Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption /:
"Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and politic...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2016.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and political characteristics? In Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and Corruption, the authors argue that clarity of responsibility is critical for reducing corruption in democracies. The authors provide a number of empirical tests of this argument, including a cross-national time-series statistical analysis to show that the higher the level of clarity the lower the perceived corruption levels. Using survey and experimental data, the authors show that clarity causes voters to punish incumbents for corruption. Preliminary tests further indicate that elites respond to these electoral incentives and are more likely to combat corruption when clarity is high"-- |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (1 volume) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781316412404 1316412407 9781316555682 1316555682 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000Mi 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn954102196 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20241004212047.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr |n||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 160727s2016 nyu ob 001 0 eng d | ||
| 040 | |a YDXCP |b eng |e rda |e pn |c YDXCP |d OCLCO |d LGG |d OCLCQ |d N$T |d EBLCP |d YDX |d OCLCO |d U3W |d OCLCF |d OTZ |d TKN |d LEAUB |d OCLCA |d AU@ |d UKAHL |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCL |d SFB |d OCLCQ | ||
| 019 | |a 1016374661 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781316412404 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 1316412407 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 9781316555682 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 1316555682 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |z 9781107127647 | ||
| 020 | |z 1107127645 | ||
| 020 | |z 9781107566927 | ||
| 020 | |z 1107566924 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)954102196 |z (OCoLC)1016374661 | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a JF1525.C66 |b S38 2016 | |
| 072 | 7 | |a SOC |x 004000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 082 | 7 | |a 364.1/323 |2 23 | |
| 049 | |a MAIN | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / |c Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits. |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2016. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (1 volume) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a "Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and political characteristics? In Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and Corruption, the authors argue that clarity of responsibility is critical for reducing corruption in democracies. The authors provide a number of empirical tests of this argument, including a cross-national time-series statistical analysis to show that the higher the level of clarity the lower the perceived corruption levels. Using survey and experimental data, the authors show that clarity causes voters to punish incumbents for corruption. Preliminary tests further indicate that elites respond to these electoral incentives and are more likely to combat corruption when clarity is high"-- |c Provided by publisher. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Defining corruption; Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption; Institutional explanations for corruption; A theory of clarity of responsibility; Scope, data, and outline of the book; 2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption; The concept of clarity of responsibility; The argument; Hypotheses; Conclusion; 3 A dataset of democracy and corruption; Measuring democracy; Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Measuring aggregate corruptionConclusion; 4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions; Variables and methods; Additional measures of clarity and accountability; Conclusion; 5 Corruption voting: a survey analysis; Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data; Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data; Conclusion; 6 Corruption voting: an experimental analysis; Description of the survey experiment; Results of the experimental test; Extensions: probing the mechanisms; Conclusion; 7 Elite anticorruption efforts | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruptionAnticorruption programs in Eastern Europe; Global patterns in anticorruption legislation; Conclusion; 8 Elite attention to corruption; Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns; Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption; Conclusion; 9 Conclusions; Scholarly implications; Policy implications; Future inquiry; Appendices; 4.1 Descriptive statistics, global sample; 4.2 Robustness tests and additional models; 5.1 Vote choice question wording | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.2 Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys5.3 Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models; 6.1 Descriptive statistics, survey experiment; 6.2 Additional regression output, survey experiment; 7.1 Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption; 7.2 Additional models; 8.1 Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8; References; Index | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Political corruption. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Corruption (Politique) | |
| 650 | 7 | |a SOCIAL SCIENCE |x Criminology. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Political corruption |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Korruption |2 gnd |0 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4032524-6 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Politik |2 gnd | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tavits, Margit, |e author. | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGjkBMdrpJmTJ73yH9GdV3 |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |z 9781107127647 |z 1107127645 |w (DLC) 2015048871 |w (OCoLC)943666577 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-4-EBA |q FWS_PDA_EBA |u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1362661 |3 Volltext |
| 938 | |a Askews and Holts Library Services |b ASKH |n AH31628878 | ||
| 938 | |a Askews and Holts Library Services |b ASKH |n AH33404421 | ||
| 938 | |a Askews and Holts Library Services |b ASKH |n AH32493012 | ||
| 938 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b EBLB |n EBL4697926 | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 1362661 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 13669696 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 13070586 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 13633961 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b GEBAY | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-4-EBA | ||
| 049 | |a DE-863 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn954102196 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1816882356156366848 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. Tavits, Margit |
| author_facet | Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. Tavits, Margit |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. |
| author_variant | l a s b las lasb m t mt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JF1525 |
| callnumber-raw | JF1525.C66 S38 2016 |
| callnumber-search | JF1525.C66 S38 2016 |
| callnumber-sort | JF 41525 C66 S38 42016 |
| callnumber-subject | JF - Public Administration |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| contents | Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Defining corruption; Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption; Institutional explanations for corruption; A theory of clarity of responsibility; Scope, data, and outline of the book; 2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption; The concept of clarity of responsibility; The argument; Hypotheses; Conclusion; 3 A dataset of democracy and corruption; Measuring democracy; Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism Measuring aggregate corruptionConclusion; 4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions; Variables and methods; Additional measures of clarity and accountability; Conclusion; 5 Corruption voting: a survey analysis; Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data; Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data; Conclusion; 6 Corruption voting: an experimental analysis; Description of the survey experiment; Results of the experimental test; Extensions: probing the mechanisms; Conclusion; 7 Elite anticorruption efforts Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruptionAnticorruption programs in Eastern Europe; Global patterns in anticorruption legislation; Conclusion; 8 Elite attention to corruption; Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns; Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption; Conclusion; 9 Conclusions; Scholarly implications; Policy implications; Future inquiry; Appendices; 4.1 Descriptive statistics, global sample; 4.2 Robustness tests and additional models; 5.1 Vote choice question wording 5.2 Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys5.3 Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models; 6.1 Descriptive statistics, survey experiment; 6.2 Additional regression output, survey experiment; 7.1 Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption; 7.2 Additional models; 8.1 Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8; References; Index |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)954102196 |
| dewey-full | 364.1/323 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 364 - Criminology |
| dewey-raw | 364.1/323 |
| dewey-search | 364.1/323 |
| dewey-sort | 3364.1 3323 |
| dewey-tens | 360 - Social problems and services; associations |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05783cam a2200673Mi 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-4-EBA-ocn954102196</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">OCoLC</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20241004212047.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr |n|||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160727s2016 nyu ob 001 0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YDXCP</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield><subfield code="e">pn</subfield><subfield code="c">YDXCP</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">LGG</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">N$T</subfield><subfield code="d">EBLCP</subfield><subfield code="d">YDX</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">U3W</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCF</subfield><subfield code="d">OTZ</subfield><subfield code="d">TKN</subfield><subfield code="d">LEAUB</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCA</subfield><subfield code="d">AU@</subfield><subfield code="d">UKAHL</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCL</subfield><subfield code="d">SFB</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="019" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1016374661</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781316412404</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1316412407</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781316555682</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1316555682</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9781107127647</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">1107127645</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9781107566927</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">1107566924</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)954102196</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1016374661</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">JF1525.C66</subfield><subfield code="b">S38 2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="072" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">SOC</subfield><subfield code="x">004000</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">364.1/323</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAIN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A.,</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption /</subfield><subfield code="c">Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">New York, NY :</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press,</subfield><subfield code="c">2016.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (1 volume)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and political characteristics? In Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and Corruption, the authors argue that clarity of responsibility is critical for reducing corruption in democracies. The authors provide a number of empirical tests of this argument, including a cross-national time-series statistical analysis to show that the higher the level of clarity the lower the perceived corruption levels. Using survey and experimental data, the authors show that clarity causes voters to punish incumbents for corruption. Preliminary tests further indicate that elites respond to these electoral incentives and are more likely to combat corruption when clarity is high"--</subfield><subfield code="c">Provided by publisher.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references and index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Print version record.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Defining corruption; Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption; Institutional explanations for corruption; A theory of clarity of responsibility; Scope, data, and outline of the book; 2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption; The concept of clarity of responsibility; The argument; Hypotheses; Conclusion; 3 A dataset of democracy and corruption; Measuring democracy; Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Measuring aggregate corruptionConclusion; 4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions; Variables and methods; Additional measures of clarity and accountability; Conclusion; 5 Corruption voting: a survey analysis; Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data; Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data; Conclusion; 6 Corruption voting: an experimental analysis; Description of the survey experiment; Results of the experimental test; Extensions: probing the mechanisms; Conclusion; 7 Elite anticorruption efforts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruptionAnticorruption programs in Eastern Europe; Global patterns in anticorruption legislation; Conclusion; 8 Elite attention to corruption; Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns; Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption; Conclusion; 9 Conclusions; Scholarly implications; Policy implications; Future inquiry; Appendices; 4.1 Descriptive statistics, global sample; 4.2 Robustness tests and additional models; 5.1 Vote choice question wording</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5.2 Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys5.3 Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models; 6.1 Descriptive statistics, survey experiment; 6.2 Additional regression output, survey experiment; 7.1 Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption; 7.2 Additional models; 8.1 Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8; References; Index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Political corruption.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Corruption (Politique)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">SOCIAL SCIENCE</subfield><subfield code="x">Criminology.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Political corruption</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Korruption</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="0">http://d-nb.info/gnd/4032524-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Politik</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tavits, Margit,</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="758" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="i">has work:</subfield><subfield code="a">Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption (Text)</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGjkBMdrpJmTJ73yH9GdV3</subfield><subfield code="4">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Print version:</subfield><subfield code="z">9781107127647</subfield><subfield code="z">1107127645</subfield><subfield code="w">(DLC) 2015048871</subfield><subfield code="w">(OCoLC)943666577</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_EBA</subfield><subfield code="u">https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1362661</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Askews and Holts Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">ASKH</subfield><subfield code="n">AH31628878</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Askews and Holts Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">ASKH</subfield><subfield code="n">AH33404421</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Askews and Holts Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">ASKH</subfield><subfield code="n">AH32493012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ProQuest Ebook Central</subfield><subfield code="b">EBLB</subfield><subfield code="n">EBL4697926</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBSCOhost</subfield><subfield code="b">EBSC</subfield><subfield code="n">1362661</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">13669696</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">13070586</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">13633961</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="994" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">92</subfield><subfield code="b">GEBAY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn954102196 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:27:18Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781316412404 1316412407 9781316555682 1316555682 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 954102196 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (1 volume) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., author. Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits. New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016. 1 online resource (1 volume) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier "Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and political characteristics? In Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and Corruption, the authors argue that clarity of responsibility is critical for reducing corruption in democracies. The authors provide a number of empirical tests of this argument, including a cross-national time-series statistical analysis to show that the higher the level of clarity the lower the perceived corruption levels. Using survey and experimental data, the authors show that clarity causes voters to punish incumbents for corruption. Preliminary tests further indicate that elites respond to these electoral incentives and are more likely to combat corruption when clarity is high"-- Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. Print version record. Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Defining corruption; Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption; Institutional explanations for corruption; A theory of clarity of responsibility; Scope, data, and outline of the book; 2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption; The concept of clarity of responsibility; The argument; Hypotheses; Conclusion; 3 A dataset of democracy and corruption; Measuring democracy; Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism Measuring aggregate corruptionConclusion; 4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions; Variables and methods; Additional measures of clarity and accountability; Conclusion; 5 Corruption voting: a survey analysis; Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data; Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data; Conclusion; 6 Corruption voting: an experimental analysis; Description of the survey experiment; Results of the experimental test; Extensions: probing the mechanisms; Conclusion; 7 Elite anticorruption efforts Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruptionAnticorruption programs in Eastern Europe; Global patterns in anticorruption legislation; Conclusion; 8 Elite attention to corruption; Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns; Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption; Conclusion; 9 Conclusions; Scholarly implications; Policy implications; Future inquiry; Appendices; 4.1 Descriptive statistics, global sample; 4.2 Robustness tests and additional models; 5.1 Vote choice question wording 5.2 Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys5.3 Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models; 6.1 Descriptive statistics, survey experiment; 6.2 Additional regression output, survey experiment; 7.1 Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption; 7.2 Additional models; 8.1 Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8; References; Index Political corruption. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 Corruption (Politique) SOCIAL SCIENCE Criminology. bisacsh Political corruption fast Korruption gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4032524-6 Politik gnd Tavits, Margit, author. has work: Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGjkBMdrpJmTJ73yH9GdV3 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: 9781107127647 1107127645 (DLC) 2015048871 (OCoLC)943666577 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1362661 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. Tavits, Margit Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Defining corruption; Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption; Institutional explanations for corruption; A theory of clarity of responsibility; Scope, data, and outline of the book; 2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption; The concept of clarity of responsibility; The argument; Hypotheses; Conclusion; 3 A dataset of democracy and corruption; Measuring democracy; Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism Measuring aggregate corruptionConclusion; 4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions; Variables and methods; Additional measures of clarity and accountability; Conclusion; 5 Corruption voting: a survey analysis; Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data; Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data; Conclusion; 6 Corruption voting: an experimental analysis; Description of the survey experiment; Results of the experimental test; Extensions: probing the mechanisms; Conclusion; 7 Elite anticorruption efforts Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruptionAnticorruption programs in Eastern Europe; Global patterns in anticorruption legislation; Conclusion; 8 Elite attention to corruption; Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns; Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption; Conclusion; 9 Conclusions; Scholarly implications; Policy implications; Future inquiry; Appendices; 4.1 Descriptive statistics, global sample; 4.2 Robustness tests and additional models; 5.1 Vote choice question wording 5.2 Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys5.3 Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models; 6.1 Descriptive statistics, survey experiment; 6.2 Additional regression output, survey experiment; 7.1 Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption; 7.2 Additional models; 8.1 Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8; References; Index Political corruption. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 Corruption (Politique) SOCIAL SCIENCE Criminology. bisacsh Political corruption fast Korruption gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4032524-6 Politik gnd |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4032524-6 |
| title | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / |
| title_auth | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / |
| title_exact_search | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / |
| title_full | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits. |
| title_fullStr | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits. |
| title_short | Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / |
| title_sort | clarity of responsibility accountability and corruption |
| topic | Political corruption. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 Corruption (Politique) SOCIAL SCIENCE Criminology. bisacsh Political corruption fast Korruption gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4032524-6 Politik gnd |
| topic_facet | Political corruption. Corruption (Politique) SOCIAL SCIENCE Criminology. Political corruption Korruption Politik |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1362661 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schwindtbayerlesliea clarityofresponsibilityaccountabilityandcorruption AT tavitsmargit clarityofresponsibilityaccountabilityandcorruption |