Principia ethica:
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| Beschreibung: | XXVII, 232 S. |
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| adam_text | Titel: Principia ethica
Autor: Moore, George Edward
Jahr: 1971
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER L
THE SrjBJKCT-MATTEE OF ETHICS.
A.
ascraoir«
L In order to define Ethics, we mtiat diacover what isboth common
andpeculiar to all undoubted ethic l judgments; . . . 1
2. but this is not that tbev are conoerned with human eonduot,
but that they are conoerned with a oertain predicate good,
and ita converae bad, which mar be applied both to conduct
aad to other things.........1
5. The Bubjeota ofthe judgments ofa scientific Ethica an not, lika
thoseof soine studies, p rtioular things ; 3
4. bat it includes all unüurtal judgments which assert the Delation
of goodness to any subject, aiwi henoe inclndes CaBuistry . 3
R
6. It must, however, enqune not only what things are univeraally
related to goodness, but also, what this predicate, to which
they are related, is:........b
8. and the auswar to this quastioa ia that it is indeftnaUe 6
7. or simple: for ifby definition b» meant the analysis of an object
of thought,oiüy oomplexohjectacanbedefined; ... 7
8. and ofthe three senaes in whioh definition «an beuaed,this
is the most importanl........
Ä. What is thus indefinaUe isnot« the good, or the whola of that
which alwaysponnsnnfe the predicate good, but this predicate
itselt...........8
10. Good, Uran, denotesonenniqua simple objeetof thoughtamong
innomerabto other»; but this object has very oommonty faeea
identified with some other?-a nülacy which mav be called
the uatunuistic tallacy .......9
xiv CONTENTS
SSO*. *±°»
11. and which reduces what is used as a fundamental principle of
Ethics either to a tautology or to a statement about the
meaning of a word.........1°
12. The nature of this fallacy is easUy recognised; . . . .13
13. and if it wer« avoided, it would be piain that the only alter-
natives to the admission that good is indefinable, are either
that it is complex or that there is no notion at all peculiar
to Ethics?alternatives which can only be refuted by an
appeal to inspection, but which can be so refuted. . 16
14. The naturalistic fallacy illustrated by Bentham; and the im-
portanos of avoiding it pointed out. ..???! *
a
15. The relations wbich ethical judgment» assert to hold universally
between goodness and other things are of two kinds: a thing
may be asserted either to 6« good itself or to be caueaUr
relatedtoeomethingelsewhichiaitself good?tobe goodas
ameans. ..........81
16. Our investigatipna of the latter und of relation oannot hope to
estabbah more than that a certain kind of action viHgefurally
be followed by the best possible results; .... SS
17. but a relation of the former kind, if true at all, will be true of
all cases. All ordinary ethical judgmenta aasart emual rela-
tions, but they are commonly treated as if they did not,
becauae the two kind» of relation are not distinguiahad. . 83
D.
18. The investigation of intrinsio values is complicated by the faet
that the value of a wbole may be diflereat from the som of
the values of its parts,........87
19. in whioh esse the parthastothe whole arelation, whichexbibüa
an equauy important difference from and rasemblancetothat
of meana to end. . ... . ...20
20. The term organio whole migbt wall be used to denote that
a whole has this property, since, of the two other properties
which A is oommonly used to imply,.....8°
21. ans, that of reciprocal causal dependence between parts, has no
necessary relation to this ose,......81
22. aad the other, upon which most streas has bean laid, can be
true of no whole whatsoever, being » self-contradiotory oon-
eeption due to confusba........33
23. H m 7 ri fhsTjtiw ...... «.«88
CONTENTS XV
CHAPTER LT.
NATÜEALISTIC ETHICS.
SBCT. IUI
24. This and the two fbllowingchapters will oonsider certain proposed
answers to the second of ethical questions: What is good in
üaelft These proposed answers are characterised by the facta
(1) that they declare some ont kind of thing to be alone good
in itself; and (2) that they do so, because they suppose this
on« thing to define the meaning of good. .... 37
25. Such theories may be divided into two groups (1) Metapbysical,
(2) Naturalistic : and the second group may be subdivided
into two others, (a) theories which declare some natural object,
other than pleasure, to be solo good, (6) Hedoniam. Thepre-
sent chapter will deal with ( t).......38
26. Definition of what is meant by Naturalism. .... 38
27. The common argument that things are good, because tbey are
natural, may involve either (1) the false proposition that
the normal, as such, is good;......41
28. or (8) the false proposition that the neoessary, as such, is
good............44
28. But a tytttmaliud appeal to Natura is now most preralent in
connection with the term Evolution. An ezamination of
Mr Herbert Spenoer s Ethics will illustrate this form of
Naturalien»...........45
30. Darwin a scientific theory of natural aelection, which has
mainly caused the modern vogue of the term Evolution,
must be earefuuy distinguished from certain ideas which
are oommonly associated with the latter term. . 47
31. Mr Spenoer s connection of Evolution with Ethics seems to
shew the innuence of ths naturalistic fallacy; . . .48
32. out Mr Spencer is vagueas to the ethical relations of pleasure
and evolution, and his Naturaliam may be mainly Natural-
istio Hedonism..........49
33. A discussion of the third chapter of the Data of Ethict servea
to illustrate these two poiots and to shew that Mr Spencer
is in utter confuaion with regard to the fundamental principles
of Ethics...........51
34. Three posaible view» as to the relation of Evolution to Ethics
are distinguished from ths naturalistic view to which it is
proposed to oonfine the name Evolutionistic Ethics. On
aay of these three view* the relation would be unimportant,
and the Evolutionistic view, which naake» it important,
involves a double fallacy. ....... 54
35. Summary of chapter. ........ 68
MO»
59
61
xvi CONTENTS
CHAPTER HL
HEDONISM.
wart.
36. The prevalence of Hedoniam is mainly due to the naturalistic
fallacy............
37. Hedonism may be defined as the doctrine that «Pleasure is the
sole good : this doctrine has always been held by Hedomsts
and used by them as a fundamental ethical principle, al-
though it has commonly been confused with others.
38. The method pursued in this chapter will consist in exposing the
reasons commonly offered for the trath of Hedonism and in
bringing out the reasons, which suffioe to shew it untrue, by
aeriticismof J. S. Mill 4 H. Sidgwick. .
39. Mill declares that Happinees is the only thing desiraWe as an
end, and inaista that Questious of ultunate euds are not
amenable todirect proof;.......84
40. yet he gives a proof of the first proposition, which consists in
(1) the faUacious confusion of dean-able* with desired, G8
41. (2) an attempt to shew that nothiog but pleasure is desired. 67
42. Tb» theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems largely
due to a confusion between the ecauo and the obj«ct of
desire: pleasure is certainty not the sole object Ol desire, and,
even if it is always among the cautu of desire, that faot
would not tempt anyone to think it a good. . . . 68
43. Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is the sole
object of desire with his admiasion that other thing» are
desired, by the absurd declaration that what is a means to
happinessis apart of bappineaa......71
44. Summaryof MiU sargumentandof my criticisia. ... 78
48. We must now proeeed to eonsider the principle of Hedonism as
an Intuition, as which it has been clearly recognised by
Prof. Sidgwick alone, That it ahould be thua incapable of
proof vt not, in itself, any raason for diasstiafsction. . 74
46. In tirns beginmng to eonsider what things are good ta thenv
salvea, we leave the refatation of Naturahem bebind, and
entaroatheacoopd üviaicttof etbkalquestiona. , . . 76
CONTENTS XVÜ
SECT. PAOB
47. Mill s doctrine that some pleasures are superior in quality to
others implies both (1) that judgments of enda must be
intuitions ;..........77
48. and (2) that pleasure is not the sole good......79
49. Prof. Sidgwick has avoided these confusions made by Mill: in
considering his argumenta we shaU, therefore, merely eon-
sider the question Is pleasure the sole good? ... 81
50. Prof. Sidgwick first tries to shew that nothing outside of
Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for
doubting this..........81
51. He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no
part of Human Existence, ezeept pleasure, is desirable. 85
52. But pleature must be distinguished from eontdoutneu of
pleasure, and (1) it is piain that, when so distinguished,
pleature is not the sole good;......87
53. and (2) it may be made equally piain that eontdoutneu of
pleature is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to dis-
tinguish it from its usual aecompanünenta. .... 90
54. Of Pro! Sidgwick s two argumenta for the contrary view, the
second is equally compatible with the supposition that
pleasure is a mere criterion at what is right; . . .91
55. and in his first, the appeal to refiective intuition, he fails to
put the question clearly (1) in that he does not recognise the
principle of organic unitiet;.......93
56. and (2) in that he fails to emphasise that the agreement, whioh
he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and
those of Common Sense, only holds otjvdgmau» of mearu:
hedonistic judgments of end* are flagrantly paradoxicaL . 94
57. I conclude, then, that a refiective intuition, if proper precau-
tions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is
absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as Ute sole
good. ... . ....85
0.
68. It remains to eonsider Egoism and TJtilitarianism It is im-
portant to distmguiah the former, as the doctrine that my
own pleasure is sole good, from the doctrine, opposed to
Altruism, that to pursue my own pleasure ezclusively is
right as a meant. , . ¦.....86
56; Egoism proper is utterly untenaW«, being self-ooötradwtory:
it falls to pereeive that when I declare a thing to be my own
good, I must be deelaring it to be good aboolutdy or eise not
good »t all........, . 87
rviii CONTENTS
ssox. wo»
60. This confusion is further brought out by an examination of
Prot Sidgwiok s contrary view;......99
61. and it is shewn that, in consequence of this confusion, his
representation ofthe relation of Rational Egoism to Rational
Benevolenoa aa the pxofoundest problem of Ethics, and his
view that a certain hypothesis is required to make Ethics
rational, are grossly erroneous.......102
62. The same confusion is involved in the altempt to infer
TJtilitarianism from Psychological Hedonism, as commonly
held, t.g. by Mal..........104
63. Egoism proper seems also to owe its piausibility to its confusion
with Egoism, as a doctrine of means. ... . 105
64. Certain ambiguities in the conception of TJtilitarianism are
notioed; and it is pointed out (1) that, as a doctrine of the
end to be puraued, it is finally refuted by the refutation of
Hedonism, and (2) that, while the argumenta most commonly
urged in its favour could, at most, only shew it to offer a
correct criterion of right action, they are quite insumcient
even for this purpose.........105
65. Summary of chapter. ........ 106
CHAPTER IV.
METAPHYSICAL ETHICS.
The term metaphyrical is defined aa having reference
primarily to any object of knowledge whioh is not a part of
Nature doe» not exist in time, aa an object of perception;
but sinee metaphysicians, not content with pointing out the
truth about such entities, have always supposed that what
does not exist in Natura, must, at leset, «xüt, the term also
aas reference to a supposed snperseasible reality : . . HO
aad by metaphysioal Ethice I mean tbose system» which
maintain or imply that the enawer to the question What is
good V lagioaUy dtpmui» upon tbe anawer to the question
What is tbe nature of »upsrsensible reality». All such
Systems obvioualy invohre tbe same fallacy?the naturalistic
fallacy ?by tbe ua» ctf which Naturalien» was also defined. . HS
Metaphysies, ae dealing with a supersenrible reality, may have
» bearing upon practicai Ethios (1) if its supersenaible
reality ia oonesived aa something future, which our actione
CONTENTS XJX
can affect; and (2) since it will prove that «wy proposition
of practical Ethics is false, if it can shew that an eterual
reality is either the only real thing or the only good thing.
Most metaphysical writers, believing in a reality of the
latter kind, do thus imply the complete falsehood of every
practical proposition, although they fail to see that their
Metaphysies thus contradicts their Ethics. . . .115
69. But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical Ethics,
is not that Metaphysies has a logical bearing upon the question
involved in practical Ethics What effects will my action
produce!, but that it has such a bearing upon the funda-
mental ethical question What is good in itselft. This
theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the
naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy: it only remains to discuss
certain confuaions whioh seem to have lent it piausibility. . 118
70. One such soorce of confusion seems to lie in the failure to dis-
tinguish between the proposition This is good, when it
means This exitting thing is good, and the same proposition,
when it means The existence of this kind of thing would be
good ; ...... ..... 118
71. and another seems to lie in the (ailure to öüstinguish between
that which tuggettt a truth, or is a oavtt of our knowing it,
and that upon which it logicaUy depeoda, or which iaarwuo»
for believing it: in the former sease fiction has a more
important bearing upon Ethics than Metaphysies can have. 181
O.
72. But a more important source of confusion seems to lie in the
suppositiou that to be good U idmüaal with Ute poaseesion
of some supersensible property, which is also involved in
tbe definition of reality. .......188
73. One cause of this supposition seems tobe the logical prejudioe
that all proposition» are of the most familiär type?that in
which subjeet and predicate are both existent». ... 128
74. But ethical propositiona cannot be reduced to this type: in
partioular, they are obvioualy to be distinguished . . 125
75. (1) from Natural Laws; with which oneofKant s most famous
doctrine» oonfasna them, . .. . . . . . . . 186
75. and (2) fromOommands; with which they are confoaed both by
Kaut and by othera. ........ 187
XX CONTENTS
D.
sxcr. **°«
77. This latter confusion is one of the sources öf the prevelent
modern doctrine that being good is identical with being
wiued ; but the prevalence of this doctrine seems to be
chiefly due to other causes. I shall try to shew with regard
to it (1) what are the Chief errors which seem to have led to
its adoption; and (8) that, apart from it, the Metaphysies of
Volition can hardly have the smallest logical bearing upon
Ethics............188
78. (1) It has been commonly held, aince Kant, that goodness has
the same relation to Will or Feeling, which truth or
reality has to Cognition: that the proper method for
Ethics is to diseover what is implied in Will or Feeling, just
aa, according to Kant, the proper method for Metaphysies
was to diseover what ia Aftpüso? in Cognition. . . ? 189
79. The actual relations between goodness and Will or Feeling,
from which this false doctrine is inferred, seem to be mainly
(a) the oautal relation oonsisting in the fect that it is only
by reflection upon the experienees of Will and Feeling that
we become aware of ethical distinetions; (b) the met» that a
Cognition of goodness is perhaps alwagi included in certain
kinda of Wilhng and Feeling, and is gtrurally aoeompanied
bythem:..........130
80. but from neither of these ptychologieal facta doe» it follow
that to be good is identical with being willed or feit in a
certain way. the supposition that it doce follow is an
inatanoe of the fundamental contradiction of modern Episte-
mology?the contradiction involved in both 4wtingiii J t g
and identifying the object and the ort of Thought, truth
itself and ita supposed oriterum:.....131
81. and, onee this analogy between Volition and Cognition $»
aeeepted, the view that ethical propositions have an naemitisl
reference to WiU or Feeling, i» atrengthened by another
error with regard to the nature of Cognition?tbe error of
aupposing that peroeptioa denote» eurej» * certain way of
cognisingan object, whereaa it aetaally incroda» the sssertion
that the object ia also true........133
82. The argument of the last three g| is recapitalated; and it is
pointod out (1) that Volition and Feeling are not enalogous
to Cognition, (3) that, even if they wer», still to be good
could iiot»«» toUwuled er feit in »certain way. . . 185
83. (8) If being good and «being wüTed tum not idtntieal, then
the latter could only be a «ritmim of tbe former; and, in
CONTENTS XXI
Order to shew that it was so, we should have to establish
independently that many things were good?that is to say,
we should have to establish most of our ethical conclusions,
before tbe Metaphysies of Volition could possibly give us the
smallest aasistance.........137
84. The fact that the metaphysical writers who, like Green, attempt
to 5a« Ethics on Volition, do not even attempt this in-
dependent investigation, shews that they start from the
false assumption that goodness is identical with being willed,
and hence that their ethical reasonings have no value what-
soever............138
85. Summary of chapter. ........ 139
CHAPTER V.
ETHICS IN RELATION TO CONDUCT.
86. The question to be disoussed in this chapter must be olearly
distinguished from the two question» hitherto disoussed,
namely (1) What is the nature of tbe proposition: This is
good in itself t.........142
87. and (8) What things are good in themselves 1 to which we gare
one answer in deeiding that pleasure was not the only thing
good in itself..........144
88. In this chapter we shall deal with the Mrd object of ethical
enquiry: namely answers to the question What conduet is
ameotw to good results I* or What ought wetodot This
is the question of Praetüal Ethics, and its answer involves
an aseertion of cautal connection......146
89. It is shewn that the aseertion» This action is right or is my
duty are äquivalent to the aasertion that the total results of
the action in question will be the best possible; . 146
80. »ad the rest of tbe chapter wül deal with certain conclusions,
upon which light is thrown by this fact Of which the first
is (1) that Intuitioniam äs mistakeo; since no proposition
with regard to duty ean be self-evident .148
91. (8) It is piain that we cannot hope to prove which among all
the actione, which it is possible for us to perform on every
oceaaion, will produce the best total results: to diseover
what is our duty, in this strict sense, is impossible. It
may, however, be possible to shew which among the actions,
wbichwesJte ta^topsafonB, witt produce the best results. 148
XXÜ CONTENTS
M.ÖM
«CT.
92. The distmction made in the last § is further explained; and it
is insisted that all that Ethics has done or can do, is, not to
determine absolute duties, but to point out which, among a
few of the alternatives, possible under certain circumstances,
will have the better results........ISO
93. (3) Even this latter task is immensely difficult, and no
adequate proof that the total results of one action are
superior to those of another, has ever been given. For (o) we
can only calculate actual results within a comparatively
near future: we must, therefore, assume that no results of
the same action in the infinite future beyond, will reverse
the balance?an assumption which perhaps ean be, but
certainly has not been, justified;......158
94. and (6) even to decide that, of any two actione, one has a better
total result than the other in the immediate future, is very
difficult; and it is very improbable, and quite impossible to
prove, that any Single action is in all eatet better as means
than its probable alternative. Bules of duty, even in this
restricted sense, can only, at most, be general truths. . . 154
95. But («) most of the actions, most universally approved by
Common Sense, may perhaps be shewn to be generaüy
better as means than any probable alternative, on the follow-
ing principle*. (1) With regard to some rules it may be
shewn that their general observance would be useful in any
State of society, where the instincta to preserve and propa-
gate life and to possess property wäre as strong as they seem
always to be; and this ntility may be shewn, independently
of a right view aa to what is good in itself, aince tbe observ-
ance is a means to things which are a necessary oondition
for the attainment of any grast good» in oonaiderable
quantities.......... 155
98. (3) Other rules am such that their general observance can only
be shewn to be useful, as means to the preservation of
society, under more or lese temporary oonditiona: if any of
these are to be proved useful in all societies, thia can only
be done by shewing theur causal relation to thing» good or
evil in themselves, which are not geaerally recognised to
be such. . . . , . . . , . .158
97. It ia piain that rules of das» (1) may alto be justified by tbe
existence of such temporary conditio!» as justify those of
dass (2); and among auch temporary oonditiona most be
reckooed the so-oalled mmetüm*. . . . .158
88. In thia way, then, H may be possible to prove the general
«tility, for tbe präsent, ofthose actions, which in our aodety
CONTENTS XXUl
are both generaUy reoognised as dutie» and ganerally prac-
tised; but it seems very doubtful whether a conclusive case
can be established for any proposed change in social custom,
without an independent investigation of what things are
good or bad in themselves........159
99. And ( f) if we eonsider the distinct question of how a Single
individual should decide to act (a) in cases where the general
Utility of the action in question is certain, (ß) in other cases:
there seems reason for thinking that, with regard to (o),
where the generally useful rule is also generally obeerved,
be should alwayt conform to it; but these reasons are not
conclusive, if either the general observance or the general
utility is wanting:........168
100. and that (ß) in all other cases, rulet of action should not be
followed at all, but the individual should eonsider what
positive goods, Äs, in his particular tiroumstances, seems
Iikely to be able to effect, and what evils to avoid. . . 164
101. (4) It follows further that the distinction denoted by the
terms duty and expediency is not primarily ethical:
when we ask Is this really expedient V we are asking pre-
cisely the same question aa when we ask Is this my duty 1,
vis, Is this a means to the best possible!. Duttes are
mainly distinguished by the non-ethical marks (1) that many
people are often tompted to avoid them, (8) that their most
prominent efiects are on others than the agent, (3) that they
excitethemoralsentiments: so faras they are distinguished
by an ethical peouliarity, this is not that they are peculiarly
useful to perform, but that they are peculiarly useful to
sanetion...........167
102. Tbe distinction between duty and interest is also, in the
main, the same non-ethical distinction: but the term
interested does also refer to a distinct ethical predicate?
that an action i» to my interest* asserta only that it will
have the best possible efiects of one particular kind, not that
it» total efiects will be tbe best possible. . .170
103. (6). We n»y further »sethat virtuos are not to be defined
as disposition» that are good in themselves: they are not
neeesaarily more than dispositions to perform actions gener-
aUy good as means, and of these, for the most pert, only
tbose nlissad as dutie» in aecordance with section (4).
It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is not
virtuous involves the difficult cauaal investigation dis-
eussed in section (3); and that what is a virtue in one State
of society may not be ao in aaotber......171
Xxiv CONTENTS
104. It follows also that we have no reason to presnme, as has
commonly been done, that the exercise of virtue in the Per-
formance of duties is ever good in itselt?far less, that it
is the sole good:.........173
105. and, if we eonsider tbe intrinsic value of such exercise, it will
appear (1) that, in most cases, it has no value, and (2) that
even the cases, where it has some value, are for from con-
stituting the sole good. The truth of the latter proposition
is generally inconsistently implied, even by those who
deny it;..........174
108. but in order fairly to decide upon the intrinsic value of virtue,
we must distinguish three difierent kinds of disposition, each
of which is commonly so caued and has been maintained to
be the only kind deserving the name. Thus (a) the mere
unoonscious habit of performing duties, which is the com-
monest type, has no intrinsic value whatsoever; Christian
moralists are right in implying that mere externa! rightness
has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that
it is therefore not virtuous, since this implies that it has
no value even as a means:.......175
107. (o) where virtue consists in a disposition to have, and be
moved by, a sentiment of love towards really good con-
sequences of an action and of hatred towards really evil
ones, it has some intrinsic value, but it» value may vary
greatly in degree : ........ 177
108. finally (e) where virtue consists in conscientiousnees, i.e. the
disposition not to act, in certain cases, until we believe and
feel that our action is right, it seems to have some intrinsM
value: the value of this feeling has been peculiarly empha-
aised by Christian Ethics, but it oertainly is not, as Kant
would lead us to think, either the sole thing of value, or
always good even as a means.......178
100. Summary of chapter......... 180
CHAPTER VL
THE IDEAL.
110. By an ideal State of things may be meant either (1) tbe
Suuunum Bonum or absolutely best, or (2) the best which
the law» of nature aßow to exist in thm world, er (8) any-
thmg greatly good in itself: this ohapter wiH be prianpally
oceupied with what is ideal in sense (3)?with aoawering tbe
fundamental question of Ethics; . . . . . .183
CONTENTS XXV
BKCT. UDI
111. but a correct answer to this question is an essential step
towards a correct view as to what is ideal in senses (1)
and (2).......... .184
112. In order to obtain a correct answer to the question What is
good in itself? we must eonsider what value things would
have if they existed absolutely by themselves; 187
113. and, if we use this method, it is obvious that personal affection
and aesthetic enjoyments include by far the greatest goods
with which we are acquainted.......188
114. If we begin by considering I. Aesthetic Enjoyments, it is piain
(1) that there is always essential to these some one of a great
variety of different emotions, though these emotione may
have little value by themtelve*:......189
115. and (2) that a Cognition of really beautiful qualities is equally
essential, and has equally little value by itself. . . . 190
116. But (3) granted that the appropriate combination of these two
elements is always a considerable good and may be a very
great one, we may ask whether, where there is added to this
a true belief in the existence of the object of the Cognition, the
whole thus formed is not much more valuable still. . . 192
117. I think that this question should be answered in the affirma-
tive ; but in order to ensure that this judgment is correct,
we must carefully distinguish it......194
118. from the two judgments («*) (bat knowledge is valuable at a
means, (o) that, where the object of the Cognition is itself
a good thing, its existence, of conrse, adds to the value of the
whole State of things:........195
119. if, however, we attempt to avoid being biassed by these two
facta, it still seems that mere true belief may be a eon-
dition essential to great value.......197
120. We thus geta tAircf essential constituentofmany great goods;
and in this way we are able to justify (1) the attribution of
value to knowledge, over and above its value aa a means, and
(2) the intrinsic superiority of the proper appreciation of a
real object over the appreciation of an equally valuable
object of mere imagination : emotions directed towards real
objeeta may thus, even if tbe object be inferior, claim
equality with the highest imaginative pleasuras. . . 198
121. Finauy (4) with regard to the object* of the Cognition which is
essential to these good whole», it is tbe buajness of Aeethet ics
to analyse their nature: it need only be here remarked
(1) that, by calling them beautiful, we mean that they bave
this relation to a good whole ; and (2) that they are, for the
most park, themselves complex whole», such that the ad-
XXVI CONTENTS
«bot. »AS»
miring eontemplation of the whole greatly exceeds in value
the snm of the values of the admiring eontemplation of the
parts............200
HB With regard to IL Personal Afection, the object is here not
merely beautiful but also good in itself; it appears, however,
that the appreciation of what is thus good in itself, vis. the
mental qualities of a person, is certainty, by itself, not so
great a good as tbe whole formed by the combination with
it of an appreciation of corporeal beauty; it is doubtful
whether it is even so great a good as the mere appreciation
of corporeal beauty ; but it is certain that the combination
of both is a far greater good than either singly. . . . 203
123. It follows from what has been said that we have every reason
to suppose that a Cognition of material qualitiet, and even
their existence, is an essential constituent of the Ideal or
Summum Bonum: there is only a bare possibility that they
are not included in it........205
124. It remains to eonsider positive evü* and missed good*. I. Evü*
may be divided into three classes, namely .... 207
125. (1) evils which oonsist in the love, or admiration, or enjoy-
mentof what is evü orugly.......808
126. (2) evü» which conaist in tbe hatred or contempt of what is
good or beautiful.........211
127. and (3) the oonsciousness of intense pain: this appears to be
the only thing, either greatly good or greatly evü, which doea
not involve both a Cognition and an emotion directed towards
its object; aad hence it is not analogous to pleasure in
respect of it» intrinsic value, whileit also seems not to add to
the vüeneas of a whole, a* a whole, in which it is oombined
with another bad thing, whereaa pleasure does add to the
goodness of a whole, in which it is oombined with another
good thing;...... . . 218
128. but pleasure and pain are completely analogous in this, that
pleasure by no means always inereases, aad pain by no
means always decreases, the total value of a whole in which
it is included : the eonvene is often true. .... 213
129. In order to eonsider II. Mixed Good*, we must first distinguish
between (1) ths value of a whole a* a whole, and (2) ita value
os the whole or total value: (1)?the difterence between (2)
and the sum of the values of the parts. In view ofthia dis-
tinction, it then appears:.......814
130. (1) That the mere combination of two er more evils is never
poaittvery good on (is whole, although it may eertainry have
great intrinsic value atawhoU; ...... 816
CONTENTS ZXVU
SECT. PAO»
131. but (2) That a whole which includes a Cognition of something
evil or ugly may yet be a great positive good on the whole :
most virtues, which have any intrinsic value whatever, seem
to be of this kind, o.g. (a) courage and compassdon, and
(6) moral goodness ; all these are instancea of the hatred or
contempt of what is evil or ugly;.....816
132. but there seems no reason to think that, where the evil object
exitts, the total State of things is ever positively good on the
whole, although the existence of the evil may add to its
value at a whole..........219
133. Hence (1) no actually existing evil is necessary to the Ideal,
(2) the eontemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to it,
and (3) where evils already exist, the existence of mixed
virtues has a value independent both of its consequences
and of the value which it has in common with the proper
appreciation of imaginary evils.......220
134. Concluding remarks. ....... 222
135. Summary of chapter.........224
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Moore, George Edward 1873-1958 |
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| edition | Reprinted |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV002895339 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T15:50:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521057531 0521091144 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Moore, George Edward 1873-1958 Verfasser (DE-588)118583859 aut Principia ethica by George Edward Moore Reprinted Cambridge Univ. Press 1971 XXVII, 232 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Analytische Ethik (DE-588)4142345-8 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4151278-9 Einführung gnd-content Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s DE-604 Analytische Ethik (DE-588)4142345-8 s 2\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=001813277&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Moore, George Edward 1873-1958 Principia ethica Analytische Ethik (DE-588)4142345-8 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4142345-8 (DE-588)4015602-3 (DE-588)4151278-9 |
| title | Principia ethica |
| title_auth | Principia ethica |
| title_exact_search | Principia ethica |
| title_full | Principia ethica by George Edward Moore |
| title_fullStr | Principia ethica by George Edward Moore |
| title_full_unstemmed | Principia ethica by George Edward Moore |
| title_short | Principia ethica |
| title_sort | principia ethica |
| topic | Analytische Ethik (DE-588)4142345-8 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Analytische Ethik Ethik Einführung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=001813277&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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