The mundane matter of the mental language:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge u.a.
Cambridge Univ. Pr.
1989
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in philosophies
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXVII, 273 S. |
| ISBN: | 0521370310 |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Grammar, Comparative and general |x Sentences |x Psychological aspects | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | The mundane matter of
the mental language
J Christopher Maloney
The University of Arizona
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Cambridge University Press
Cambridge
New York Port Chester Melbourne Sydney
Contents
Acknowledgments page xix
Introduction xxi
1 The mental language 1
1 1 Mentalistic constructs 1
Mentalistic constructs are among the central explana-
tory and predictive concepts deployed in folk psychol-
ogy, the popular and plausible psychology of com-
mon sense In recent years various philosophers
and psychologists have argued that these concepts are
unfit for any scientific psychology Nevertheless, ar-
guments in support of the conceptual basis of folk
psychology are available We begin by assessing the
merits of the charges against mentalistic concepts, and
that requires that we first survey the presuppositions
of such concepts
1 2 The Representational Theory of the Mind 3
Since the notion of belief is the most fundamental of
mentalistic concepts, we focus exclusively on it Be-
liefs are intentional - that is to say, representational -
states with truth-values Any theory that counts be-
liefs as representations is a version of the Representa-
tional Theory of the Mind It remains to assess the
manner in which beliefs represent Various facts seem
to indicate that beliefs are properly modeled in terms
of what we know of the symbolic structures of spo-
ken languages Ascriptions of beliefs identify beliefs
by specifying their contents The clause embedded in
an ascription of belief that specifies the content of the
ascribed belief is referentially opaque A belief ascrip-
tion is thus similar to a quotation and perhaps traces
its opacity to the presumed fact that the belief as-
cribed, like a sentence quoted, is itself a symbolic
structure The fact that beliefs have truth-values may
vii
also derive from beliefs being symbolic structures,
analogous to sentences, with referential and predica-
tive components Beliefs typically arise in large logi-
cally related clusters This too may devolve from the
presumed symbolic properties of beliefs, much as log-
ical relations among sentences may depend on their
symbolic properties These points collectively warrant
the hypothesis of Sententialism, that beliefs are rela-
tions to sentential structures within a language of
thought, Mentalese
1 3 Folk psychology and Representationalism 10
As an edition of the Representational Theory of the
Mind, Sententialism presupposes folk psychology and
its array of mentalistic constructs So, before further
developing Sententialism, we first attempt to refute
the arguments put forth by the Churchlands and al-
luded to in Section 1 1 that conclude with the repu-
diation of folk psychology as a foundation for
cognitive science
1 4 Sententialism 15
Behavior is typically an agent s rational response to
his or her situation The rationality of behavior is best
explained by postulating that behavior is the result of
an inferential process internal to the agent Inference
presupposes a language over which it is defined This
language must be Mentalese Failure of introspection
to detect Mentalese tokens does not tell against Sen-
tentialism, since introspection is notoriously fallible
and limited in its reach The contents of mental states
agree just in case the states are relations to Mentalese
sentences of the same type As mental states, decisions
and beliefs certainly can agree in content Yet ascrip-
tions of decisions depend on content clauses that differ
in verb form or mood from their associated belief as-
criptions We hypothesize that if this overt grammati-
cal difference reflects a difference in the syntactic
structure of the Mentalese sentences occurrent in the
ascribed mental states, then Mentalese sentences may
feature sentential or predicate modifiers
1 5 The regress of embedded agents 22
Internal mental representations seem to entail an infi-
nite regress of embedded cognitive agents Apprecia-
tion of the representational powers of artificially
intelligent programs serves to illustrate that internal
vni
representations do not require embedded agents This
way of avoiding embedded agents presupposes that
the representations in a program are genuine represen-
tations, and this is itself a controversial assumption
Thus, to avoid basing the reply to the objection per-
taining to nested agents on Artificial Intelligence, we
hypothesize that the sheer intentionality of a mental
state is a function of the matter of which the state is
composed This amounts to hypothesizing that men-
tation is materially based
1 6 Notation and content 33
Sententialism holds that identity of mental content de-
volves upon syntactic identity of Mentalese representa-
tion But it seems plausible to suppose, as Artificial
Intelligence seems to demonstrate, that sameness of
mental state does not require syntactic sameness of in-
ternal representations Various replies to this objection
are available The objection trades on a questionable
assumption about the identity of various mental states
such as desires The very disparity of the internal rep-
resentations may be grounds for supposing that the
objection s conjecture of identical mental states and
behavioral agreement may be mistaken
2 The frame problem and scripts 47
2 1 Combinatorial explosion 47
Sententialism denies that it is possible for an agent to
have infinitely many beliefs, while allowing that, on
occasion, an agent may be disposed to have any of in-
finitely many potential beliefs The beliefs an agent
actually has are those necessary best to explain the
agent s behavior Since Sententialism posits dynamic
belief sets, it is subject to the frame problem, the task
of specifying how an agent is able to modify his or
her belief store consistently with changes in the
agent s environment The limited success of the the-
ory of scripts in Artificial Intelligence indicates that
the frame problem can be solved in principle The de-
tails of its ultimate solution are properly left to empir-
ical inquiry
2 2 The range and context of scripts 56
Dreyfus has raised various objections to appealing to
scripts in order to solve the frame problem These ob-
jections can be answered by noting that they depend
IX
on mistaking the current for the possible final state of
the art Our understanding of concepts comes in de-
gree and varies across agents A contemporary script
can be viewed as a limited, artificial, and highly re-
stricted conceptual system
2 3 Modular cognitive systems 63
We take up Fodor s worry that the general processes
of belief fixation may not admit of a computational
solution if belief fixation is, as Fodor says, isotropic
and Quinean Four answers seem open First, Fodor
may err in taking belief fixation to be isotropic and
Quinean Belief fixation is to be modeled on the
growth of science Yet science as practiced seems not
to be isotropic and Quinean Second, the causal pro-
cesses that govern belief fixation may be amenable to
understanding Third, Fodor allows that encapsulated
cognitive modules are not subject to the frame prob-
lem Yet these modules may well be nondemonstra-
tive systems in the same sense as the central processes
of belief fixation are So, if modules are not finally
subject to the frame problem, the same may be true
of the processes of belief fixation generally Fourth, it
is possible that we are nothing but interactive cogni-
tive modules bereft of any central system of belief
fixation
3 Intelligence, rationality, and behavior 70
3 1 Intelligent behavior and brute reaction 70
What distinguishes mental processes, as causal pro-
cesses, from nonmental causal processes? Fodor s an-
swer that only mental processes include representa-
tions of the rules that govern the processes is rejected
on the grounds that the ability to represent such rules
may surpass the actual representational powers of the
agents in question Rather, mental processes are dis-
tinguished from nonmental processes by virtue of the
matter out of which mental representations are drawn
Sententialism distinguishes those effects of mental rep-
resentations that are genuine bits of behavior from
those that are not by adverting to the rational rela-
tions that bind the former, but not the latter, types of
effects to their mental causes Two relevant senses of
rationality are proposed
3 2 Rationality and behavior 83
Sententialism entails that all behavior is the rational
product of mental states Behavior that appears to be
nonrational seems so when judged against the whole
corpus of the agent s mental states rather than when it
is assessed relative only to those mental states that ac-
tually cause it Should utterly nonrational events be
shown to be caused by mental states, the efficacy of
the mental states would be seen not to reside in those
properties of the states encoding their content When
the actual effects of mental states in fact preclude the
satisfaction of the desires encoded in those states, the
effects are properly characterized as failed attempts to
achieve results other than those actually produced If
each bit of behavior is best described as an attempt to
achieve some goal, then possibly more effects of men-
tal states qualify as behavior than common sense is in-
clined to recognize So much the worse for untutored
common sense
3 3 Causal waywardness 94
A nonbehavioral event that accidentally results in the
satisfaction of an agent s desire may in fact be caused
by that very desire in concert with the agent s plan to
satisfy that desire This would seem to imply the con-
tradiction that the nonbehavioral event is indeed a bit
of behavior But examples cited to illustrate such cases
fail to demonstrate satisfactorily both that the relevant
mental states are the actual cause of the event and that
the representational properties of the mental states are
the efficacious properties
3 4 Empirical tests of rationality 99
Various empirical studies suggest that much of what
passes for behavior is not rational It is questionable
whether the studies actually isolate genuine behavioral
episodes The best reaction to these studies may be to
note that the experiments fail to acknowledge that the
behavior is embedded in self-correcting systems that
serve to preserve the rationality of the behavior Stich
argues that selected experiments indicate the failure of
cognitive agents to achieve rationality But the evi-
dence in question may be differently construed consis-
tent with the rationality of the agents
XI
4 Along the cognitive spectrum 109
4 1 The scope of Sententialism 109
Sententialism does not maintain that all behavior is
rooted in sentential processes Instead it proposes only
that behavior traced to propositional attitudes is gov-
erned by sentential processes The Churchlands raise
various objections to this thesis Paul Churchland
charges that Sententialism is too parochial ever to
comprehend much of what is important to the psy-
chology of nonverbal agents This objecion wrongly
assumes that a nonverbal agent could not instantiate
an unspoken mental language as a system of cognitive
representation Patricia Smith Churchland urges
against Sententialism that it incorrectly entails that
concept learning is an illusion, that human language is
necessarily static, and, consequently, that scientific ad-
vance is impossible An explanation of how Senten-
tialism allows for conceptual change is offered in
reply
4 2 From infant to adult 116
Paul Churchland admonishes Sententialism for failing
to account for the continuity of the psychological pro-
cesses common to infants and adults An explanation
of the possibility of developmental psychology s being
sententially based is provided Also, it may, in the
end, be incorrect to suppose that the psychologies of
infant and adult are in fact the same Churchland also
is concerned that Sententialism imposes on the child
too sophisticated a system of computation Yet it is
unclear whether proposed alternative systems are any
less complex Sententialism, Churchland finally wor-
ries, may fail to accommodate the stability of the pro-
cesses that allow for belief revision Nevertheless, this
stability is ensured if the principles or laws that gov-
ern belief revision are not among the mental represen-
tations encoded with an agent Additionally, if all
accepted truths are, in principle, subject to revision,
then the very principles dictating belief revision, if
mentally represented, would themselves be open to
disconfirmation But this is compatible with doxastic
stability if such stability requires only that epistemic
principles are relatively, though not absolutely, resist-
ant to modification and revised only rarely and over
many generations
xn
4 3 Doxastic holism and Mentalese ambiguity 124
Stich argues that Mentalese is ambiguous, that tokens
of the same syntactic structure can vary in content
But the examples marshaled by Stich to illustrate his
claim are open to alternative interpretations One
trades on the issue of neurological impairment and
may thereby prejudice the case against Sententialism
Also questionable is whether the examples ensure the
syntactic identity of the relevant representations Ad-
ditionally, allowing that the comprehension of con-
cepts varies in degree may stall Stich s objection
5 The matter of intentionality 140
5 1 Searle s argument against Artificial Intelligence 140
Searle s argument that Artificial Intelligence cannot
explain the intentionality of mental states is reviewed
5 2 Artificial Intelligence at bay 145
In defense of Artificial Intelligence, one might hold
that Searle s argument incorrectly supposes that a pro-
gram for language comprehension would also need to
drive complementary nonlinguistic behavior This re-
ply fails to appreciate that language comprehension
can in principle be teased apart from nonlinguistic
behavior In any event, even when language-
comprehension programs are associated with routines
controlling nonlinguistic behavior, understanding is
not ensured, because it remains open that the agent
may not conceive of the relevant behavior in the
proper way
5 3 Language comprehension and translation 152
Being multilingual presupposes the ability to trans-
late across known languages This ability is not
guaranteed by standardly envisioned language-
comprehension programs
5 4 Fragmented agents 157
Proponents of Artificial Intelligence may be inclined
to suppose that a program for language comprehen-
sion within an intelligent system constitutes a distinct
cognitive agent Nevertheless, this gambit does not
account for the fact that the introduced linguistic
agent is not the agent assumed to have originally ac-
quired the language in question
xm
5 5 Cognitive psychology as a formal theory 162
Stich s Syntactic Theory of the Mind eschews ascrip-
tions of content to mental states, instead supposing
that psychology ought to attend only to syntactic
properties of mental representations The reasons on
which Stich draws to justify repudiating ascriptions of
content may be deflected if they depend on the un-
warranted assumption that different environments of
cognitive agents require different, if any, content as-
signments to syntactically identical mental
representations
5 6 The mundane matter of mind 169
The apparent inability of Artificial Intelligence to ex-
plain the nature of intentionality suggests that inten-
tionality is a phenomenon essentially located in only
certain kinds of material structures This is not to say,
however, that Artificial Intelligence errs in holding
that formal relations among representations contribute
to the contents of those representations The inten-
tionality of a state may, in the end, be a function of
its matter, whereas the state s specific content may be
determined by its causal relations Arguments against
the materialistic basis of intentionality typically begin
with the assumption that it is possible for intentional
states to be registered in matter of any kind whatso-
ever Although this assumption may be correct, it re-
mains unsubstantiated Thus, any argument that
depends on this assumption is open to legitimate
question
6 Fixing the content of mental sentences 177
6 1 Empiricism and mental representations 177
Mental representations occur when sensation induces
intentional states Such states are assumed to be foun-
dational in a theory of mental content Nativism is dis-
avowed, and it is therefore necessary to explain how
content accrues to mental representations current in
sensuous experience
62A causal explanation of sensuous representation 179
Sensory states represent their causes As Mentalese
types, sensory states refer and predicate Sensuous
Mentalese predicates are those features of sensory
states that place the states in their physical types
Mentalese predicates ascribe the properties of physical
xiv
objects that cause the occurrence of the sensory states
that encompass the predicates Those features of a
sensory state that differentiate it from other states of
the same type function as the referential term in the
state Sensuous Mentalese terms - subjects and predi-
cates - are thoroughly demonstrative They refer and
attribute without describing or classifying
6 3 Objections and replies 191
Causal theories apparently entail, contrary to fact, that
mental representations are infallible Two responses
are offered First, some of the assumptions on which
the charge of infallibility rest are dubious Second, the
apparent infallibility can be tolerated by Sententialism
if it is restricted to demonstrative sensuous mental
representations Also raised against causal theories of
representation is the complaint that although reference
is supposed to be to the object that causes the repre-
sentational state, there is in fact no unique object that
stands as the cause of the state This objection is par-
ried if the referent of a sensuous mental representation
is singled out as the object causally necessary only (so
far as causing sensory states is considered) for the oc-
currence of the state encoding that representation
6 4 Sensory doppelgangers 200
Doppelgangers agree in sensuous representation, even
if they do sense things of different physical kinds, so
long as the causal properties of the sensed objects
coincide
65Up from sensation 202
The content of a nonsensuous Mentalese representa-
tion is determined by its typical causes and effects
within a cognitive system Sensuous Mentalese terms
contribute to the meanings of nonsensuous Mentalese
terms by contributing to the causation of the nonsen-
suous terms Although the content of a Mentalese
term may be fixed by its etiological relations, ascrip-
tions of content to a Mentalese term are, at best, hy-
potheses as to the best explanation Thought experi-
ments of Putnam and Burge show not that the con-
tent of Mentalese terms of the same type depend on
the contexts of their occurrence but, rather, that the
content of such terms may not easily be reported in
public languages
xv
6 6 Meaning and definition 215
Nonsensuous Mentalese terms are not necessarily de-
finable in terms of sensuous Mentalese terms It is
necessary, however, for the meaningfulness of non-
sensuous Mentalese terms that they bear some, even if
remote, causal and semantic relations to sensuous
Mentalese terms In this sense, nonsensuous Mentalese
terms derive their meanings much as do theoretical
terms in recorded theoretical discourse Sensuous
Mentalese sentences may infallibly represent Nonsen-
suous Mentalese sentences are fallible, however, since
their occurrences are modeled on fallible inferences
7 The quality of consciousness 220
7 1 Functional accounts of consciousness 220
Functional accounts of consciousness are suspect on
the grounds that they do not happily accommodate
the possibility of inverted qualia spectra and also seem
wrongly to allow for unconscious artificial cognitive
systems
7 2 Could qualia be nonpsychological? 225
Graham and Stephens contend that a quale is a non-
psychological bodily property within a compound
state, one element of which is a psychological state
representing that bodily state They maintain that
their proposal depends on there being nonpsychologi-
cal descriptions of qualia The examples they cite to
defend this claim are suspect, however, and also seem
to imply incorrectly that humans and bees must expe-
rience the same color qualia
7 3 Sententialism and consciousness 228
Sententialism, supplemented by the hypothesis that
cognition is rooted in matter of a certain sort, entails
that consciousness is to be located in the use of Men-
talese as physically encoded It thus implies that only
creatures endowed with the right kind of matter could
be conscious Different agents can experience the same
qualia only if they can have physically identical types
of sensory states Qualia, according to Sententialism,
are fundamentally physical-syntactic features of sen-
suous Mentalese representations An explanation of
unfelt and nonaversive pain is provided
xvi
7 4 Sensation and qualia 237
Some qualia, such as fear, appear not to be necessarily
occurrent in sensory states Nevertheless, the qualia
associated with such selected propositional attitudes
are properly traced to the occurrence of sensory states
caused by the onset of the propositional attitude That
only some types of propositional attitudes result in
sensory states explains why only some types of prop-
ositional attitudes have characteristic qualia
7 5 Moods 241
The effect that moods have on cognitive processing is
best explained without reference to qualia The qualia
typical of a mood are very likely the summation of
the qualia occurrent in the sensory states caused by
the nonsensuous representations constituting the prop-
ositional attitudes characteristic of the mood
7 6 The subjectivity of consciousness 244
The hypothesis of the Material Basis of Cognition im-
plies that an understanding of consciousness is ex-
hausted by an understanding of the physical properties
of mental representations Nagel and Jackson object,
but their concern seems to rest on the mistaken pre-
supposition that the vocabulary of the physical sci-
ences is inadequate for the description of qualia
7 7 What it is like to be different 247
In order to understand fully what it is like to be an
agent of an alien conscious kind, one would need (1)
to know what it is like to be a thing of the relevant
kind and (2) to experience as do members of that kind
Knowledge of the physiology of the agent, together
with an interpretation scheme for the agent s system
of mental representation, suffices for knowing what it
is like to be a thing of the agent s kind To experience
as do members of the agent s kind involves suffering
the physical types of sensory states that agents of the
relevant kind suffer
7 8 Artificial consciousness 252
The hypothesis of the material basis of mentation does
not necessarily preclude that some artificially intelli-
gent agents could be genuinely intelligent No princi-
pled reason entails that artifice could not so structure
the matter characteristic of naturally intelligent sys-
tems into an artificial agent Such an artificial system
xvn
could indeed be conscious because consciousness is a
function of sensory systems based in the proper type
of matter
References 254
Index 267
xvm
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| id | DE-604.BV002750786 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T15:49:05Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521370310 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-001758665 |
| oclc_num | 18984939 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-29 DE-83 DE-11 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-29 DE-83 DE-11 DE-188 |
| physical | XXVII, 273 S. |
| publishDate | 1989 |
| publishDateSearch | 1989 |
| publishDateSort | 1989 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Pr. |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in philosophies |
| spelling | Maloney, J. Christopher Verfasser aut The mundane matter of the mental language J. Christopher Maloney 1. publ. Cambridge u.a. Cambridge Univ. Pr. 1989 XXVII, 273 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophies Grammaire comparée et générale Pensée Philosophie de l'esprit Psycholinguistique Représentation mentale Taalpsychologie gtt Grammatik Psychologie Grammar, Comparative and general Sentences Psychological aspects Mental representation Philosophy of mind Psycholinguistics Thought and thinking Sprache (DE-588)4056449-6 gnd rswk-swf Psycholinguistik (DE-588)4127537-8 gnd rswk-swf Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd rswk-swf Denken (DE-588)4011450-8 gnd rswk-swf Psycholinguistik (DE-588)4127537-8 s Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 s DE-604 Denken (DE-588)4011450-8 s Sprache (DE-588)4056449-6 s HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=001758665&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Maloney, J. Christopher The mundane matter of the mental language Grammaire comparée et générale Pensée Philosophie de l'esprit Psycholinguistique Représentation mentale Taalpsychologie gtt Grammatik Psychologie Grammar, Comparative and general Sentences Psychological aspects Mental representation Philosophy of mind Psycholinguistics Thought and thinking Sprache (DE-588)4056449-6 gnd Psycholinguistik (DE-588)4127537-8 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Denken (DE-588)4011450-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056449-6 (DE-588)4127537-8 (DE-588)4031630-0 (DE-588)4011450-8 |
| title | The mundane matter of the mental language |
| title_auth | The mundane matter of the mental language |
| title_exact_search | The mundane matter of the mental language |
| title_full | The mundane matter of the mental language J. Christopher Maloney |
| title_fullStr | The mundane matter of the mental language J. Christopher Maloney |
| title_full_unstemmed | The mundane matter of the mental language J. Christopher Maloney |
| title_short | The mundane matter of the mental language |
| title_sort | the mundane matter of the mental language |
| topic | Grammaire comparée et générale Pensée Philosophie de l'esprit Psycholinguistique Représentation mentale Taalpsychologie gtt Grammatik Psychologie Grammar, Comparative and general Sentences Psychological aspects Mental representation Philosophy of mind Psycholinguistics Thought and thinking Sprache (DE-588)4056449-6 gnd Psycholinguistik (DE-588)4127537-8 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Denken (DE-588)4011450-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Grammaire comparée et générale Pensée Philosophie de l'esprit Psycholinguistique Représentation mentale Taalpsychologie Grammatik Psychologie Grammar, Comparative and general Sentences Psychological aspects Mental representation Philosophy of mind Psycholinguistics Thought and thinking Sprache Psycholinguistik Kognition Denken |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=001758665&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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