Causality and determinism:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Columbia Univ. Press
1974
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Woodbridge lectures
10 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXI, 143 S. |
| ISBN: | 0231037589 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Titel: Causality and determinism
Autor: Wright, Georg Henrik von
Jahr: 1974
Contents
Parti
l
Introductory remarks on aim and method.
Only one idea of causation and deter¬
minism will be discussed. This idea of cau¬
sation is intrinsically connected with ideas
of human action (experiment, interference,
manipulation). Determinants of human ac¬
tion will not be discussed here at all. 1
2
The need for an analysis of the notions of
cause and effect. Suggested analyses of
causation in the terms of functional or prob¬
abilistic relationships, and in the terms of
conditionship relations. Priority here ac¬
corded to the last. 3
3
The Logic of Conditions—a branch of
quantification theory or of modal logic?
ix
The extensionalist and the intensionalist
position. 5
4
A causal conditionship relation must war¬
rant counterfactual conditional statements
about past occasions. The extensionalist
view of conditions cannot secure this. 7
5
Neither the extensionalist nor the inten¬
sionalist analysis of conditions seems capa¬
ble of capturing the asymmetry or direct-
edness which is characteristic of causal
relations. 10
6
The ontological background: a logico-
atomistic world-model constructed in the
terms of states of affairs and temporally re¬
lated occasions. World-history a succession
of logically independent total states in a
discrete time-medium. The notions of state,
process, and event. 13
x
7
Causal restrictions on world developments.
A measure of degrees of determination
(freedom). A topological illustration of pos¬
sible histories from a given now towards
the future. 17
8
The logics of tomorrow and of yester¬
day, of the future and of the past. Their
correspondence with the modal systems M,
S4, R, and S4.3 respectively. The notions of
perhaps and certainly. Epistemic and
ontic alternatives (possibilities). Deter¬
minism. The open future and the closed
past. Closedness and linearity. 19
9
All time. The notion of lost possibilities.
The causally necessary and the universally
true. 26
iO
Causally necessary states and nomic con¬
nections. Contingency clauses. Contiguity
and causal action at a distance. Nomic
xi
connections, conditionship relations, and
causes. 27
ii
Analysis of counterfactual conditional state¬
ments. Categorical and hypothetical coun-
terfactuals. The extraction of counterfac-
tuals from nomic generalizations. 31
Summary of sections 8-11. The fourfold
structure of world development. The asym¬
metry between the past and the future.
Suggested arguments for overcoming the
asymmetry: epistemically, both past and fu¬
ture are branching; ontically, both might be
linear (closed). 33
Part II
i
The ontic difference between an accidental
regularity and a nomic or lawlike connec¬
tion is marked by the element of counter-
factual conditionality inherent in the latter.
To establish lawlikeness is to verify the
xii
presence of this element. Since the past is
afait accompli, verification is possible only
in some oblique sense. Thesis: the verifi¬
cation of causal counterfactuals takes
place through interfering with the world
( nature ). 36
2
The concept of an action. Distinction be¬
tween productive and preventive action
and between the result and the conse¬
quences of an action. The idea that we can
act rests upon our confidence in what
would be the course of nature if we did not
interfere. This element of counterfactual
conditionality involved in action is not,
however, a confidence in causal counterfac¬
tuals. 39
3
The test procedure for causal counterfac¬
tual conditionals. We produce p, when oth¬
erwise it would remain absent, and notice
q follow; we let p stay absent, and notice
that q remains absent too. Why this exper¬
iment and supplementing observation
impress us. The elimination of a common
cause of p and q. The disentangling of p
from other possible causes of q. 44
xiii
4
Causal relations subsist between events
(states) in nature, not between agents and
events. Causation, therefore, is existen-
tially independent of agency. The depen¬
dence of the first notion upon the second is
conceptual; it exists by virtue of the fact
that the notion of agency is involved in the
conceptual structure of the peculiar facts
upon which the distinction between nomic
and accidental regularities is founded.
Comparison with the position of Hume. 48
5
The double foundation of our concepts: in
the historical and social setting of our cul¬
ture; and in facts of the world. The notion
of causation which we are here trying to
clarify depends for its existence upon a cer¬
tain degree of logical atomism in the build
of the world, upon repeatability and regu¬
lar successions among generic states of af¬
fairs, and upon the separability of discrete
occasions in time. These requirements may
to a greater or lesser degree be fulfilled for
various regions of the world. 54
xiv
6
The notion of manipulative (actionist, ex¬
perimentalist) causation. The division of
reality into man and nature, and the
corresponding division of the sciences.
Causation in the natural sciences primarily
of the manipulative type. We acknowledge
as causal (nomic) only such regularities that
can be related to the hard core of laws over
which we have experimental control in our
laboratories. But many laws of nature have
the character of conceptual principles, true
by convention, and are not experimentally
testable nomic connections. 57
Part III
l
The problem of the asymmetry of the
causal relation reconsidered. The asym¬
metry is not only temporal. How it can be
maintained also when cause and effect
occur simultaneously. The example of the
container with the two valves. 62
xv
2
Laws which state a functional relationship
between determinates (values) or deter-
minables (variables) are not normally
called causal. But changes in the deter¬
minates are causally related. These causal
relations are the basis of the functional law.
Functional relations, therefore, cannot re¬
place causality. The cause-effect distinc¬
tion and the distinction between indepen¬
dent and dependent variables. 68
3
The causal relation holds primarily be¬
tween events and not between states. The
concept of an event. Elementary events. An
event is a change among states of affairs—
and the negation of an event is a not-
change or constancy. Four possible ways in
which changes and constancies may be
causally related. 70
4
A change can be causally sufficient for an¬
other change—and a constancy can be cau¬
sally necessary for another constancy. But
xvi
only in an oblique sense can a change cau¬
sally condition a constancy, or a constancy
a change. Counteracting or intervening
causes. They destroy the frame within
which a genuine causal law holds between
changes or between constancies. 73
5
The concept of a frame of a causal law. Ce-
teris paribus clauses. The indeterminacy
inherent in the frame means that the choice
between falsifying a law and correcting its
frame is always open. The distinction be¬
tween counteracting and acting causes. 79
6
The symbolic expression of causal laws.
Contingency- and opportunity-clauses
needed to cut out trivialities. The notion of
an instance of a law. A productive cause is
not necessarily also a sustaining cause. 83
7
The test condition for nomicity. Its full for¬
mulation requires the introduction of new
symbolic means. 86
xvii
8
The distinction between the physically and
the causally possible and between the phy¬
sically certain and the inevitable (causally
necessary). The validity of causal laws
usually subject to a condition of non-inter¬
ference after the cause has materialized.
How to express in symbols that states have
come or can come to exist through action. 89
9
The symbolic expression of the test condi¬
tion for the lawlike character of an ob¬
served regularity. 93
10
Remarks on a problem of Mill: Why is
night not a cause of day? Suggested an¬
swer: The fact that night and day are op¬
posed as contradictories makes it logically
impossible to test the lawlike character of
the uniformity. 95
xviii
Part IV
1
The idea of Universal Determinism. Its re¬
striction to changes in nature. Nothing
happens without a cause interpreted as
meaning that no change occurs unless an¬
other change occurred which, under the cir¬
cumstances, was its causally sufficient con¬
dition. 99
2
A weaker interpretation of the determinis¬
tic principle only says that for every kind of
change there exists another kind of change
such that a change of the second kind is a
causally sufficient condition for a change of
the first kind. The idea of universal simula-
bility of natural events. 102
3
Definition of the notion of a (generically)
determined change. Determination and
overdetermination. Two alternative formu¬
lations of the strong thesis of Universal De¬
terminism. 105
xix
4
Universal Determinism, or the reign of
law, entails that the history of the world is
a linear succession of total states. 107
5
The linearity of the succession of world-
states does not entail determinism under
law. Step-by-step necessity and the idea
of determinism through the foreknowledge
of a divine being. If we know that p will
obtain, p is certain to obtain. Ill
6
The Laplacean demon idea—a stronger
version of the idea of Universal Deter¬
minism under law. 115
7
The problem of reconciling Universal De¬
terminism with the possibility of (free) ac¬
tion. Its solution would not prove that de¬
terminism is true. 120
xx
8
The agent and the experimenter. An at¬
tempt to show that action is compatible
with the determined character of its result. 122
9
Why the existence of causes for the results
of our actions does not necessarily make ac¬
tion an illusion. 128
iO
The truth of Universal Determinism must
remain an open question. We can settle it
only for fragments of the world. In order to
discriminate between ontic and epistemic
alternatives (show that some are merely
epistemic ) we must admit alternatives for
which such discrimination has not yet been
made. How this fact is related to the thesis
that the concept of cause presupposes that
of action. 133
Appendix 137
Index 141
xxi
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| physical | XXI, 143 S. |
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| spelling | Wright, Georg Henrik von 1916-2003 Verfasser (DE-588)118635328 aut Causality and determinism Georg Henrik von Wright New York Columbia Univ. Press 1974 XXI, 143 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Woodbridge lectures 10 Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 gnd rswk-swf Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 gnd rswk-swf Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd rswk-swf Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 s Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 s DE-604 Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 s Woodbridge lectures 10 (DE-604)BV001889444 10 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=001473878&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Wright, Georg Henrik von 1916-2003 Causality and determinism Woodbridge lectures Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 gnd Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 gnd Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4018326-9 (DE-588)4149218-3 (DE-588)4030102-3 |
| title | Causality and determinism |
| title_auth | Causality and determinism |
| title_exact_search | Causality and determinism |
| title_full | Causality and determinism Georg Henrik von Wright |
| title_fullStr | Causality and determinism Georg Henrik von Wright |
| title_full_unstemmed | Causality and determinism Georg Henrik von Wright |
| title_short | Causality and determinism |
| title_sort | causality and determinism |
| topic | Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 gnd Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 gnd Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Freiheit Determinismus Kausalität |
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