Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior: the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Boulder, Colo.
Westview Pr.
1983
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXVII, 573 S. |
| ISBN: | 0865319464 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS Ftp FOREWORD__________ IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XXIX CHAPTER I—PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY__________ 1 I. Relevant Questions and Structural Design__________________ A. Basic questions raised____________________________________ B. Design of study__________________________________________ 1. Structure_________________________________________ 2. Sources_________._________________________________ 3. Limitations of study______________________________ II. Definitions and Assumptions__________________________________ A. Diplomacy and negotiation defined________________________ 1. From the American perspective____________________ 2. From the Soviet perspective_______________________ B. Assumptions_____________________________________________ 1. On the value of diplomacy and negotiation_________ 2. Accepting the realities of conflicting perspectives____ 3. Summing up______________________________________ 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 5 7 7 8 9 CHAPTER II—DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE___________________________________________________ 11 I. In II, In Beginning_______________________________________________ A. Emerging forms of diplomatic method under the Greeks-----B. Contributions from Rome________________________________ C. The Byzantine heritage----------------------------------------------------the Modern Age___________________________________________ A. The Venetian-Italian system---------------------------------------------1. Contributions by the Venetians------------------------------2. Characteristics of the Italian system-----------------------3. Contributions
of the Italian system____________ - — 4. A mixed legacy-----------------------------------------------------B. The French system and its impact------------------------------------1. Grotius, a man before his time-------------------------------2. Richelieu’s contributions to the diplomatic methods 3. Universalizing the French diplomatic method under Louis XIV______________________________________ 4. De Callières’ counsel to negotiators and diplomats — 5. Discrediting the balance of power concept---------------6. Velue of the French diplomatic method—-------------C. Characteristics of I9th century diplomacy-------------------------1. A period of transition-------------------------------------------2. Europe, the political center of the world-----------------3. Primacy of the great powers----------------------------------4. Great power responsibility for conduct of. smaller powers_________________________________________ 5. Establishment of a professional diplomatic service---6. Continuous and confidential negotiation-----------------7. Diplomacy of “civilized society”----------------------------- the ІѴШ 1 11 11 12 13 15 15 15 15 16 17 18 18 18 19 20 22 23 23 23 24 24 24 25 25 26
ѵш III. The Rossi an Experience-------------------------------------------------------------- A. The early years.------------------------------------------------------1. Formative forces.-------------------------------------------2. Early contacts with Europe------------- -----------------3. Personal behavior and negotiating techniques of early Russian diplomats---------------------------------------B. In the 19th century--------------------------------------------------1. Changing mode of Russian diplomacy------------------2. Notable Russian diplomats-------------------------------C. Russian-American encounters--------------------------------------1. Negotiating for Alaska------------------------- ---------- (a) Seward and Stoeckl confer on Treaty of Cession_____________________________ (b) Signing of the Alaska Treaty------------------(c) Stoeckl’s role in consummating treaty------(d) Significance of Stoeckl’s role as diplomat and negotiator---------------------------------------2. Mediation at Portsmouth to end Russo-Japanese war, 1905______________________________________ (a) Deadlock in war ; search for peace------------(b) Witte’s negotiating plan------------------------(c) Negotiating sessions at Portsmouth...------(d) Witte’s performance as Russia’s negotiator. _ D. Traditionalism affirmed______________________________ Ptft 27 27 27 27 28 29 29 30 31 31 31 32 33 34 34 34 35 35 37 41 CHAPTER III—FROM REVOLUTION TO “UNITED FRONT” WITH CH1CHER1N AND LITVINOV IN THE 1920’S AND 1930’S--------43 43 I. The New Diplomacy_______________________________________ 43 A. Changing
international environment____________________ 44 B. Undermining of the old diplomacy_____________________ 44 1. Impact of World War I________________________ 44 2. Political, economic, and technological causes----------45 C. New directions of diplomacy___!_______________________ 45 1. A new internationalism_________________________ 45 2. Role of diplomat______________________________ 47 II. Impact op Bolshevik Revolution on Russian Diplomacy---------47 A. Diplomacy ideologized and revolutionized_______________ 47 1. Gestation of Socialist diplomacy_________________ 2. Bolshevik Deci ее of Peace, Nov. 8, 1917, and Trotsky’s 47 Dictum_____________________________________ 48 3. Abolition of Czariet diplomatic apparatus--------------48 B. Negotiating at Brest-Litovsk_____________________ _____ 48 1. An initiation in Bolshevik negotiating tactics_______ 49 2. Aspects of Bolshevik revolutionary behavior__ _____ 50 C. Trotsky’s legacy of revolutionary diplomacy______________ III. Çhicherin in Command____________________________________________ 51 A. Chicherin: Aristocrat, diplomat, and revolutionary________ 51 1. Shift toward traditional diplomacy________________ 51 2. The man and his career_________________________ 51 B. Soviet foreign office and diplomatic service_______________ 52 1. Requirements of a new era______________________ 52 2. Building a new diplomatic service________________ 53 3. Soviet Foreign Office: Organization, power, and con flicting purposes_______________ ^_____________ 54 4. Favorable appraisal and durable dilemmas_________ 56 C. Conduct of Soviet
diplomacy__________________________ 57 1. Defensive policy of engagement___________________ 57 2. Some aspects of early Soviet negotiating behavior...! 58 3. Genoa Conference and Rapallo Treaty, 1922_____ 59 (a) Purpose of Genoa Conference__________ I ՜ 59 (b) Russian-German meeting at Berlin_____ ! 59 (c) Negotiations at Genoa; Treaty of Rapallo.!. 60 (d) Significance of Rapallo and evaluation of γ. . Soviet performance____________________ 62 1 . Importance of Chicherin: A bridge from Czarism to Bolshe63
fm IV. Era United Front_________________________________ Ascent of Litvinov, 1930-39__________________ ,_______ 1. New requirements for changing times_____________ 2. Enter Maxim Litvinov_________________________ Soviet Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service____________ 1. Subservience of Foreign Office and its head________ 2. Devastation of the Foreign Service in the Great Purge. (a) Continuation of the Chicherin tradition____ (b) Impact of the Great Purge______________ (1) Extent of devastation___________ (2) Litvinov’s survival________ (3) The new Molotov generation of diplomats___________________ (4) Effects of the Great Purge on Soviet diplomacy-------------------3. Persisting dilemma of purposes__________________ Aspects of Soviet policy and negotiating style--- --------------1. Transcending policy thrust: Collective security_____ (a) A reflection of Litvinov, the diplomat_____ (b) The critical year 1933, the turning point----2. U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union_____________ (a) Initiation into Litvinov’s negotiating style... (b) Proceedings in Washington, November 7-16, 1933.______________________________ (1) Converging interests____________ (2) Hull’s preliminary assessment of Litvinov______ ______________ (3) Preparations for negotiations_____ (4) Deadlock and Roosevelt-Litvinov “summit” meeting____________ (5) Litvinov’s performance assessed----(6) Lessons for U.S. negotiators______ Litvinov, diplomat and negotiator: A summing up------------- of the A. B. C. D. CHAPTER IV—NEGOTIATIONS UNDER STALIN: DURING WORLD WAR II,
1939-45____________________________________________ Part I—International Setting, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations for Lend-Lease and Military Cooperation I. Diplomacy in Wartime____________________________________ A. Radical change in international environment-------------------B. As Soviets face war and diplomacy-------------------------------1. Stalin, the decisionmaker----------------------------------(a) Concentration of power_________________ (b) Value of diplomacy to Stalin---------2. Molotov and his foreign policy cadres------------------(a) The Molotov generation of diplomats--------(b) Characterizations of Molotov as diplomat and negotiator__________________________ 3. Soviet Ambassadors to the United States--------------(a) Oumansky, a walking insult”------------------(b) Litvinov, “a morning coat * * * dusted off”.. C. Problems for diplomacy and negotiators-------------------------1. Major problems in wartime negotiations---------------2. Renewal of summit diplomacy---------------------------3. Downgrading of the State Department-----------------II. Negotiating for Lend-Lease--------------------------------------------A. The Hopkins mission, July 30-31, 1941-------------------------1. Background and purpose of the mission----------------2. Hopkins confers with Stalin-------------------------------3. Considerations on the mission----------------------------(a) As a negotiating experience--------------------(b) On the preeminence of Stalin------------------(c) An encounter with Soviet suspicions---------(d) Mission accomplished---------------------------- 65 65
65 66 67 67 68 68 68 68 70 70 72 73 73 73 73 74 74 74 76 76 76 76 77 79 79 81 85 85 85 86 86 86 87 88 88 90 92 92 93 94 94 95 96 98 98 98 98 99 99 100 101 101
x II. Negotiating por Lend-Lease—Continued В The Harriman-Beaverbrook mission, September-October Pac« 102 1941_______________________________ ________ _____ 102 1. Background and purpose------------------ _------ - -------102 (a) German military successes, Soviet peril------(b) Agreement on purposes at Roosevelt-Church 102 ill Argentia meeting---------------------------104 2. Conferences with Stalin---- --------------------------------104 (a) First meeting: Elation---------------------------105 (b) Organizational meeting of delegations--------105 (c) Second meeting: Depression--------------------106 (d) Third meeting: Elation--------------------------107 (e) Plenary session and protocol---------------— 108 3. Considerations on the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission. 108 (a) From a negotiating perspective----------------108 (1) No quid pro quo________________ 109 (2) Stalin’s tactic of abuse-------- -------(3) Future agendas and the politics of 110 war_________________________ 110 (b) Views of Soviet leaders__________________ 110 (1) Harriman on Stalin--------------------111 (2) Molotov and the ambassadors------112 (c) Conference procedures___________________ 112 (1) Planning without information..-— 113 (2) Interpreters: Relying on the Soviets. 114 (3) Record of meetings with Stalin-----(4) Committee system and Soviet in 114 transigence___________________ 115 (d) Conference results and significance________ C. Hazard on negotiating under lend-lease: From the perspective 116 of Washington_____________________________________ 116 1. Organizational structure for lend-
lease_____________ 117 2. Problems in negotiating with the Soviets__________ 117 (a) Binding bureaucratic control_____________ 118 (b) Communication difficulties_______________ (c) Suspicion and its adverse impact on negotia 118 tions________________________________ (d) On understanding the American system: 119 Minuses and pluses___________________ 120 (e) On expecting gratitude__________________ 122 3. Rules for negotiating with the Soviets_____________ 122 (a) On keeping one’s self-control___ __________ (b) Patience as a virtue_____________________ 122 (c) On understanding Communist theory and value of the direct approach____________ 123 (d) On avoiding “mudslinging contest”________ 124 (e) On standing by decisions_________________ 124 4. A summing up_________________________________ 124 D. Deane on negotiating lend-lease and military cooperation: From the perspective of Moscow______________________ 125 1. Negotiating encounters with the Soviets__________ _ 125 (a) Deane’s role, his attitude and mission in Moscow_____________________________ 125 (1) Purposes of Deane’s mission______ 125 (2) His attitude toward the Russians__ 125 (3) Range of negotiations for military cooperation__________________ 126 (b) Negotiations on Soviet-liberated American POW’s______________________________ 128 (1) Problem of POW’s: Differing per ceptions______________________ 128 (2) Deane takes initiative____________ 128 (3) Agreement at Yalta; failure in com pliance_______________________ 129
II. Negotiating for Lend-Lease—Continued D. Deane on negotiating lend-lease—Continued 1. Negotiating encounters with the Soviets—Continued Ptte (c) Negotiating for airbases in Soviet Siberia___ 130 (1) The problem____________________ 130 (2) Agreement with Stalin___________ 130 (3) Stalin as a negotiator____________ 131 (4) Soviet failure to comply_________ 132 2. Soviet negotiating behavior: Characteristics and problems____________________________________ 133 (a) Ingredients of fear: Insecurity, suspicion, secrecy, and xenophobia_______________ . 133 (b) Changing cycles in cooperation____________ 135 (c) Tough bargainers: On the offensive with abuse and countercharges______________ 136 (d) Centralized decisionmaking and a binding bureaucracy__________________________ 138 (e) On agreeements “in principle”____________ 140 (f) On not taking initiatives_________________ 140 (g) Problems of language and concepts________ 141 (1) Special problems with translators and interpreters___________________ 141 (2) Conflicting concepts in ideology and military planning______________ 142 3. Precepts and guidelines for negotiating with the Soviets_________ ____________________________ 143 (a) On the value of firmness, quid pro quo and leverage_____________________________ 143 (b) On building good will and expecting gratitude. 144 (c) On expecting delays in procedure and dis criminating targets for cooperation. .i___ 144 (d) Deane to Marshall: Prescription for negotiations__________________________ 145 4. Future prospects for negotiations; Deane as a source.. 146 (a) Prospects for the
future__________________ 146 (b) Soviets as negotiators____________________ 146 (c) Deane as a source_______________________ 146 CHAPTER V—NEGOTIATIONS UNDER STALIN: DURING WORLD WAR II, 1939-45______________________________________________ 149 Part II—Major Wartime Conferences: From the Moscow Conference of 1942 to Yalta in 1945 and Descent Into the Cold War HI. Major Wartime Conferences_____________________ A. Churchill-Harriman meeting with Stalin, Aug. 12-15, 1942.. 1. Purpose of the conferences_______________________ (a) Major wartime conferences_______________ (b) Decision against second front_____________ 2. First session: Somber but friendly_________________ (a) Churchill gives bad news, then good news__ (b) Ending on happy note___________________ 3. Second session: Stalin’s tactic of abuse____________ (a) Nocturnal meetings, a calculated negotiating ploy?________________________________ (b) Stalin’s negotiating offensive______________ (c) Churchill-Harriman repulse----------------------(d) Churchill s gloom_______________________ 4. Kremlin dinners: Satisfaction and affability-----------(a) Harriman’s prediction proved correct--------(b) Churchill meets Stalin in private apartment. 5. Results of the conference------------------------------------(a) As a negotiating experience_______________ (1) Stalin’s tactic of abuse___________ (2) On the technical military talks-----(3) Technical conference matters______ (b) For the conduct of the war_______________ 149 149 149 149 149 150 150 150 151 151 151 151 151 152 152 152 153 153 153 153 154 154
хп III. Major Wartime Conferences—Continued p·** B. Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, October 1943_______ 154 1. Conference purposes and Standley s advice to Hull.. 154 (a) Participants and purposes----------------------154 (b) Standley’s advice to Hull-----------------------155 2. Principal subjects on the agenda_________________ 156 (a) Soviet pressure for the second front________ 156 (1) Molotov’s proposals________ 156 (2) Anglo-American reaction to affirma tion of second front provisional decision_____________________ 156 (3) Protocol of the conference________ 157 (b) Four-power declaration on war aims and in ternational organization_______________ 157 (1) Hull’s proposal_________________ 157 (2) Substantive sections of declaration.. 157 (3) Molotov’s objections; Hull’s firm ness________________________ 158 (c) Problems of Europe____________________ 158 (1) Setting up the European Advisory Commission__________________ 158 (2) Confederation of Europe------------158 3. Other concerns at Moscow______________________ 159 4. Results and significance of the conference-------------159 (a) As a negotiating experience-------------159 (1) Formal atmosphere of cordiality---159 (2) Hull’s hopeful assessment------------159 (3) Aggressive Soviet behavior and dila tory tactics---------------------------160 (а) Upstaging Hull on the agenda____________ .. 160 (б) Opposition to China in the four-power declaration__ 160 (c) Deane’s sideshow with Vishinsky_______________ 161 (d) Soviet dilatory tactics____ 162 (b) In acnieving its purposes: An “enormous suc
cess”_______________________________ 162 C. Conference at Teheran, November 28-December 1, 1943___ 164 1. Substantive issues_____________________________ . 164 (a) Background and purposes of the conference.. 164 (b) Questions of military strategy: Overlord____ 164 (1) Overlord, the central question_____ 164 (2) Churchill’s ambiguity; Roosevelt’s and Stalin’s solidarity__________ 165 (3) Recommendations by the combined military staffs_________________ 166 (c) Political questions: Laying the foundations of the postwar world__________________ 166 (1) The matter of territorial claims____ 166 (2) The problem of postwar Germany . _ 167 (3) Poland’s frontiers________________ 167 (4) On the United Nations organization. 168 2. Teheran as a negotiating experience_______________ 168 (a) Organization and procedures______________ 168 (1) General characteristics of the con ference__________________ 168 (2) Agenda, staffing, records, and in terpreters_____________________ 169 (а) No agenda____________ ՜՜ i69 (б) Imbalanced staffing_____ 169 (c) Absence of sufficient record. 170 (e) The interpreters__________ 171 (3) Shortcomings at Teheran, a summing up------------------------------------- 6 iri
xm III. Major Wartime Conferences—Continued C. Conference at Teheran, November 28-December 1, 1943—Con. 2. Teheran as a negotiating experience—Continued Pm· (b) Negotiating with Stalin_________________ 172 (1) Stalin’s toughness on Overlord____ 172 (2) Roosevelt s approach in negotiating with Stalin____________________ 174 (3) Churchill’s approach in negotiating with Stalin___________________ 175 3. Results and significance of the conference__________ 176 D. Yalta conference, February 4-11, 1945__________________ 177 1. Background and purpose of the conference_________ 177 (a) Approaching victory, emerging discord____ 177 (b) Goals and purposes at Yalta_____________ 178 2. Global issues in a global war_____________________ 179 (a) Range of issues___________________ _____ 179 (b) Poland and Soviet security: Stalin’s major concern______ ·----------------------------------179 (1) Military power and Soviet negotiat ing leverane.--------------------------179 (2) Negotiating Poland’s frontiers_____ 179 (а) Test between conflicting perceptions of security, political systems, and ideologies_____________ 179 (б) Stalin firm on eastern boundary_____________ 179 (e) Resolution of the frontier issue________________ 181 (3) Poland’s future government_______ 181 (a) Soviet’s negotiating advan tage---------------------------181 (ծ) Fledge for free elections___ 182 (c) Soviet entry into the Pacific War: Roosevelti major objective at Yalta_______________ 182 (1) Stalin takes the initiative_________ 182 (2) Stalin’s first draft of conditions____ 183 (3) Haminani reservations on Soviet
linguistic initiatives____________ 183 (4) Tieing up the package____________ 184 (d) Plans for a defeated Germany____________ 184 (1) Areas of agreement---------------------184 (2) The role of France: Stalin’s conces sions_________________________ 185 (3) Problem of German economic re covery and reparations-------------186 (4) Dismemberment of Germany, a lingering notion_______________ 187 3. Yalta as a negotiating experience_____________ 188 (a) Organization and procedures--------------------188 (1) General characteristics and tone of the conference_________________ 188 (2) Aspects of conference support and organization__________________ 189 (a) Procedure and agenda: Order and confusion-----189 (b) Staffing and briefing---------190 (c) Official records at Yalta----191 (b) Negotiating with Stalin---------------------------192 (1) General appraisals of Stalin’s style.. 192 (2) Stalin’s toughness and shrewdness... 193 Í3Í Concessions by Stalin------------------194 (a) A prevailing compromising spirit_________________ 194 (b) Concessions on France-----194 (c) U.N. participation and less weighty concessions------195
XIV III. Major Wartime Conferences—Continued D. Yalta conference, February 4-11,1945—Continued 3. Yalta as a negotiating experience—Continued (b) Negotiating with Stalin—Continued (4) Roosevelt’s health and effects on negotiations with Stalin-----------(c) Some lessons from the Yalta negotiations---(1) Absence of a negotiating strategy— (2) Imprecision in (Rafting---------------(3) The matter of the Kurile Islands--4. Results and significance of the conference------------(a) Achievements of negotiators-------------------(b) Prevailing mood: Optimism and hopeful expectation------- .,-----------------------------IV. Descent Into the Cold War: The View From Moscow---------A. Early signals from Harriman and Kennan in Moscow--------B. Soviet change to a “unilateral”, “isolationist” policy---------(1) Deadlock at London’s Foreign Ministers Conference. (2) Harriman’s conversation with Stalin at Gagra------(3) Ominous warnings from Litvinov__________ ____ (4) Source of Soviet aggressiveness: “Their old feeling of insecurity”_____________________________ _ (a) Effect of the atomic bomb: Andreychin’s estimate___________________________ (b) Harriman’s assessment confirmed------------C. Somber messages to the American people------------------------- CHAPTER VI—NEGOTIATIONS UNDER STALIN: DURING THE COLD WAR, 1946-53________________________________________ I. International Setting____________________________________ A. Emergence of bipolarity______________ B. Impact of the cold war on diplomacy and diplomats----------II. Characteristics of Soviet Cold War Diplomacy_____________ A.
General characteristics of Soviet behavior________________ 1. Diplomacy of abuse and hostility: A return to the Brest-Litovsk style------------2. Views on Soviet leaders and practitioners of diplomacy. (a) Bohlen on Stalin_______________________ (b) On Molotov___________________________ (cl Acheson on VishinSky___________________ (d) On Soviet diplomats____________________ 3. One-sided negotiations: An invitation to failure_____ (a) Osborn’s appraisal of the UN AEC experience. (b) Simmons’ similar experience in negotiating” cultural exchanges____________________ (c) Acheson’s diagnosis of the problem________ 4. Leites on Soviet behavior: Fear for security________ B. In the vortex of the cold war: Smith and Kennan in Moscow.. 1. Walter Bedell Smith, soldier and diplomat_________ (a) Dominating presence of the cold war_______ (b) Soviet obsession with security_____________ (c) Prospects for the future__________________ 2. Kennan in isolation____________________________ (a) Lower depths of the cold war_____________ (b) Soviet “congenital senseof insecurity”______ (c) Diplomacy, negotiations and the cold war: Paradox of Soviet purposes_____________ III. Soviet Negotiating Techniques_________________________ A. Commentary by Mosely, scholar and negotiator___________ і. Mosely s credentials as observer of Soviet negotiations • a summary of observations drawn from experience ՜ (a) Soviet negotiator, “a mechanical mouthpiece” for Moscow_ շշց Vig» 195 197 197 198 198 199 199 200 202 202 203 203 204 205 206 206 206 208 209 209 209 210 213 213 213 215 215 216 216 217 218 218 218 219
220 221 221 221 223 224 224 224 226 227 շշց շշց 229 229
XV III. Soviet Negotiating Techniques—Continued Л. Commentary by Mosely, scholar and negotiator—Continued 2. A summary of observations—Continued (b) Bound to rigid instructions______________ (c) “Treasuring of grievances’’ and the “headagaînst-stone-wall’’ technique_________ _ (d) Pitfall: Reaching “agreement in principle”.. (e) Compromise anathema to the Soviet negotiator__________________________ 3. Advice in negotiating with the Soviets____________ (a) Determine the Soviet negotiating position__ (b) Establish a “single clear position5’________ (c) Uphold position “in detail, and for a long time,” avoid constant modifications_____ (d) State position “in terms of a definite material interest”___________________________ 4. A role for negotiations in the cold war____________ B. Kennan’s rules of behavior___________________________ 1. Impossibility of close friendships_________________ 2. Conflicting “community of aims”________________ 3. Good will gestures as cause of “perplexity and sus picion”— 4. On making requests and showing displeasure on rejec tion_______________________________________ 5. On dealing with the Soviet bureaucracy___________ 6. On initiatives for high level conferences___________ 7. On the value of overkill________________________ 8. On the value of being unpleasant________________ 9. Other insights, other instructions for the negotiator.. (a) Their value: Durability and relevance_____ (b) Impact of history on Russian behavior in diplomacy__________________________ (c) On calculations of Soviet interests________ (d) Power and Soviet
behavior______________ (e) On the Soviet attitude toward agreements__ (f) Response to Soviet negotiating initiative in times of extreme American adversity____ IV. Significant Negotiating Encounters____________________________ A. Negotiations by semaphore: Lifting the Berlin blockade, 1949. 1. Soviet purposes in Berlin crisis of 1948-49__________ (a) Some successful negotiations: FEC and Nuremberg trials________________________ (b) Berlin, the ultimate threat_________________ 2. An exchange of signals______________________________ (a) Stalin’s interview by Kingsbury Smith______ (b) Acheson’s response: Signal to use private channel--------------------------------------------------3. Jessup-Malik secret meeting at the U.N____________ (a) Initial contact, February 15, 1949__________ (b) Subsequent negotiations and agreement, May 4, 1949__________________________________ 4. Council of foreign ministers confirm Jessup-Malik agreement________________________________________ 5. Results and significance of the Berlin negotiations---(a) As a negotiating encounter-------------------------(1) Risks and dangers magnified in the absence of diplomacy____________ (2) Importance of “negotiations by semaphore”_____________________ (3) The value of secret negotiations-----(4) On the value of the U.N. and con ference diplomacy_______________ (5) Toughness in the Soviet negotiating style, response in kind----------------(6) Acheson’s appraisal of the Soviet negotiating style_____ ______ Pate 230 230 231 231 232 232 232 233 233 234 235 235 235 235 235 236 236 236 237 237 237 237 238 238 238 239
240 240 240 240 240 241 241 242 243 243 243 244 245 245 245 246 246 247 247 248
XVI IV Significant Negotiating Encounters—Continued A. Negotiations by semaphore—Continued Page 5. Results and significance of the Berlin—Continued (b) Impact of Berlin crisis on East-West relations. 249 (1) Soviet setback; Western strength en 249 hanced______________________ (2) Europe divided in deepening cold 249 ■war pattern__________________ (3) Berlin: A tactical retreat, not a new 250 Soviet strategy-----------------------250 B. Initiating negotiations for an armistice in Korea---------------1. Balance of military forces and favorable political 250 conditions---------------------------------------------------251 2. Resort to secret diplomacy--------------------------------252 3. Kennan’s mission to Malik--------------------------------252 (a) Why Kennan---------------------------------------252 (b) Acheson’s purposes in the Kennan mission... 253 (c) Kennan-Malik encounter in New York------254 4. Armistice negotiations initiated.---------- --------------255 5. Results and significance of the Kennan mission-------(a) On seeking solutions through diplomacy and 255 negotiations_________________________ (b) The danger of overmilitarizing national 256 policy----------------------------------------------256 (c) On the value of secret diplomacy-------------257 V. Stalin’s Russia, 1953: Besieged and Isolated---------------------------CHAPTER VII—IN TRANSITION TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH KHRUSHCHEV, 1953-64____ ___________________________ 259 Part I—Changes in Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations: Context, Diplomatic Establishment and Characteristics I. Changing Context of
Soviet Diplomacy_____________________ 259 A. Structural changes in international relations______________ 259 1. Shift from bipolarity to multipolarity; emergence of the Third World_____________________________ 259 2. The globalizing of nuclear power_________________ 260 B. Major trends in Soviet-American relations________________ 260 1. Emerging détente, 1953-55______________________ 260 2. A period of acute confrontation, 1956-62__________ 261 3. Retreat to accommodation, 1962-64______________ 262 II. The Soviet Diplomatic Establishment Under Khrushchev____ 263 A. The Molotov legacy: A grim professionalism______________ 263 1. Building for the future__________________________ 263 2. Control from the center_________________________ 264 3. The Molotov prototype_________________________ 265 B. Politicization and professionalism in the diplomatic service __ 267 1. Politicization by Khrushchev____________________ 267 2. Continuation of professionalism________ 269 (a) A new breed of Soviet diplomat Լ 269 (b) Expanding missions abroad_______________ 270 (c) The KGB presence__________________ ՜;՜~ 271 3. Khrushchev’s control over foreign policy___________ 272 4. Rising prestige of the Soviet diplomatic service 274 L/. Expanding intellectual resources for foreign policy 275 1. Limitation on resources prior to the Khrushčhév éraľ 275 ձ. Khrushchev s innovations, 1956______________ 277 (a) Revitalization՝ and expansion of Soviet intel lectual resources_________________ 277 (b) Upgrading the training of diplomats__ 278 3. Improved base for conducting diplomacy 279 U. A summing
up_____________ ___ J 280
χνπ III. Some Characteristics of Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations Pa*· in the Khrushchev Era_________________________________ 281 A. Peaceful coexistence: A new direction for Soviet theory, policy, and strategy_______________________________ 281 1. The meaning of peaceful coexistence_____________ 281 2. Foreign policy implications of peaceful coexistence__ 282 B. Khrushchev’s style of negotiations by threat and intimidation. 283 1. New rules for diplomacy and negotiations_________ 283 2. Khrushchev’s “missile diplomacy”_______________ 283 3. Diplomacy by deadline: The Berlin crises_________ 284 4. Diplomacy by humiliation______________________ 285 (a) Collapse of the Paris Summit Conference, May 1960._________________________ 285 (b) Khrushchev at the U.N., September 1960__ 286 C. Khrushchev’s open and personal diplomacy: An innovation__ 287 1. Khrushchev’s personal approach_________________ 287 (a) Open diplomacy, Soviet style____________ 287 (b) Khrushchev, “the most original diplomatic negotiator’ ’_________________________ 288 2. Expansion of social activities in Moscow__________ 289 (a) A turnabout from Stalin’s insularity and isolation____________________________ 289 (b) Serving political purposes for both sides____ 290 (c) Limited value of diplomatic social functions; continued isolation___________________ 291 3. Propaganda role in Soviet diplomacy magnified_____ 293 D. Khrushchev’s style of negotiations and open diplomacy: A summing up______________________________________ 294 E. American diplomats on the Soviet style in diplomacy and
negotiations______________________________________ 294 1. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State____________ 294 (a) Dulles’ address to the National Press Club on negotiations_________________________ 294 (b) Place for negotiations___________________ 295 (c) Soviet toughness in negotiations on “matters of real substance”____________________ 296 (d) Skepticism of Summit Conferences and Khrushchev’s objectives_______________ 296 (e) Distinction between party and government in negotiations_________________________ 297 (f) On the value of negotiations_____________ 297 2. Foy Kohler: Views of an American diplomat_______ 298 (a) Kohler, a seasoned diplomatic observer____ 298 (b) Definition of negotiation________________ 298 (c) Channels for negotiations________________ 298 (d) Channels and a will to negotiate__________ 299 (e) Other impediments to negotiations: Illusory and real____________________________ 300 • (f) Problem of differing political structures____ 301 (g) Problem of incompatible purposes_________ 301 (h) Insistence on continuing negotiations______ 302 (i) On the value of Kohler’s commentary_____ 303 CHAPTER VIII—IN TRANSITION TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH KHRUSHCHEV: 1953-64______________________________ Part II—Major Negotiating Encounters: Geneva Summit, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty IV. Major Soviet-American Negotiating Encounters Under Khrushchev___________________________________________ A. The Geneva Summit Conference, 1955--------------------------1. Background of the conference----------------------------(a) Nuclear stalemate: Pressure
to parley-------(b) A favorable convergence of events------------- 305 305 305 305 305 306
хѵт ΐγ. Majob Soviet-American Khrushchev—Continued Negotiating Encounters Under .. , A. The Geneva Summit Conference, 1955—Continued 1. Background of the conference—Continued (c) Perspectives and purposes--------- — ----(1) From the Soviet side: Khrushchev and Bulganin-------------------------(2) From the American side: Eisenhower and Dulles__;_________________ (a) Eisenhower’s cautionary ap proach— (ծ) Dulles’ pessimism and skep ticism— 2. Preparations, agenda, organization, and procedures, _ (a) Preparations for the conference----------------(1) Meetings of the Foreign Ministers- . (2) “Position papers” and conference logistics--------------------------------(b) Conference agenda--------------------------------3. Aspects of the negotiations------------------------------- (a) General characteristics: Formality and in formality____________________________ (1) Formalism and tedium----------------(2) On the value of informal contacts: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Macmillan____________________ (b) Issues and deliberations______________ ___ (1) German unification: A nonnegotiable issue (2) European security: A case of con flicting purposes_______________ (3) Disarmament and Eisenhower’s “open skies” proposal__________ (4) Development of East-West contacts. (5) Negotiating the final communique,, 4. Assessment of the Soviet negotiators______________ (a) Khrushchev and mutual perceptions_______ (1) Eisenhower, Macmillan, and Bohlen on Khrushchev________________ (2) Khrushchev on Eisenhower and Dulles_______________________ (b) Cameos of Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko, and
Zhukov__________________________ 5. Results and significance of the conference__________ (a) As a negotiating experience_______________ (1) Opportunity for mutual appraisals֊_ (2) On the value of informal contacts__ (3) Preparations for the conference____ (b) Impact on the international scene_________ (1·) An easing of international tensions, temporarily___________________ (2) A turning point in Soviet foreign policy__________ B. The Cuban missile crisis, 1962: Negotiations by action 1. Background of the missile crisis___________________ P“ missile crisis as a negotiating encounterlb) Kennedy on negotiating with the Soviets___ /n D°im Sorensen’s perspective______ 12) Prelude to Cuba: Negotiating with Khrushchev at Vienna, June 3-4, (3) The balance of power : A predominat ing concept and nonnegotiable connicting perceptions_____________ (c) D menti“·8 η ^0νίηί interests and commit ments m Cuba, 1960-62 (d) Vigorous American counterthrusts_____ Pag« 307 307 308 308 309 309 309 309 310 311 312 312 312 312 314 314 315 315 317 317 318 318 318 319 320 322 322 322 323 323 324 324 325 326 326 326 326 326 327 329 330 331
XIX IV. Majob Soviet-American Khrushchev—Continued Negotiating Encountebs Under В. The Cuban missile crisis, 1962 : Negotiations by action—Con. Pee* 2. Prelude to the crisis___________________________ 332 (a) On a collision course in August-September 1962_______________________________ 332 (1) Khrushchev’s decision and motiva tions________________________ 332 (2) Estimate of Khrushchev’s motiva tions in the West_____________ 332 (a) Radically change strategic and political balance of power_______________ 332 (b) Improve Soviet negotiating position______________ 333 (3) Influx of Soviet weapons and military technicians__________________ 333 (b) Soviet program for “cover and deception”__ 304 (c) Growing American alarm________________ 335 3. Thirteen critical days of confrontation, crisis, and negotiations________________________________ 336 (a) Discovery of missiles; internal deliberations; decision____________________________ 336 (b) The initial U.S. negotiating position: Ken nedy’s speech of October 22____________ 337 (1) On the nature of the Soviet threat__ 337 (2) Proposals for resolving the crisis___ 339 (c) Soviet counteractions: Khrushchev’s rejec tion________________________________ 340 (d) Critical days of negotiations: Confrontation and interaction______________________ 340 (1) Positions in conflict: On a collision course______________________ 340 (2) Negotiations by action along the quarantine line_______________ 341 (e) Denouement: Agreement and resolution of the crisis____________________________ 343 (1) Fomin-Scali unofficial negotiations, Friday afternoon
and evening, October 26___________________ 343 (a) Peaking of the crisis-------343 (b) Meeting at the Occidental Restaurant___________ 344 (c) Meeting at the Statler Hil ton’s coffee shop_______ 344 (2) Khrushchev’s letter of concession, evening of October 26--------------345 (3) Khrushchev’s apparent retraction, Saturday morning, October 17----346 (a) A precipitous downturn in the crisis_____________ 346 (b) Complicating issue of the Turkish missile bases___ 347 ^c) Resumption of the FominScali negotiations______ 347 (4) Kennedy’s response to Khrushchev, Saturday evening, October 27----348. (a) Accepting the letter of con cession, ignoring the state ment of reversal-______ 348 (b) Robert Kennedy’s meeting with Dobrynin________ 349 (5) Resolution of the crisis, Sunday morning, October 28---------------350
XX IV. Major Soviet-Amebican Negotiating Encounters Under Khrushchev—Continued B. The Cuban missile crisis, 1962 : Negotiations by action—Con. 4. Results and significance of the missile crisis-----------(a) As a negotiating experience---------------------(1) Total diplomacy------------------------(2) Negotiations by action----------------(a) Miscalculation on both sides_________________ (b) Negotiating along the quar antine line__________ _ (c) Negotiations by action in Cuba________________ (3) Negotiations through unofficial channels_____________________ (4) On secrecy and public disclosure___ (5) President Kennedy as a negotiator. . (a) Some qualities of a success ful negotiator__________ (b) An appraisal____________ (c) A judgment at the time: Prime Minister Mac millan________________ (6) Khrushchev as a negotiator________ (a) An American appraisal: So viets handled crisis with “wisdom and restraint”... (b) Khrushchev’s control over the confrontation and ne gotiations_____________ (c) Khrushchev’s judgment on the negotiated settlement: “A triumph of common sense”________________ (7) Enhanced role of the Ambassador .. (a) Soviet Ambassador Dobry nin, a key communica tions fink_____________ (b) British Ambassador Ormsby Gore, friend of the Ken nedys________________ (8) Staff support: Excellence of the exec utive committee_______________ (b) Impact of Soviet-American relations: The be ginning of détente_____________________ C. The nuclear test ban treaty, 1963: Concluding negotiations to control nuclear testing_______________________________ 1. Test ban
negotiations in perspective______ HIHII_____ (a) Prolonged stalemate in Geneva H I II I (b) A brief survey of negotiations, 1958-62՜-___ (c) Arthur H. Dean: Observations on Soviet negotiating behavior___________________ (D Dean, a qualified diplomatic observer. (2) Soviet style in diplomacy and nego tiations: Expectations of hostility *pd inflexibility in bargaining___ (3) Soviet tactics in diplomacy and nego tiations____ 6 (o) Disbelief in getting some thing for nothing______ rí?1® twisting technique”. . W The question of time_____ / ľ£en№ment in principle”.. («) The waiving argument” .. Pag« 350 350 350 351 351 352 352 353 353 354 354 354 356 356 356 356 357 358 358 358 359 360 360 360 360 361 363 363 363 364 364 364 365 365 366
XXI IV. Ma job Soviet-Amebican Khrushchev—Continued Negotiating Encounters Under - C. The nuclear test ban treaty, 1963 : Concluding negotiations to control nuclear testing—Continued 1. Test ban negotiations in perspective—Continued (4) Soviet obsession with secrecy; pos sible U.S. mitigating response___ 366 (а) Roots of Soviet opposition to onsite verification___ 366 (б) Possible mitigating U.S. response_______________ 368 (5) On the value of informal meetings 369 (6) Staffing and negotiating teams____ 370 (7) Requirements for Western negotiators. 370 (8) Importance of continuing negotia tions______________________ 371 2. Improving political climate after the missile crisis___ 372 (a) Favorable trends and negative countertrends. 372 (b) Kennedy’s American University address, June 10, 1963: An overture to negotiate__ 372 (c) Khrushchev’s response in East Berlin, July 2, 1963__________________________________ 374 3. Negotiations at Moscow, July 1963____________ 374 (a) U.S. preparations for negotiations______ 374 (1) Harriman, the principal U.S. ne gotiator___________________ 374 (2) High quality of American support staff______________________ 375 (3) Kennedy in control of negotiations. _ 375 (b) The negotiations from Harriman’s perspective. 376 (1) On the value of setting a target date for negotiations____________ 376 (2) Opening meeting with Khrushchev.. 376 (а) Khrushchev on the necessity of nuclear arms control.. 376 (б) Khrushchev: No onsite inspection______________ 377 (c) Tabling test ban drafts___ 377 (3) Points at issue in the negotiations__ 378 (a) U.S. draft as
basis for negotiations_____________ 378 (b) Foggy language in the pre amble__________________ 378 (c) Conflict over the withdrawal clause________________ 378 (d) Khrushchev’s concession on proposal for a NATOWarsaw Pact nonagres sion treaty_ 379 (e) U.S. concession on testing for peaceful purposes___ 379 (ƒ) Problem of treaty accession. 380 (4) An encounter with the Soviet people. 380 4. The Moscow Treaty: Final action__________ 381 5. Results and significance of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty________________________________________ 381 ia) As a negotiating encounter__________ 381 (1) Genuine bargaining_ 381 (2) Skillful and tough negotiators382 (3) Control of negotiations at the top... 382 (4) Importance of external factors on treaty s success_ 383 (b) Impact on Soviet-American relations and international relations_ 384 V. Khrushchev’s Legacy op Peaceful Coexistence 386
ххп CHAPTER IX—SOLIDIFYING PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH BREZHNEV, 1965-7»------- --------- -------------------------------------------------------------------- 389 text. Diplomatic Establishment, and Characteristics I. Changing Context or Soviet Diplomacy------------------------------------389 A. Structural changes in international relations-------------------— 389 1. Globalizing naţionalism; regeneration of the NationState__________________________________-—----389 2. Interdependence, science and technology, and the transformation of diplomacy------------------------------390 3. Détente; Soviet involvement in the Third World; American withdrawal from globalism----------------------391 B. Major trends in Soviet-American relations-------------------------394 1. Movement toward détente------- ------------------------------394 2. A countertrend: Soviet military buildup and expansion into the Third World______________________________ 395 II. The Soviet Diplomatic Establishment--------------------------------------396 A. Soviet secrecy, security, and the problem of limited informa tion _____________________________________________________ 396 B. Extension of the Khrushchev years------------------------------------397 C. The Soviet foreign policy infrastructure-----------------------------398 1. Brezhnev’s control at the top---------------------------------398 2. The Foreign Ministry under Brezhnev______________ 399 (a) Organization of the Foreign Ministry_______ 399 (b) The Ministry’s leadership____________________ 400 (c) World outlook of the Foreign Ministry_____ 400 (d) On
dealing with the Foreign Ministry______ 401 3. Intellectual resources for foreign policy_____________ 402 (a) The training of Soviet diplomats_____________ 402 (b) Zorin’s standards for a Soviet diplomat_____ 403 (c) The “fourth generation” of Soviet diplomats. 403 (d) Role of the institutes______._______________ 404 (1) Khrushchev’s legacy to his succes sors______________________ 4 (2) Importance of the institutes_______ 404 (3) The USA Institute__________________ 405 (4) On originating studies_______________ 405 D. Evaluations of the Soviet diplomatic establishment._____... 406 1. From the Soviet perspective________________________ 406 (a) High quality of Soviet diplomats___________ 406 (b) Prestige of the Soviet diplomatic service____ 407 2. From the perspective of American diplomats, negotia tors, and other foreign policy specialists_____________ 408 (a) On Gromyko, et al_________________________ 408 (b) On the Soviet diplomatic service____________ 409 (1) Views on Soviet negotiating staffs__ 409 (2) Reservations on diplomats in the field____________________________ 409 (c) The foreign policy institutes: USA Institute.. 411 (1) On the journal______________________ 411 „ . (2) Observations on the staff______ ____ 412 3. On balance______________________ __ ... _ 413 E. Influence of the diplomatic establishment on the foreign poliev process_______________________________ 413 1. Politburo’s reliance on expert advice. 413 2. Influence of the Foreign Ministry___________________ 414 (a) Source of influence________________ ~ 414 (b) Party connections__________ ՜_____ ՜՜՜.՜_՜՜
414 få role in the SALT negotiations__ 415 (a) Defense Ministry as a competitor____________ 417 ■*· Influence of the institutes______________ _ _ _ 418 (a) Solicited advice from the Academy of Sciences____________________________ 4
ххш II. The Soviet Diplomatic Establishment—Continued E. Influence of the diplomatic establishment on the foreign policy process—Continued 3. Influence of the institutes—Continued (b) On the Institute of World Economy and Inter national Relations and the Institute of the USA and Canada________________________ (c) Role of Arbatov___________________________ (d) Soviet perception of the USA Institute’s influence_________________________________ (e) Petrov’s evaluation of the impact by scholars and their institutes______________________ 4. Neutralizing counterforces__________________________ (a) A common outlook of the Soviet elite_______ (b) Built-in mechanisms of control_____________ (1) Neutralizing inflow of ideas________ (2) Senate parliamentary visit: Case study of an encounter with the Soviet leadership________________ 5. Summing up_______________________________________ F. And the future generations____________________ 1. Westernizers vs. Slavophiles________________________ 2. Relevance to foreign poUcy_________________________ (a) Engagement or isolationism________________ (b) Lasting security concerns___________________ 3. Potential for change within the Soviet system_______ (a) Rule by gerontocracy and emerging new professional elite_________________________ (b) Soviet intellectual elite: “Vehicle of change”?. G. Summing up_______________________________________________ III. Some Characteristics of Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations in the Brezhnev Era________________________________________ A. Brezhnev’s report to the 25th Party Congress______________ 1. Affirming
the Khrushchev legacy of peaceful coexist ence: Paradox of goals____________________________ 2. Support for national liberation movement in the Third World_____________________________________ 3. Viability of détente_________________________________ 4. Barrier to détente: Arms race_______________________ 5. Revolution and détente: Concepts in harmony______ 6. Flawed logic: Persisting contradiction_______________ B. Brezhnev s style in diplomacy______________________________ 1. À “businesslike” approach__________________________ 2. Brezhnev’s address to the heads of diplomatic missions. 3. Differentiation among relationships: The Czechoslovak Case, 1968_______________________________________ (a) Factors affecting differentiation____________ (b) Insider’s view of negotiating the Moscow “protocol”___________________________ C. Diplomatic life in Moscow_____________________________ ____ 1. Bohlen’s observations in 1968________ ______________ 2. Beam on marginal improvements___________________ 3. Generalizations by Eric Clark_____________________ D. Summing up_______________________________________________ 438 439 439 439 441 441 CHAPTER X—SOLIDIFYING PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH BREZHNEV, 1965-79________________________________________________ 443 418 419 420 421 421 421 422 422 422 424 424 424 425 425 426 427 427 428 420 431 431 431 431 432 433 433 434 434 434 435 436 436 Partii—Concluding Negotiations on SALT I and Commentaries by American Officials on Soviet Negotiating Behavior IV. A Major Negotiating Encounter: Concluding Negotiations on SALT I, May
1972______________________________________________ A. SALT I negotiations, 1967-7!-------------------------------------------1. Brief summary of the negotiations--------------------------(a) Their importance---------------------------------------(b) Origins and purposes----------------------------------- 443 443 443 443 444
XXIV IV A Majos Negotiating Encounter: Concluding Negotiations on SALT I, May 1972—Continued A. SALT I negotiations, 1967-71—Continued 1. Brief summary of the negotiations—Continued (c) Delays in negotiations-------------------------------- (d) Establishing the conceptual foundation of SALT________________________________ -֊- (e) Definition of SALT-------------------------------2. Some characteristics of the negotiations----------------(a) Organization and procedures-------------------(1) Plenary sessions------------------------(2) “Miniplenaries,” informal meetings and working groups-----------------(3) “Back channel” negotiations--------(а) Garthofi’s criticism_______ (б) Sonnenfeldt’s rebuttal-----(c) On balance______________ (4) Other procedural aspects: Records and interpreters----------------------(b) Soviet negotiators and staff---------------------(1) Vladimir S. Semenov, Chief of the U.S.S.R. delegation-----------------(2) The Soviet delegation and the mili tary presence-------------------------(а) Comparable to U.S. dele gation with exceptions__ (б) Military predominance___ (c) Coordination, decisionmak ing, and control at the top(3) Role of Ambassador Dobrynin____ (c) Aspects of Soviet negotiating behavior_____ (1) Seriousness of the negotiations____ (2) Differing approaches: The general versus the specific - -___________ (3) On taking the initiative__________ (4) Secrecy, suspicion, control________ B. Concluding SALT I: The Brezhnev-Nixon Summit Meeting in Moscow, May 1972_______________________________ 1. The context: General presummit developments_____ (a)
A kaleidoscope of interacting events_______ (b) Status of SALT negotiations______________ 2. Reaching agreement at Moscow, May 1972________ (a) Negotiating teams and issues to be resolved-(b) Dilemma of the ABM radars_____________ (c) Restricting mobile ICBM’s_______________ (d) On the matter of missile size______________ (e) The crucial issue: Replacement of SLBM’s-(1) Long, arduous negotiating sessions.֊ (2) The President’s final offer_________ (3) Kissinger-Gromyko final negotia tions_________________________ „ „ (*) Pinal approval and signing________ o. Some characteristics of the Moscow summit meeting (a) Organization and procedures______________ (1) Intensive preparations____________ (2) Organizational matters_________ (3) Summit records and the use of a Soviet interpreter______________ (a) Summit records.-II,-I__I _ W Using а Soviet interpreter.14) Concern for bugging_____________ Tat* 444 445 446 447 447 447 448 449 449 451 451 452 453 453 454 454 454 456 457 458 458 459 460 460 462 462 462 463 463 463 464 464 465 465 465 466 466 466 467 467 367 468 469 469 470 472
xxv IV. A Major Negotiating Encounter: Concluding Negotiations on SALT I, May 1972—Continued B. Concluding SALT I : The Brezhnev-Nixon Summit Meeting in Moscow, May 1972—Continued 3. Some characteristics of the Moscow summit—Continued (b) Soviet- negotiators and their style_________ (1) Nixon’s views on Brezhnev, the man and negotiator_________________ (а) On Brezhnev’s human quali ties__________________ (б) As a negotiator__________ (c) Brezhnev’s toughness and shock tactics: On Vietnam at Summit I___________ (d) Brezhnev’s toughness and shock tactics: At San Clemente during Summit II____________________ (e) Brezhnev and Khrushchev compared_____________ (ƒ) On Soviet negotiating tech niques________________ (g) On the skill, ability, and selfconfidence of the Soviet leaders________________ (2) Commentaries on other Soviet ne gotiators and on Soviet negotiat ing style--------------------------------(a) Smirnov, Gromyko, Dobry. nin, and Aleksandrov___ (b) Newhouse on Soviet and American negotiating characteristics_________ 4. Finalaction on the SALT I agreements____________ 5. Results and significance of SALT I-----------------------(a) As a negotiating encounter-----------------------(1) Soviet willingness to negotiate seri ously_________________________ (2) Summitry: Nixon and Kissinger as negotiators ; and the SALT process. (3) Problem of hasty negotiations_____ (4) Problem of unilateral statements___ (5) Secrecy and excessive Soviet concern for security___________________ (b) Impact of SALT I on Soviet-American rela tions and on the international scene______ (1)
Emergence of détente____________ (2) Soviet counterpressures in the Third World________________________ (3) Durability of theSALT process____ V. Commentaries by American Statesmen, Diplomats, and Nego tiators on Soviet Negotiating Behavior--------------------------- A. General and specific observations--------------------------------... 1. Summary of Ambassador Johnson’s comments--------2. Affirmation from lkle-----------------------------------------(a) Precision in drafting language------------------(b) Danger of self-negotiation________________ (c) Litvinov’s old “bazaar tactic”------------------3. Nitze and Lodai on Soviet negotiating intentions: Shysters or hard bargainers?----------------------------- P»te 473 473 473 474 474 477 478 479 480 481 481 482 483 484 484 484 485 487 488 489 491 491 492 492 493 493 493 493 493 494 494 495
XXVI v. Сом MENTABIE8 by Amebican Statesmen,AND ΝΕβ°· TiATOBS ON Soviet Negotiating Behavior—Continued B. Ambassador Smith’s “do’s and don’ts” in negotiating with nv th® b°Lurting for the Summit, and the “home court” advantage--------- --------- -֊֊.-------------------------------Avoid “two-channel negotiations-------------------------“Don t expect quick results”----------------------- --------On tabling unequal proposals and uncertain positions. Understand the different negotiating styles -----Tactical negotiating advantages of the closed society . Don’t overreact to leaks: Avoid overoptimistic state ments and “poor-mouthing” U.S. defense posture. 8. Noninterference with negotiating process---------------9. Patience with elusive results---------------------------------10. SALT as an irreversible process-----------------------------11. Importance of Smith s principles-------- ------------------C. Ambassador Beam on Soviet negotiators: Their competence and techniques_________________________________________ 1. Their competence---------------------------------------------------2. Control from the center------------------------------------------3. Some characteristics of Soviet negotiators----------------(a) An aggressive sense of realism--------------------(b) Avoiding the initiative-------------------------------(c) Convergence of diplomatic styles----------------4. On the value of Beam’s commentary. ---------------------D. Garthoff’s lessons on negotiating with the Soviets--------------1. Essential precepts and changing Soviet approach to
negotiations--------------------------------------------------------(a) Firm leadership and support---------- ------------(b) Clear and consistent negotiating objectives ._ (c) Negotiating tactics and techniques-------------(d) Integrity of negotiating channels___________ (e) Unnecessary constraints and burdens---------(f) Publicity and confidentiality-----------------------(g) Taking the initiative---------------------------------(h) Bargaining room and calculated ambiguity-. (i) Patience and firmness______________________ (j) Informal probing___________________________ (k) Relevance of external developments________ (l) Shared objectives and success_______________ (m) Changing Soviet approach to negotiations. .. 2. A summing up_____________________________________ E. Sonnenfeldt’s view of Soviet diplomacy and negotiations___ 1. Quality of the Soviet diplomat______________________ 2. Soviet perceptions of negotiations___________________ 3. Aspects of Soviet negotiating behavior______________ 4. Converging diplomatic styles_______________________ 5. The generational problem and the future___________ 6. Guide for negotiators______________________________ F. On the value of these commentaries________________________ 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. VI. Facing the 1980 s: A New Era of Diplomacy and Negotiations. 496 496 496 497 498 498 499 499 500 500 500 500 501 501 501 501 501 502 502 502 502 502 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 504 504 504 504 504 504 505 505 505 506 507 508 509 510 5П CHAPTER XI—PERMANENCY AND CHANGE IN THF SOVIFT 513 I. Changing Structure of International
Relations_____________ A. Some elements of change__________ 1. In historical perspective В FfWt; oÄip0Jan4multiP°։arity and՜interdependence՜. B. Effects of international changes on world of diplomacy 2՛. Enha^ed role of SdîpniomPartUnİtİeS ^ neg0t‘ators ; ֊ 513 513 513 514 514 514 515
XXVII Pag« II. Permanent Aspects op Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations.. . A. Imperatives of security____________________ ___________ 1. Rooted in history, doctrine, and reality___________ 2. Likelihood of change____________________________ B. Imperatives of ideology________________________________ 1. Quest for legitimacy____________________________ 2. Ideology as motive power_______________________ C. Imperatives of the political system______________________ 1. Institutional permanency________________________ 2. Effects upon the foreign policy structure and estab lishment___________________________ _________ (a) Predetermined existence_________________ (b) Enduring characteristics՛ in diplomacy and negotiations__________________________ III. Changing Aspects op Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations___ A. Institutional changes__________________________________ B. Decline of ideology____________________________________ C. Effects of institutional changes and decline of ideology_____ 1. On Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior_____ 2. Pull towards the emerging international system_____ D. Westernizers versus Slavophiles_________________________ IV. Implications fok U.S. Foreign Policy----------------------------------A. Diplomacy and negotiations: Instruments of accommodation and stability_____________________ 1. New opportunities; new burdens__________________ 2. On the value of diplomacy and negotiations in SovietAmerican relations____________________________ fa) In historical perspective_________________ (b) Diplomacy and the SALT process_________ (1) SALT: A distinction
between the treaty and the process__________ (2) On the value of the SALT negotiating process; a contrasting view_____ (3) Converging Russian-American inter ests in historical perspective_____ (4) Analogy between the SALT process and the Congress of Vienna_____ (c) Is Soviet diplomacy really diplomacy?-------(1) Diplomacy, but with a difference— (2) Intellectualism in the service of party policy________________________ (d) Judgments on Soviet diplomacy and nego tiators________________ 3. Summing up___________________________________ B. The balance of power factor and the future_______________ 1. The power factor and the Third World in SovietAmerican relations____________________________ 2. On the necessity for strength and purpose_________ (a) Unendingcycle of challenge and response----(b) On achieving a balance of power__________ (c) Total diplomacy------------------------------------(d) Problem of the Third World______________ (e) Mosely’s advice: Strength and negotiation... 3. Diplomacy, negotiations, and the power balance------- 517 517 517 518 519 519 520 521 521 521 521 521 526 526 527 527 527 528 529 531 531 531 534 534 535 535 536 539 539 540 540 541 542 542 543 543 544 544 545 545 546 547 548 A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY___________________________________ 549 Books________________________________________ _________________ Articles, Pamphlets, Newspapers_______________________________ U.S. Government Publications__________________________________ 549 556 560 APPENDIX_____________________________________________________ 563 Soviet Strategy and Tactics in Economic and
Commercial Negoti ations With the United States___________________________ 563
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Whelan, Joseph G. |
| author_facet | Whelan, Joseph G. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Whelan, Joseph G. |
| author_variant | j g w jg jgw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV000470616 |
| classification_rvk | ML 6600 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)241589142 (DE-599)BVBBV000470616 |
| dewey-full | 327.47073 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.47073 |
| dewey-search | 327.47073 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.47073 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| era | Geschichte 1979-1988 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1979-1988 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Sowjetunion USA |
| id | DE-604.BV000470616 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T15:14:26Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0865319464 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-000290045 |
| oclc_num | 241589142 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-739 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-188 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-739 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-188 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | XXVII, 573 S. |
| publishDate | 1983 |
| publishDateSearch | 1983 |
| publishDateSort | 1983 |
| publisher | Westview Pr. |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Whelan, Joseph G. Verfasser aut Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy Joseph G. Whelan Boulder, Colo. Westview Pr. 1983 XXVII, 573 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Geschichte 1979-1988 gnd rswk-swf Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd rswk-swf Diplomatische Beziehungen (DE-588)4138523-8 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 g Diplomatische Beziehungen (DE-588)4138523-8 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 s DE-604 Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 s Geschichte 1979-1988 z 1\p DE-604 Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 s 2\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=000290045&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Whelan, Joseph G. Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd Diplomatische Beziehungen (DE-588)4138523-8 gnd Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4012402-2 (DE-588)4062875-9 (DE-588)4138523-8 (DE-588)4020517-4 (DE-588)4077548-3 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy |
| title_auth | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy |
| title_exact_search | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy |
| title_full | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy Joseph G. Whelan |
| title_fullStr | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy Joseph G. Whelan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy Joseph G. Whelan |
| title_short | Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior |
| title_sort | soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior the emerging new context for u s diplomacy |
| title_sub | the emerging new context for U.S. diplomacy |
| topic | Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd Diplomatische Beziehungen (DE-588)4138523-8 gnd Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Diplomatie Verhandlung Diplomatische Beziehungen Geschichte Sowjetunion USA |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=000290045&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT whelanjosephg sovietdiplomacyandnegotiatingbehaviortheemergingnewcontextforusdiplomacy |