Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management /:

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency cover...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ratnovski, Lev
Corporate Author: International Monetary Fund. Research Department
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2013.
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/13/16.
Subjects:
Online Access:DE-862
DE-863
Summary:Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.
Item Description:Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Jan. 30, 2013).
"Research Department.
"January 2013."
Physical Description:1 online resource (41 pages)
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN:9781475545883
1475545886
9781475536157
1475536151
9781616356774
1616356774

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