From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 4 1917: year of crisis
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Oxford Univ. Press
1969
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| Beschreibung: | XXIV, 364 S., 7 Bl. Ill., Kt. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow |b the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 |n 4 |p 1917: year of crisis |c by Arthur J. Marder |
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| adam_text | Titel: Bd. 4. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. 1917: year of crisis
Autor: Marder, Arthur Jacob
Jahr: 1969
Contents
PREFACE
PART I. THE CRISIS OF THE NAVAL WAR
the Jellicoe-Carson Period
December 1916-July 1917
CHAPTER I. IN THE BACKGROUND: THE RISE
OF NAVAL AVIATION
1. AIRSHIP POLICY
R.N.A.S. strength and functions early in the war—Beatty and
Jellicoe want airships—Admiralty views on rigid airships—
The S.S. airships: uses and limitations—Construction of
rigids—Comparisons with the High Seas Fleet airships—
Reasons for the weak airship policy—The exaggerated opinion
of rigids as scouts—The Grand Fleet s Zeppelin problem.
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CARRIER
Samson s flights from a ship—Seaplane-carriers—Aeroplanes
replace seaplanes in carriers—Dunning and deck-landing
trials—Rutland pushes for flush-deck carriers—The experi-
ence of the Furious—The first flush-deck and island carriers—
The carrier situation in the Grand Fleet, 1918—Aircraft are
flown off the decks of lighters—Destruction of L 53—Rutland s
aeroplane experiments—The Grand Fleet is fitted with flying-
off platforms—and wins air command in the North Sea, 1918.
3. EVOLUTION OF THE TORPEDO PLANE
Types of naval aircraft—Early experiments with torpedo-
carrying aircraft—Torpedo-carrying seaplanes achieve suc-
cesses in the Dardanelles, 1915—Slow development of torpedo
planes—Sueter proposes torpedo-seaplane attacks on the
German and Austrian Fleets—The Cuckoo torpedo plane
joins the Fleet—Factors retarding the development of naval
air power.
CHAPTER II. THE GRAND FLEET UNDER BEATTY
I. BEATTY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Beatty s traits and work habits—Lady Beatty—Bridging the
Grand Fleet-B.C.F. gulf—Beatty s staff: Chatfield—Brand—¦
O de B. Brock—Pakenham as commander of the B.C.F.—
Madden, Sturdee, Evan-Thomas initially mistrust Beatty—
Beatty wins the confidence of the Fleet.
xiii
CONTENTS
2. GRAND FLEET TACTICS
The G.F.B.I.s and G.F.B.O.s—Decentralization of command
v. centralization—Divided tactics v. concentration of the battle
fleet—A fleet turn towards v. a fleet turn away from a massed
torpedo attack—The doctrine of the tactical offensive—Gun-
nery concentration—A more aggressive use of torpedoes—The
acceptance of a night action if necessary—The use of submarines
and aircraft with the Fleet—Communications and intelligence.
3. GRAND FLEET STRATEGY
Jellicoe and Beatty disagree on the importance of blockade—
Beatty s cautious strategic policy—Reasons for a cautious
strategy: inroads into Grand Fleet personnel and destroyers—
Concern over battle-cruiser strength—The Japanese are ap-
proached for help—The crux of the matter : no gambling with
the Grand Fleet—Beatty s ideas for offensive action—He finds
the unending wait for action irksome—Jellicoe on the prospects
of meeting the High Seas Fleet—The Germans will not gamble
with their Fleet—Stalemate in the North Sea.
CHAPTER III. NEW STRATEGY AND NEW MEN:
PLESS AND WHITEHALL
(December 1916-January 1917)
1. THE LAUNCHING OF UNRESTRICTED
U-BOAT WARFARE
The circumstances—Holtzendorff s memorandum of 22 De-
cember 1916—The die is cast: Pless, 9 January 1917—U-boat
sinkings without warning—Germany s strength in submarines
—Why no larger U-boat programme was ordered early in 1917
—The commissioning rate.
2. NEW FACES AT WHITEHALL
Carson as First Lord: strengths and weaknesses—The other
civilian members of the Board: Greene, Pretyman, Macna-
mara—The Naval Secretary, Everett—Jellicoe as First Sea
Lord: serious shortcomings—The other Sea Lords: Burney,
Tudor, Halsey, Paine—Jellicoe injects new blood into the
Admiralty—The War Staff: Oliver, Duff, Webb, Hall—A
note on the War Cabinet.
CHAPTER IV. FIGHTING THE U-BOATS
(December 1916-April 1917)
I. MEASURES TO EASE THE SHIPPING
SHORTAGE
Increase in home-grown food—Maclay appointed Shipping
Controller—Merchant shipbuilding in 1917—Attempts to
relieve the squeeze on shipping—Jellicoe campaigns to reduce
overseas military commitments.
xiv
CONTENTS
2. NAVAL MEASURES OLD AND NEW
Establishment of the Anti-Submarine Division—Its functions—¦
Initial confusion—Jellicoe summarizes the ways of dealing
with the submarine—Development of A/S weapons: depth
charges, bomb howitzers and throwers, mine nets—The failure
of the Dover mine-net barrage—The explosive paravane—
The hydrophone does not realize expectations—ASDIC—The
experiment with sea lions—Other fantastic suggestions—
Flares—Surface craft, aircraft, and submarines v. U-boats—
Mining the Heligoland Bight—The quality of mines and tor-
pedoes.
3. SHIPPING DEFENCE
Smoke-producing apparatus— Dazzle painting—The Otter
mine-protecting device—The Actaeon anti-torpedo net—
Zig-zagging and other A/S work are taught—The policy of de-
fensive armament for merchant ships—It proves no solution—
The routeing of ships—Development of approach routes —
The inefficiency of patrolling.
4. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The Otranto mobile barrage—Its ineffectiveness—The Admir-
alty consider possible naval offensives in the Adriatic—The
imperfect co-operation of Allied patrol forces in the Mediter-
ranean—The British experiment with dispersed routes—-Jelli-
coe succeeds in withdrawing five old battleships—Reprise : the
system of patrol.
CHAPTER V. FAILURE OF THE ANTI-SUBMARINE
CAMPAIGN (February 1917-April 1917)
1. SURFACE RAIDERS AND U-BOATS
German minelaying—The surface raiders Moewe, Wolf, and
Seeadler—Characteristics of the 1917 U-boats—The number at
sea, February-April—Shipping losses in January-April—The
British underestimate the extent of shipping losses—The results,
direct and indirect, of U-boat warfare—U-boat kills—Des-
troyer raids in the Dover Straits, 25 February, 17-18 March—
The Broke and Swift action, 20-21 April.
2. THE POT SIMMERS
Admiralty assurances in January—Beresford raises a debate in
the Lords, 13 February—Carson s statement in the Commons,
21 February—The honeymoon ends: mounting criticism of
the Admiralty—The demand for Lord Fisher s recall—His
offer to serve as Third Sea Lord and Controller is rejected—
Beatty loses faith in the Admiralty—Jellicoe is pessimistic about
the prospects of curbing the U-boats—The Imperial War
Cabinet considers making a peace overture, 23 March.
XV
CONTENTS
CHAPTER VI. THE INTRODUCTION OF MERCANTILE
CONVOY (December 1916-ApriI 1917)
1. FORCES AND ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION I
The controversy over convoy introduction—Convoy in British
naval history—It is considered fundamentally unsound—
Early wartime advocates of convoy—The idea has little support
at the Admiralty—The main argument: dearth of escorting
ships—Strong opposition of mercantile officers—Service opin-
ion—Hostility of shipowners—The port-congestion factor—
The difficulty of assembling a convoy in a neutral port—Too
many eggs in one basket—Consequences of a surface attack
and entanglement in a minefield—Admiralty failure to make a
serious study of trade protection—The absence of a true naval
staff as a contributory factor—Ignorance of analytical methods
—Problems of organization—Public opinion and the Govern-
ment are generally averse to convoy.
2. THE TURNING OF THE TIDE I
The experience of the French coal trade—The Scandinavian
trade is also organized on a system of controlled sailings —
The Longhope Conference of 4 April recommends convoy for
the Scandinavian traffic—Beatty s support and Admiralty
misgivings—The Admiralty agree to a trial—Success of the
system—The decisive factors in April—U.S. entry—Heavy
shipping losses—-Jellicoe s pessimism—Revelation of the true
situation re the ocean escort problem.
3. lloyd George s intervention i
The Prime Minister s attributes—His Service informants—
Hankey s role in converting Lloyd George to convoy—The
breakfast meeting of 13 February—Carson s position on convoy
—Why Lloyd George hesitated—His 25 April announcement
that he will visit the Admiralty—Duff s recommendation of 26
April to start ocean convoy—The Admiralty approve a trial
convoy—Had the Admiralty accepted ocean convoy in response
to the P.M. s coming visit?—The visit on 30 April: legend and
fact—The seeds of continuing difficulties between the politi-
cians and the admirals—The Leslie-Henderson relationship.
CHAPTER VII. THE AFTERMATH OF 30 APRIL
(May 1917-July 1917)
I. REORGANIZATION OF THE ADMIRALTY I
The public debate over naval strategy: sea heresy v. defen-
sive school—Beatty and Richmond castigate Custance—The
position of the Young Turks —The press agitation focuses on
the organization of the Admiralty—Grand Fleet criticism of
the Admiralty—Lloyd George decides to do something—
Geddes appointed Controller—The Navy is not enchanted
with him—Reorganization of the Staff system—Division of the
Admiralty into two sides, operations and administration—
Hope succeeds Jackson as D.O.D.—W. W. Fisher becomes
D.A.S.D.—Press and Service reaction to the organizational
changes—Beatty s position.
xvi
CONTENTS
2. CONVOY PROBLEMS
I
Shipping losses in May-June—The Allied Naval Conference
at Corfu, 28 April-i May—Wemyss, Gough-Calthorpe, and
the Mediterranean command—The British start small convoys
in the Mediterranean—The critical shipping position—The
Shipping Controller is full of gloom—Beatty s pessimism—The
Prime Minister s optimism—The trial Gibraltar convoy in
May—The U.S. Navy is not keen on convoy—The experi-
mental Hampton Roads convoy in May—Report of the
Atlantic Trade Convoy Committee, 6 June—Its recommenda-
tions are not followed up—The convoy situation at the end of
June—The Admiralty is lukewarm on extension of convoy—
The reasons for their attitude—The effect upon Lloyd George.
Lloyd George s opinion of Jellicoe—Jellicoe s pessimism—His
strategic ideas clash with the Prime Minister s—Establishment
of a Planning Section of the Operations Division—Dudley
Pound appointed its head—Beatty urges Jellicoe not to resign
—Jellicoe s precarious position—Carson supports Jellicoe—
Lloyd George decides to replace Carson—Haig s campaign
against Carson and Jellicoe—The naval background of Third
Ypres—Jellicoe scotches a purely naval operation v. Zeebrugge
and Ostend—His gloomy statement at the War Policy Com-
mittee, 20 June—The Navy s share in Third Ypres—Was
clearing the Belgian coast vital to the A/S campaign?—Naval
considerations in Haig s continuation of the Flanders offensive—
The last stage in the campaign to sack Carson—Lloyd George
makes the plunge, 6 July—Geddes replaces Carson as First
Lord.
PART II. EBBING OF THE TIDE:
the Jellicoe-Geddes Period
July 1917-December 1917
CHAPTER VIII. A REVOLUTION AT THE ADMIRALTY
(July 1917-October 1917)
I. THE GEDDES RÉGIME 21
The Navy and Geddes as First Lord—Geddes kicks up a
tempest at the Admiralty—Anderson becomes Controller—
Graham Greene, the Permanent Secretary, is sacked—Oswyn
Murray as Secretary—Jellicoe s battle to save Burney and
Oliver—A compromise is reached.
Geddes s understanding with Lloyd George re Jellicoe—The
Geddes memorandum of 10 September—The Operations and
Maintenance Committees—Expansion of the Sea Lords titles—
Institution of the Plans Division—Keyes is appointed Director
of Plans—Clarification of responsibility for issuing orders for
B xvii
3. CARSON S DISMISSAL
I
2. FURTHER REORGANIZATION
21
CONTENTS
war operations and ship movements—Broader significance of
the changes—Wemyss is elevated to Deputy First Sea Lord—
The consequences of the appointment—A capsule summary of
the story of Jellicoe s dismissal.
CHAPTER IX. OFFENSIVE SCHEMES
(July 1917-December 1917)
1. MINING AND OTHER SCHEMES
Admiralty view of offensive schemes—The minelaying cam-
paign in the Bight—Minelayers v. minesweepers—A North
Sea barrage is mooted—Obstacles—An Allied naval confer-
ence endorses the barrage—The decision to proceed—Plans to
capture an island in the Bight—Churchill s proposals for offen-
sive operations—The Admiralty s objections to island-capturing
schemes—Lloyd George and Churchill advocate the naval
bombardment of German naval bases.
2. A BLOCKING OPERATION
The talk of stopping the hornets holes —Jellicoe has the
Planning Section investigate its feasibility—Plans submit a
scheme of vast magnitude—Jackson regards it as too risky—
Jellicoe and the Naval Staff consider it impracticable—
Madden s opinion of blocking the U-boats in port.
3. A NAVAL AIR OFFENSIVE
Beatty s thoughts on the U-boat threat—He is anxious to
exploit the potentialities of torpedo-carrying aircraft—The
Director of Air Services strongly supports him—Beatty s plan
to immobilize the High Seas Fleet by torpedo planes—The
conference in the Queen Elizabeth, 24 August—Beatty returns
in October to his air project—Admiralty reactions—The
Admiralty concludes that the Fleet s role must remain essen-
tially defensive.
4. A BALTIC OFFENSIVE
Baltic offensive ideas early in the war—The Admiralty and the
Russian situation after the March Revolution—Renewed
anxiety in the autumn as the Germans threaten Reval and
Petrograd—The Russians press the British for naval assistance
—Jellicoe s arguments against Baltic operations—Naval de-
monstrations to relieve the pressure on the Russians—The
danger of the Germans acquiring the Russian Baltic Fleet—A
course of action is adopted—Fleet and public reaction to the
Admiralty s Baltic strategy—The effect of the Russian collapse
on North Sea strategy.
5. THE NORTHERN NEUTRALS IN NAVAL
STRATEGY
The strained relations with the neutrals—The press agitation
for a tightening of the blockade—The Admiralty and War
Office concern over a German invasion of Jutland—The prob-
lem of Holland—Beatty sees interesting possibilities in the
xviii
CONTENTS
Dutch situation—He urges contingent plans to meet a German
move on Holland—The Plans Division work out plans to stop
the Germans—The problem fades away—The Norwegian
problem—Beatty is concerned over the German use of Nor-
wegian territorial waters—The Government will not counten-
ance any violation of Norwegian neutrality—Service plans to
assist Norway if she were attacked—The U-boat problem
causes the Admiralty to rethink their Norwegian policy—The
Grand Fleet, Admiralty, and the Government s policy towards
the Northern Neutrals—Frustration in the Grand Fleet over
the defensive strategy.
CHAPTER X. THE CONVOY SYSTEM IN OPERATION
(July 1917-December 1917)
1. EXTENSION OF OCEAN CONVOY
The shipbuilding position—Jellicoe insists on the reduction of
the Army s shipping requirements—The change in the Ameri-
can attitude towards convoy—A regular North Atlantic
Homeward Convoy System is started—The continuing heavy
shipping losses—The problem of the outward-bound trade—
Duff presses for an outward-bound ocean system—It is insti-
tuted—Ocean convoy justifies itself—The unsatisfactory
situation in the Mediterranean—A general system is adopted
in that sea—Gough-Calthorpe s views on convoy—Convoy
proves itself in the Mediterranean—The escort problem there
—The missing links in the convoy system.
2. ORGANIZATION
The Convoy Section at the Admiralty—The activities of the
Chart Room—The role of Room 40 in A/S warfare—The
water-tight division between Room 40 and the intelligence
sections of N.I.D.—The D.N.I, ends the divorce—The work of
Fleet Paymaster Thring—Details of convoy organization, in-
cluding escorts, size of convoys, air escort.
3. PROBLEMS
Station-keeping in convoy—The atmosphere and perils of a
convoy—The too many eggs in one basket theory—The loss
of time involved in collecting a convoy—The reduction of
vessels in convoy to the speed of its slowest ship—Solution of
the ocean-escort problem—The end of the 10th Cruiser Squad-
ron (Northern Patrol)—Solution of the destroyer-escort prob-
lem—The contribution of the American destroyers—Convoy
affords a sense of security to the masters and men—The
weather co-operates with the convoy system.
4. RESULTS
The threat of the U-cruisers —Shipping loss statistics and
their evaluation—U-boat losses—Percentage of losses to sail-
ings in convoy through October—The work of the Statistics
Department—Detailed analysis of its General Review of the
submarine campaign and the convoy system—Convoy is
mainly responsible for the containment of the U-boat menace
xix
CONTENTS
—Improvement of the situation as regards mines—The high
German hopes for unrestricted U-boat warfare are shattered—
The cautious optimism at the Admiralty—But there is no
general awareness that the worst is over—Reservations on
convoy: it is a defensive measure—Winter conditions and
German battle-cruiser raiders promise to reduce the efficacy
of convoy.
CHAPTER XI. HOME WATERS: A TALE OF WOE
(October 1917-December 1917)
1. THE INCIDENT OF 17 OCTOBER 293
Inherent dangers in the Scandinavian convoys—The surprise
raid on the Mary Rose convoy—The apparent failure to report
the enemy by W/T—Escape of the raiders—The Admiralty
under fire—Beatty profits from the incident—Plans for a
revision of the Scandinavian convoy system.
2. THE 17 NOVEMBER ACTION 299
Beatty sees possibilities in the enemy s minesweeping activity—
Forces allocated to the operation—The plan—The action in
the Heligoland Bight—Its turning point—Retirement of the
British forces—Evaluation of the engagement—Some of its
features: enemy tactics, British shell, etc.—Beatty distributes
blame and praise—Napier s feelings—A discussion of the
criticisms directed at his tactics—The Admiralty s verdict on
Napier—The Courageous and Glorious facet of the action—
Napier and Beatty draw lessons from the action—The problem
of minefield information—A sobering reflection on the action.
3. THE SECOND CONVOY INCIDENT 31I
The 12 December attack on the Scandinavian convoy—The
futility of the aftermath—Conclusions and recommendations of
the Court of Inquiry—Beatty s appreciation—Revisions in the
Scandinavian convoy system—The convoy incident rouses
public opinion.
4. THE DOVER STRAITS SIEVE 315
Bacon, his talents and deficiencies—Ineffectiveness of the anti-
submarine defences in the Straits—Bacon commences a deep
mine barrage—The conflict between Bacon and the Channel
Barrage Committee: over illumination and patrol of the new
barrage—Lesser issues—Bacon s resentment of the Committee
—His personality as a factor—Keyes takes the lead against
Bacon and his arrangements—-Matters are brought to a head
in December—Significance of the destruction of UB-56.
CHAPTER XII. JELLICOE S DISMISSAL
(December 1917)
I. IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND 323
The dissatisfaction with the war at sea—The demand for Lord
Fisher s restoration—Jellicoe and the Admiralty have their
XX
CONTENTS
champions—Northcliffe s hostility: possible explanations—
The Daily Mail s campaign against Jellicoe—Lloyd George s
role—The factors explaining his hostility to Jellicoe—Was
Jellicoe run down?—The root cause of the Prime Minister s
lack of confidence—Geddes and Jellicoe: sources of friction:
naval aviation, the first convoy incident—The press criticism
of Jellicoe ties Geddes s hands—Friction over the 17 November
action—The second convoy incident strains relations further—
The incident of an honour for Duff—The Dover Straits prob-
lem is the last straw—Geddes s motives in dismissing Jellicoe.
2. RESIGNATION AND AFTERMATH 34O
Geddes asks for and receives Jellicoe s resignation—Jellicoe s
feelings—How the press took the news—It comes as a complete
surprise and shock to the Navy—The exceptions—The atti-
tude of the Liberal leaders—Jellicoe is offered a peerage: to
accept or not to accept?—The Sea Lords contemplate resigna-
tion—Jellicoe during 1918—An evaluation of his tenure as
First Sea Lord—Oliver leaves the Admiralty and Bacon is
sacked—Bacon s work at Dover—The two sides of the ledger as
the year ends.
xxi
|
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| physical | XXIV, 364 S., 7 Bl. Ill., Kt. |
| psigel | BSBWK1 |
| publishDate | 1969 |
| publishDateSearch | 1969 |
| publishDateSort | 1969 |
| publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Marder, Arthur Jacob 1910-1980 Verfasser (DE-588)142891207 aut From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 4 1917: year of crisis by Arthur J. Marder London Oxford Univ. Press 1969 XXIV, 364 S., 7 Bl. Ill., Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Grande-Bretagne - Royal Navy ram Guerre mondiale (1914-1918) - Opérations navales ram (DE-604)BV004957945 4 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=003032912&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Marder, Arthur Jacob 1910-1980 From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 Grande-Bretagne - Royal Navy ram Guerre mondiale (1914-1918) - Opérations navales ram |
| title | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 |
| title_auth | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 |
| title_exact_search | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 |
| title_full | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 4 1917: year of crisis by Arthur J. Marder |
| title_fullStr | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 4 1917: year of crisis by Arthur J. Marder |
| title_full_unstemmed | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 4 1917: year of crisis by Arthur J. Marder |
| title_short | From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow |
| title_sort | from the dreadnought to scapa flow the royal navy in the fisher era 1904 1919 1917 year of crisis |
| title_sub | the Royal Navy in the Fisher era ; 1904 - 1919 |
| topic | Grande-Bretagne - Royal Navy ram Guerre mondiale (1914-1918) - Opérations navales ram |
| topic_facet | Grande-Bretagne - Royal Navy Guerre mondiale (1914-1918) - Opérations navales |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=003032912&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV004957945 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marderarthurjacob fromthedreadnoughttoscapaflowtheroyalnavyinthefisherera190419194 |