Topics in social choice: sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York u.a.
Praeger
1990
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XX, 208 S. :graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0275934306 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Topics in social choice |b sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation |c Dan S. Felsenthal |
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| 264 | 1 | |a New York u.a. |b Praeger |c 1990 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Figures and Tables xiii
Preface xvii
PART I
SOPHISTICATED VOTING UNDER THE PLURALITY
AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES: THEORETICAL
MODELS AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
1 Sophisticated Voting: Orientation and General Approach 3
Sincere and Sophisticated Voting: Definition 5
Sophisticated Voting and the Classification
of Voting Games 6
Sophisticated Voting: Plan of the Investigation 8
2 Two Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson
and Niemi Frank 9
The Assumptions of Models F and NF:
A Critical Evaluation 10
Farquharson s Model 12
The Sophisticated Voting Model of Niemi and Frank 16
X CONTENTS
3 The Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated
Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures 18
The Properties 19
The Compatibility of Sincere and Sophisticated PV
and AV with the Normative Properties of
Voting Procedures 25
Is Sophisticated Voting Less Desirable Than
Sincere Voting? 31
4 The Chairman s Paradox and Its Extensions under
Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According
to Models F and NF 33
Farquharson s No Tie Breaker Paradox 34
The No Regular Vote Paradox 38
A No Power Paradox 41
Combining the Paradoxes 42
Interpretation and Conclusions 44
5 The Condorcet Efflciency of Sophisticated Voting According
to Model F under the Plurality and Approval Procedures 47
The Simulation 48
Results 54
Sincere Voting and Some Conditions of
Condorcet Efficiency 57
Conclusions 58
6 Tacit Cooperation in Three Alternative Noncooperative
Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior
under the Plurality and Approval Procedures 60
Justifying Tacit Cooperation in Noncooperative
Three Alternative Voting Games 60
The DF Model of Sophisticated Voting 63
Model DF: Examples 67
7 Sincere versus Sophisticated Behavior under PV and AV:
A Competitive Test of Four Models 69
Experiment 1: Four Person, Three Alternative Games
under PV 70
Experiment 2: Four Person, Three Alternative Games
under AV 81
Summary and Conclusions 90
CONTENTS Xi
PART II
EFFICACY AND CORRECT DECISIONS
8 Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality
and Approval Procedures 95
Efficacy 96
The Computation of Efficacy under AV 98
The Computation of Efficacy under PV 103
Results: The Relative Efficacies of AV and PV 104
Conclusions 107
9 Is Cumulative Voting Really Different from
Plurality Voting? 108
Assumptions 110
Proof of the Arguments 111
Conclusions 115
10 On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting 116
Propositions 117
Proving the Propositions 118
Conclusions 124
11 Majority Rule, Correct Decisions, and the
Quorum Paradox 125
A Motivating Example Revisited 126
The Example Re Analyzed 130
Requiring Special Majorities 132
Conclusion 134
PART III
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: NORMATIVE
SCHEMES AND AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF
VOTING PROCEDURES
12 Microcosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for
Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems 137
The Problem of Fair Representation in PR Systems 137
Desiderata for PR Schemes 140
Normative Methods for Determining the Proportion
of Seats in PR Systems 142
Xii CONTENTS
Consistent and Inconsistent Matrices of Preference
Ratios 146
Theoretical Considerations 150
Conclusion and Implications 152
13 Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation
of the Plurality and Approval Procedures 153
The 1985 Elections to Israel s General Federation
of Labor 154
The Exit Poll and Its Results 155
An Evaluation of the Three Aggregation Schemes 158
Discussion and Implications 160
Appendix A: Possible Size Relations among Four Blocs 163
Appendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6 167
Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2 179
Notes 185
Bibliography 195
Author Index 203
Subject Index 205
Figures and Tables
FIGURES
6.1 A Flow Chart Description of Model DF 66
7.1 An Example of the Display in Experiment 1 71
11.1 Probability of Correct Decision (Pcd) as a Function of
Members Present (N) when T = 10, Q = 6, and
Supporters and Opposers of the Issue Are Equally Likely
to be Absent 129
TABLES
2.1 Sophisticated Plurality Voting According to Farquharson s
Model 14
2.2 A Reduced Sophisticated Voting Game Derived from
Table 2.1 15
4.1 Farquharson s Chairman Paradox Lost under Approval
Voting 35
4.2 Farquharson s No Tie Breaker Paradox Regained under
Approval Voting 37
4.3 The Chairman Has Only a Tie Breaking Vote under the
Plurality Procedure 39
Xiv FIGURES AND TABLES
4.4 No Regular Vote Paradox under Approval Voting 40
4.5 A Combined Chairman s Paradox: Sophisticated Voting
When the Chairman Has No Voting Power or Only a Tie
Breaking Vote 42
4.6 A Combined Chairman s Paradox: Sophisticated Voting
with the Chairman as a Regular Voter and as Both a
Regular Voter and a Tie Breaker 43
5.1 VN, VA, and VB Vectors Derived from Four Distributions
of Bloc Sizes 51
5.2 Condorcet Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting under the PV
Procedure 55
5.3 Condorcet Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting under the AV
Procedure 56
6.1 Model F Is Indeterminate Even if an Absolute Majority of
the Voters Have an Identical Top Preference 61
7.1 Observed and Predicted Results in Experiment 1 74
7.2 Final Outcomes of Experiment 1 by Game and Iteration 76
7.3 Number of Sequences with 0 5 Changes in Strategy in
Experiment 1 by Game 76
7.4 Analysis of Admissible and Inadmissible Strategies in
Experiment 1 by Game and Voting Strategy 77
7.5 Frequency of Dominated Strategies in Experiment 1 by
Player and Group 78
7.6 Observed and Predicted Results in Experiment 2 83
7.7 Final Outcomes of Experiment 2 by Game and Iteration 85
7.8 Number of Sequences with 0 5 Changes in Strategy in
Experiment 2 by Game 85
7.9 Analysis of Admissible and Inadmissible Strategies in
Experiment 2 by Game and Iteration 86
7.10 Frequency of Dominated Strategies in Experiment 2 by
Player and Group 87
8.1 Computation of Efficacy under Approval Voting for Three
Voters and Four Candidates 99
8.2 63 Permutations for Obtaining Contingency/= (2,2,1,1) 100
8.3 Increase in the Probability of Winning under Approval
Voting for Three Voters and Four Candidates Given
Contingency/= (2,2,1,1) 102
8 4 Efficacy under Approval Voting for n = 1 25 and m =
2 7 •04
FIGURES AND TABLES XV
8.5 Efficacy under the Plurality Procedure for n = 1 — 25 and
m = 2 7 105
8.6 Ratio of Efficacies under Approval and Plurality Voting
for n = 1 25 and m 3 7 106
8.7 Efficacy of Strategy Sk under Approval Voting for
n = 1 25 and m = 3,4,5 107
10.1 Outcome in Three Candidate Contest under AV and CAV 118
10.2 Dominant and Undominated Strategies under AV and CAV
for k = 3 120
10.3 Probabilities Regarding the Type of Decisiveness of the
Focal Voter under AV and CAV When k = 3 and as a
Function of the Size of n 123
11.1 Probability of Correct Decision (Pcd) as a Function of
the Sample Size (N) when T = 10, Q = 6, and q Is
Simple Majority of N 128
11.2 Probability of Correct Decision (/ cd) as a Function of
the Sample Size (N) when T = 12, Q = 8, and q = (2A)N 133
12.1 An Example of Preference Ratio Matrices with Four
Parties and Ten Voters 141
12.2 Reciprocal Matrices of Preference Ratios for the Case of
Cyclical Majorities of Equal Size 149
123 ^max CI RI and CR as a Function of Matrix Size and
Response Scale 150
13.1 Distribution of Votes by Party under the Plurality
Procedure 155
13.2 Distribution of Voters by the Number of Parties They
Would Have Supported under the Approval Procedure 157
13.3 Distribution of Votes by Party under Approval Voting 157
13.4 Matrices of Preference Ratios Computed under Methods 1,
2, and 3 159
A. 1 88 Possible Size Relations Among Four Blocs of Voters
w, x, y, and z 164
B.I Possible Voting Patterns and Outcomes When the Social
Preference Ordering Is a b c and the Voters Whose
Top Preference Is a Vote for Their Second Preference 168
B.2 Four Voting Patterns According to Model F 170
B.3 Possible Voting Patterns and Outcomes When the Social
Preference Ordering Is a b c and the Voters Whose
Top Preference Is a Vote for Their Top Preference 172
Xvi FIGURES AND TABLES
B.4 Outcome Permutations under Columns 2 and 5 in Table
B.3 172
B.5 Possible Outcomes under Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 in Table
B.3 and the Derived Final Outcome According to Models
F and NF 174
B.6 Possible Voting Patterns and Some of Their Associated
Outcomes When All Voters Act Independently of One
Another According to Model F and Given the Relevant
Outcomes of Tables B.3 and B.5 175
C.I Voting Strategies in Experiment 1 by Player, Group,
Game, and Iteration 180
C.2 Voting Strategies in Experiment 2 by Player, Group,
Game, and Iteration 182
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1046922157 |
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| dewey-full | 324.6/3 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 324 - The political process |
| dewey-raw | 324.6/3 |
| dewey-search | 324.6/3 |
| dewey-sort | 3324.6 13 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV004322414 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T16:11:27Z |
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| isbn | 0275934306 |
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| spelling | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 Verfasser (DE-588)1046922157 aut Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation Dan S. Felsenthal 1. publ. New York u.a. Praeger 1990 XX, 208 S. :graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Représentation proportionnelle Vote Proportional representation Voting Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd rswk-swf Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd rswk-swf Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 s DE-604 Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002687905&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation Représentation proportionnelle Vote Proportional representation Voting Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd |
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| title | Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation |
| title_auth | Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation |
| title_exact_search | Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation |
| title_full | Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation Dan S. Felsenthal |
| title_fullStr | Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation Dan S. Felsenthal |
| title_full_unstemmed | Topics in social choice sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation Dan S. Felsenthal |
| title_short | Topics in social choice |
| title_sort | topics in social choice sophisticated voting efficacy and proportional representation |
| title_sub | sophisticated voting, efficacy, and proportional representation |
| topic | Représentation proportionnelle Vote Proportional representation Voting Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Représentation proportionnelle Vote Proportional representation Voting Wahl Wahlsystem Theorie |
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