic | Raisonnement Reasoning Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Evaluation (DE-588)4071034-8 gnd Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 gnd |
topic_facet | Raisonnement Reasoning Erkenntnistheorie Evaluation Argumentation |
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