Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress: an economic interpretation
Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress challenges the widely accepted assumption that legislators, if not all politicians, are driven by the desire to be reelected. Through a series of creative arguments drawing on rational choice theory and microeconomics, political sci...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ann Arbor
Univ. of Michigan Press
1992
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress challenges the widely accepted assumption that legislators, if not all politicians, are driven by the desire to be reelected. Through a series of creative arguments drawing on rational choice theory and microeconomics, political scientist Glenn R. Parker offers a controversial alternative to the reelection assumption: he posits that legislators seek to maximize their own discretion--the freedom to do what they want to do. Parker uses this premise to account for the behavior of legislatures, the organization of Congress, the emergence of policy outcomes that reveal legislator altruism as well as parochialism, and the evolution of Congress as a political institution. Legislators behave like monopolists, argues Parker, creating barriers to entry that prevent competitive challenges to their reelection and ultimately increasing their discretion. Parker uses this premise to explain basic historical patterns in the evolution of Congress, from the lengthening of congressional terms of service to the unusual expansion in the number of committee assignments held by members of Congress. |
| Beschreibung: | 118 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0472103296 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress challenges the widely accepted assumption that legislators, if not all politicians, are driven by the desire to be reelected. Through a series of creative arguments drawing on rational choice theory and microeconomics, political scientist Glenn R. Parker offers a controversial alternative to the reelection assumption: he posits that legislators seek to maximize their own discretion--the freedom to do what they want to do. Parker uses this premise to account for the behavior of legislatures, the organization of Congress, the emergence of policy outcomes that reveal legislator altruism as well as parochialism, and the evolution of Congress as a political institution. Legislators behave like monopolists, argues Parker, creating barriers to entry that prevent competitive challenges to their reelection and ultimately increasing their discretion. Parker uses this premise to explain basic historical patterns in the evolution of Congress, from the lengthening of congressional terms of service to the unusual expansion in the number of committee assignments held by members of Congress. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, DISCRETION, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CONGRESS AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION GLENN R. PARKER ANN ARBOR THE UNIVERSITT OF
MICHIGAN PRESS CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 1. BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND THE
EXPANSION OF DISCRETION 15 2. DISCRETION-MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOR IN CONGRESS
33 3. PARTISANSHIP AND PRODUCTIVITY 49 4. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO
CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE 67 5. CONSTRAINTS ON DISCRETION 81 6. SOME
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON DISCRETION-MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOR IN
LEGISLATURES 95 REFERENCES 109 NAME INDEX 115 SUBJECT INDEX 117
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Parker, Glenn R. |
| author_facet | Parker, Glenn R. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Parker, Glenn R. |
| author_variant | g r p gr grp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV005908461 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JK1331 |
| callnumber-raw | JK1331.P37 1992 |
| callnumber-search | JK1331.P37 1992 |
| callnumber-sort | JK 41331 P37 41992 |
| callnumber-subject | JK - United States |
| classification_rvk | MG 70500 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)25632305 (DE-599)BVBBV005908461 |
| dewey-full | 328.73/07220 328.73/072 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 328 - The legislative process |
| dewey-raw | 328.73/072 20 328.73/072 |
| dewey-search | 328.73/072 20 328.73/072 |
| dewey-sort | 3328.73 272 220 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Book |
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| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV005908461 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T16:36:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0472103296 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 118 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1992 |
| publishDateSearch | 1992 |
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| publisher | Univ. of Michigan Press |
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| spelling | Parker, Glenn R. Verfasser aut Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation Glenn R. Parker Ann Arbor Univ. of Michigan Press 1992 118 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress challenges the widely accepted assumption that legislators, if not all politicians, are driven by the desire to be reelected. Through a series of creative arguments drawing on rational choice theory and microeconomics, political scientist Glenn R. Parker offers a controversial alternative to the reelection assumption: he posits that legislators seek to maximize their own discretion--the freedom to do what they want to do. Parker uses this premise to account for the behavior of legislatures, the organization of Congress, the emergence of policy outcomes that reveal legislator altruism as well as parochialism, and the evolution of Congress as a political institution. Legislators behave like monopolists, argues Parker, creating barriers to entry that prevent competitive challenges to their reelection and ultimately increasing their discretion. Parker uses this premise to explain basic historical patterns in the evolution of Congress, from the lengthening of congressional terms of service to the unusual expansion in the number of committee assignments held by members of Congress. États-Unis - Congress - House United States. Congress. House USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 gnd rswk-swf Parlementaires - États-Unis Parlements - Aspect économique Legislators -- United States Legislative bodies -- Economic aspects Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd rswk-swf Politisches Verhalten (DE-588)4046588-3 gnd rswk-swf Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 gnd rswk-swf Abgeordneter (DE-588)4000135-0 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf USA USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 b Abgeordneter (DE-588)4000135-0 s Politisches Verhalten (DE-588)4046588-3 s Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 s Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 s DE-604 Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=003698443&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Parker, Glenn R. Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation États-Unis - Congress - House United States. Congress. House USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 gnd Parlementaires - États-Unis Parlements - Aspect économique Legislators -- United States Legislative bodies -- Economic aspects Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd Politisches Verhalten (DE-588)4046588-3 gnd Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 gnd Abgeordneter (DE-588)4000135-0 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)35622-0 (DE-588)4079351-5 (DE-588)4046588-3 (DE-588)4121553-9 (DE-588)4000135-0 (DE-588)4039225-9 |
| title | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation |
| title_auth | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation |
| title_exact_search | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation |
| title_full | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation Glenn R. Parker |
| title_fullStr | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation Glenn R. Parker |
| title_full_unstemmed | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress an economic interpretation Glenn R. Parker |
| title_short | Institutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress |
| title_sort | institutional change discretion and the making of modern congress an economic interpretation |
| title_sub | an economic interpretation |
| topic | États-Unis - Congress - House United States. Congress. House USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 gnd Parlementaires - États-Unis Parlements - Aspect économique Legislators -- United States Legislative bodies -- Economic aspects Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd Politisches Verhalten (DE-588)4046588-3 gnd Rationale Erwartung (DE-588)4121553-9 gnd Abgeordneter (DE-588)4000135-0 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | États-Unis - Congress - House United States. Congress. House USA Congress Parlementaires - États-Unis Parlements - Aspect économique Legislators -- United States Legislative bodies -- Economic aspects Wirtschaftstheorie Politisches Verhalten Rationale Erwartung Abgeordneter Mikroökonomie USA |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=003698443&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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