Nuclear weapon tests: prohibition or limitation?
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
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Oxford
Oxford Univ. Pr.
1988
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXII, 423 S. |
| ISBN: | 0198291205 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804115241257140224 |
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| adam_text | Nuclear Weapon Tests:
Prohibition or Limitation?
Edited by
Jozef Goldblat and David Cox
sipri
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
CUPS
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Contents
Foreword xviii
Preface xix
Acronyms xxi
Parti Summary and conclusions 3
Jozef Goldblat and David Cox
I Introduction 3
II How necessary was it for the nuclear weapon powers to
test a nuclear explosive before building a weapon
stockpile? 4
III Why were further test explosions needed after nuclear
weapons had been developed, manufactured and
stockpiled? 4
New weapon designs—Reliability of the stockpiled
weapons—Effects and physics tests—Security and safety
tests—Need to retain the technology base
IV Why did negotiations for a nuclear test ban begin, and why
did they fail? 8
V What is the value of the test limitation treaties which have
been signed? 10
The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty—The 1974 Threshold
Test Ban Treaty—The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty
VI How important is verification in achieving a test ban? 15
VII How are the existing test limitation treaties verified? 15
The PTBT—The TTBT—The PNET
VIII What are the present capabilities for detecting under-
ground nuclear explosions? 17
IX How could monitoring capabilities be improved to render
evasion difficult or impossible? 19
International system—In-country stations—Non-seismic
means of verification—On-site inspection— Advantages
of cheating
X What are the present attitudes of states towards nuclear
testing? 22
The United States—The Soviet Union—The United King-
dom, France and China—Non-nuclear weapon countries
vi NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?
XI What would be the impact of a comprehensive test ban on
the nuclear arms race? 25
XII What other effects would result from a test ban? 26
XIII Conclusions 27
Part 2 Overview of nuclear explosions
Chapter I The purpose of nuclear test explosions
Paper 1
J Carson Mark
I
II
III
IV
V
Paper 2
Abstract
Introduction
US testing experience
Weapon improvements—Adaptation to weapon car-
riers—Effects tests—Safety tests—Peaceful nuclear
explosions—Summary
Weapon development without testing
Confidence in stockpiled weapons
Conclusion
Notes and references
Donald M Kerr
I
II
III
IV
V
Abstract
Introduction
The role of testing in weapon development
Weapon reliability
Can calculations replace testing?
Consequences of testing restraints
Chapter II The role of laboratory tests
Paper 3
Donald R Westervelt
I
II
III
Abstract
The importance of very-low-yield nuclear tests
What is a nuclear test?— Beginner states—Nuclear
weapon powers—ICF and similar tests—Summary
Field test requirements for beginner states
Why a field test?—Summary
Laboratorv tests to replace underground explosions
Objectives of nuclear weapon programmes—Develop-
ment of new weapon designs—Improvements in safety
and security—Assurance of force survivability—
Avoidance of technological surprise—Discovery and cor-
CONTENTS vii
rection of stockpile problems—Design technology
base—Summary
Notes and references 58
Chapter III Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes 59
Paper 4 59
Iris Y P Borg
Abstract 59
I Introduction 59
II Development of the US PNE programme, 1957-77 60
Background—Research and phenomenology experi-
ments—Excavation—Development of PNE explosives—
Gas stimulation—Heavy element production—Under-
ground storage
III Feasibility studies on application of nuclear explosions 65
IV Termination of the Plowshare programme 66
V Soviet PNE programme to 1973 67
VI Soviet PNE programme after 1973 68
VII Economic viability of PNEs 70
VIII PNEs in emerging nuclear countries 71
IX Impact of the PTBT, NPT, TTBT and PNET 71
Notes and references 73
Table 4 1 Plowshare experiments 62
Table 4 2 Plowshare feasibility studies 65
Table 4 3 Cost of conventional and nuclear development 70
Chapter IV Environmental effects of underground nuclear
explosions 75
Paper 5 75
A C McEwan
Abstract 75
I Phenomenological effects 75
Cavity, fracture and chimney formation—seismic and
ground shock effects—Fault displacements, aftershocks
and earthquakes—Other shock-induced effects
II Pathways for dispersal of radionudides in the environ-
ment 81
Production and initial distribution of radionudides—
Venting—Leakage
III Conclusions 89
Notes and references 89
Table 5 1 Examples of scaled depths of burial for five tests at
the Nevada Test Site 79
viii NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?
Table 5 2 Inventory of some fission product and actinide radio-
nudides arising from underground tests at different times after
detonation 82
Figure 5 1 The fracture zone and chimney formed after col-
lapse of the cavity in a deep underground nuclear detonation 77
Figure 5 2 US Air Force helicopters fly DOE radiation-
monitoring personnel and photographers over Yucca Flat
during tests 78
Figure 5 3 Strontium-90 annual deposition in New Zealand and
at Milford Haven, UK 84
Part 3 The historical record
Chapter V Survey of past nuclear test ban negotiations 95
Paper 6 95
measures: the
Chapter VI The nuclear explosion limitation treaties 119
Paper 7 119
Jozef Goldblat
Abstract 119
I Introduction 119
II The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty 120
Scope of the obligations—Verification—Entry into force
and amendments—Implementation—Assessment of the
PTBT
III The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty 127
Scope of the obligations—Verification—Implementation
—Assessment of the TTBT
IV The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 133
Scope of Ihe obligations—Verification—Implementation
—Assessment of the PNET
V Conclusions 139
Notes and references 140
G Allen
I
II
III
IV
V
Greb
Abstract
Introduction
The early years: hope and frustration
The PTBT—The NPT—More partial
TTBT and the PNET
Renewed CTB negotiations, 1977-80
New leaders and the test ban, 1981-86
Conclusion
Notes and references
CONTENTS ix
Part 4 The question of verification
Chapter VII Present capabilities for the detection and identi-
fication of seismic events 145
Paper 8 145
Lynn R Sykes
Abstract 145
I Introduction 145
II Recent scientific advances in the verification of nuclear
testing 146
More accurate estimates of yields of Soviet explosions—
Recent advances in identifying very small underground
nuclear tests
III Capabilities for monitoring a comprehensive test ban
treaty 150
IV Soviet compliance with the TTBT 151
V Disadvantages to US security interests if the TTBT and
SALT II do not continue in force 154
Table 8 1 Thresholds for reliable identification of underground
nuclear explosions using seismic networks external and inter-
nal to the USSR 150
Figure 8 1 Example of recordings made by the Norwegian
Seismic Array of a large earthquake followed by a very small
underground nuclear explosion at the eastern Kazakhstan test
site, USSR 148
Figure 8 2 Histogram of the number of underground explo-
sions at the Arctic test site, USSR, in Novaya Zemlya from
1964 to 1975 as a function of size 154
Appendix 8A Letter to Hugh E DeWitt, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory 156
Appendix 8B Weapons of various sizes that had been tested by
Spring 1985 158
Paper 9 159
Dennis C Fakley
Abstract 159
I Introduction 159
II Seismic detection 159
III Seismic identification 161
Location—Depth of focus—P-wave first motion—Com-
plexity and spectral discriminants—The mb:Ms
criterion—Identification at regional distances
IV Yield/magnitude relationships and evasion scenarios 165
V An overall assessment of current seismic verification
technology 167
x NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?
VI The potential for seismic verification improvements 167
VII Differences in CTB verification assessments 168
Chapter VIII International seismological verification 169
Paper 10 169
Peter W Basham and Ola Dahlman
Abstract 169
I Introduction 169
II Historical background 170
Geneva experts, 1958-59—Development of national pro-
grammes—International efforts
III The 1978 CCD global system 174
CCD Group of Scientific Experts—Seismograph
stations—Parameter data derived at stations—Waveform
data—Parameter data communications—International
data centres—An opening to the future system
I V An international seismological verification system 179
Political requirements—A three-tiered verification
system
V Implementation of the global system 186
VI Conclusions 187
Notes and references 188
Figure 10 1 Schematic diagram of the international seismic
data exchange system described by the GSE in its first report,
Figure 10 2 A global seismograph network described by the
GSE in its first report in 1978, as an example of stations that
might be selected for the global system 176
Figure 10 3 Proportional land areas of the earth occupied by
nuclear weapon states, by potential participants in the global
seismic verification system, and by potential non-participants
in the global system 188
Chapter IX In-country seismic stations for monitoring
nuclear test bans 191
Paper 11 191
Willard J Hannon, Jr
Abstract 191
I Introduction 191
II The verification process 192
The technology of in-country seismic systems—Functions
of an in-country monitoring system—Monitoring advanta-
ges of in-country stations
III CTB evasion techniques 195
IV LYTTB evasion techniques 201
CONTENTS xi
V What is acceptable verification? 203
VI Conclusions 205
Notes and references 206
Table 11 1 Functions necessary to deploy and operate an in-
country seismic monitoring system 192
Table 11 2 Approximate number of unidentified events per
year from high-performance seismic systems monitoring the
Soviet Union 201
Figure 11 1 Regional seismic waves; a regional seismic record
from a well-coupled nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site
measured at EIko, Nevada; a teleseismic record for the same
event from a high-quality array station located in Norway 196
Figure 11 2 Differences in frequency content, used to detect
explosions in the coda of an earthquake 198
Figure 11 3 Magnitude-yield relationships from Nevada Test
Site explosions and estimated detection thresholds for in-
country networks deployed in the Soviet Union 199
Figure 11 4 The estimated detection capability of an in-country
network, which varies as a function of the number and type of
stations deployed 200
Figure 11 5 The value of different networks, depending on the
evasion threat 204
Chapter X Techniques to evade detection of nuclear tests 209
Paper 12 209
Jeremy K Leggett
Abstract 209
I Introduction 209
II Evasion by cavity decoupling 210
Theory and practice—Feasibility
III Other strategies for evasion 228
Evasion by dry-alluvium muffling—Evasion by earth-
quake masking—Evasion in space
IV Conclusions 230
Notes and references 232
Chapter XI Means of nuclear test ban verification other than
seismological 237
Paper 13 237
Allan M Din
Abstract 237
I Introduction 237
II Monitoring by satellite-based sensors 238
III Radar monitoring of the ionosphere 240
IV Detection of airborne radioactivity 241
V On-site monitoring 243
xii NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?
VI Conclusions 244
Notes and references 246
Chapter XII On-site inspection to check compliance 247
Paper 14 247
Warren Heckrotte
Abstract 247
I History of on-site inspections 247
Conference of Experts, 1958—Early CTB negotiations—
Tripartite negotiations, 1977-80
II Voluntary OSIs: initiation and potential problems 252
III: Seismic monitoring: requirement for OSIs 253
IV Location of an OSI: a critical element 255
V Techniques and procedures for an OSI 255
Aerial survey—Visual and geological survey—Seismic
survey—Survey for artifacts—Radiation survey—
General considerations
VI Conclusion 259
Notes and references
Chapter XIII Degree of verification needed 265
Paper 16 265
Ray E Kidder
Abstract 265
I Introduction 265
II Distribution of US nuclear explosive yields, 1980-84 266
III Military significance of tests of various yields 267
IV Experiments with potential military significance: nuclear
weapon research 269
V Conclusions 270
Notes and references 272
Table 16 1 Percentage of tests conducted with yield less than Y
kilotons 268
Figure 16 1 The distribution of yields of nuclear explosions
conducted at the Nevada Test Site, 1980-84 267
Paper 15
A A Vasiliev and I F Bocharov
I
II
III
IV
V
Abstract
Introduction
The US and Soviet positions
The need for verification
On-site inspection
Conclusion
CONTENTS xiii
Chapter XIV Verification of a very-low-yield nuclear test
ban 273
Paper 17 273
Charles B Archambeau
Abstract 273
I Introduction 273
II Provisions of a limited test ban and verification
requirements 274
III Seismic verification: general considerations 276
IV The impact of new seismic verification methods 278
V Implications for long-term test ban verification 278
VI Relationship to the NRDC-Soviet Academy monitoring
project 279
VII Monitoring test sites using in-country seismic stations 280
VIII Identification of seismic events 285
IX Yield estimation 289
X Summary 293
Notes and references 295
Figure 17 1 Soviet salt deposits and sites of underground
nuclear explosions, 1962-85 280
Figure 17 2 US salt deposits and sites of underground nuclear
explosions, 1961-85 281
Figure 17 3 Soviet earthquakes, 1960-74 • 283
Figure 17 4(a) Earthquakes and nuclear explosions occurring
in the vicinity of the Soviet Kazakh and Azgir test sites 287
Figure 17 4(b) Discrimination results, for identification of
events in figure 17 4(a) 287
Figure 17 5 The relationship between magnitude and yield of
high coupling mb and/or Ms explosions at NTS sites, selected
non-NTS US sites and French sites 290
Figure 17 6 The relationship between magnitude and yield for
the- largest nuclear tests at eastern Kazakh 292
Part 5 Consequences of the cessation or
further limitation of nuclear tests
Chapter XV Attitudes of the nuclear weapon powers 299
Paper 18 299
Carl G Jacobsen
Abstract 299
I Introduction
II The Soviet position 300
III The US position , 302
IV The British position 304
xiv NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?
V The French position
VI The Chinese position
VII Conclusion
Notes and references
Chapter XVI Attitudes of the nuclear threshold countries
Paper 19
Peter Lomas
Abstract
I Introduction
II India
III Pakistan
IV; Argentina
V Brazil
VI South Africa
VII Israel
VIII Conclusion
Notes and references
Chapter XVII A nuclear test ban and prevention of nuclear
weapon proliferation
Paper 20
Paul C Warnke
Abstract
I Introduction
II The debate on horizontal proliferation
Tripartite CTB negotiations, 1977-80—The exemplary *
value of a tripartite agreement—Impact of a CTB on allied
nations- -Impact of a CTB in areas of regional conflict
III The debate on the question of vertical proliferation 325
Rationales for continued nuclear testing—Arguments for
an end to nuclear testing
IV The low-threshold alternative 328
Notes and references 329
Appendix 20A Letter to the Chairman of the House of Represen- 330
tatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Paper 21 332
Vitalii I Goldanskii
Abstract 332
I Introduction 332
II Horizontal proliferation 333
III Vertical proliferation 333
CONTENTS xv
IV Threshold agreements: the arms control value 334
Notes and references 334
Table 21 1 Nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon testing 332
Table 21 2 US nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site, 334
1980-84
Chapter XVIII Political, strategic and psychological effects
of a nuclear test ban 335
Paper 22 335
Eugene J Carroll, Jr
Abstract 335
I Introduction 335
II Talk-test-build arms control 337
III Possible psychological consequences of a test ban 338
IV Possible political consequences of a test ban 339
V The consequences of nuclear arms control 341
VI Conclusions 344
Notes and references 345
Annexes
Annexe 1 Existing legal limitations on nuclear explosions 349
Prepared by Ragnhild Ferm
I Major treaties 349
II Other treaties 363
Annexe 2 Major proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty 367
L, UK-USA-USSR: Tripartite Report to the Committee on
Disarmament, 30 July 1980 367
II Sweden: Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon test
explosion in any environment, 14 June 1983 370
III Group of Socialist Countries: Basic provisions of a treaty
on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear
weapon tests, 8 June 1987 375
Annexe 3 Seismological means of nuclear test ban verification:
techniques and equipment 379
Eva Johannisson
I Introduction 379
II Earthquakes 379
III Explosions 381
IV Seismic waves 382
V Magnitudes and yields 385
VI Seismographs 387
xvi NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?
VII Detection and location of seismic events 389
Array stations—Station networks
VIII Identification 392
Depth estimation—Discrimination techniques
IX Conclusions 398
Figure 1 World seismicity for a six-year period (1969-74) with
bodywave magnitudes larger than 4 0 and focal depths
between 0 and 100 km 380
Figure 2 The main test sites where nuclear explosions are
currently conducted: the Nevada Test Site in the USA,
Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk in the USSR, Lop Nor in
China and the French test site at Mururoa 381
Figure 3 Seismogram showing P-, S-, Rayleigh and Love waves
recorded from an earthquake 383
Figure 4 Seismic waves drawn as examples of some of the
phases that can be found in a recording of a seismic event 384
Figure 5 Arrival time, amplitude and period of one cycle, as
measured from the seismogram in order to locate an event and
determine its strength 385
Figure 6 Seismic magnitudes as a function of explosion yield for
different geological environments 387
Figure 7 Outline of a typical modern digital seismograph
installation 388
Figure 8 Examples of short-period records of a shallow and a
deep earthquake and of a nuclear explosion 393
Figure 9 Short- and long-period signals recorded at the Hagfors
Observatory from an underground explosion and an
earthquake 394
Figure 10 mb and M, values for a number of underground
nuclear explosions and shallow and deep earthquakes located
in the USSR, plotted in a mb:Ms diagram 395
Figure 11 Short-period signals observed at the Hagfors
Observatory from a shallow earthquake and an underground
explosion 396
Annexe 4 Nuclear explosions, 16 July 1945-1 July 1987 399
Robert S Norris and Ragnhild Ferm
I Sources 399
II Interpretation 401
Notes and references 401
Table 1 Estimated number of nuclear explosions 16 July 1945-
5 August 1963 (the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty) 402
Table 2 Estimated number of nuclear explosions 6 August
1963-30 March 1976 403
Table 3 Estimated number of nuclear explosions 31 March 1976
(date of the envisaged application of the 150-kt explosive yield
limitation under the TTBT and the PNET)-1 July 1987 404
CONTENTS xvii
Table 4 Dates and locations of individual nuclear explosions
31 March 1976 (date of the envisaged application of the 150-kt
explosive yield limitation under the TTBT and the PNET)-
1 July 1987 405
Table 5 Estimated aggregate number of nuclear explosions
16 July 1945-1 July 1987 411
Select bibliography 413
Index 417
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| spelling | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? ed. by Jozef Goldblat ... SIPRI, Stockholm Internat. Peace Research Institute ... Oxford Oxford Univ. Pr. 1988 XXII, 423 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Atomwaffenbeschränkung fes Kernwaffentest (DE-588)4139467-7 gnd rswk-swf Internationales Recht (DE-588)4027447-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Kernwaffentest (DE-588)4139467-7 s Internationales Recht (DE-588)4027447-0 s 1\p DE-604 Goldblat, Jozef Sonstige oth HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=000494773&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? Atomwaffenbeschränkung fes Kernwaffentest (DE-588)4139467-7 gnd Internationales Recht (DE-588)4027447-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139467-7 (DE-588)4027447-0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? |
| title_auth | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? |
| title_exact_search | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? |
| title_full | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? ed. by Jozef Goldblat ... SIPRI, Stockholm Internat. Peace Research Institute ... |
| title_fullStr | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? ed. by Jozef Goldblat ... SIPRI, Stockholm Internat. Peace Research Institute ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation? ed. by Jozef Goldblat ... SIPRI, Stockholm Internat. Peace Research Institute ... |
| title_short | Nuclear weapon tests |
| title_sort | nuclear weapon tests prohibition or limitation |
| title_sub | prohibition or limitation? |
| topic | Atomwaffenbeschränkung fes Kernwaffentest (DE-588)4139467-7 gnd Internationales Recht (DE-588)4027447-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Atomwaffenbeschränkung Kernwaffentest Internationales Recht Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=000494773&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT goldblatjozef nuclearweapontestsprohibitionorlimitation |