Governing the commons :: the evolution of institutions for collective action /
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource prob...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2015
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Schriftenreihe: | Canto classics.
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries-- |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xvi, 280 pages) illustrations, map |
Auszeichnungen: | Nobel Prize, 2009. |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
ISBN: | 9781316458723 1316458725 |
Internformat
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520 | |a The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries-- |c Provided by publisher | ||
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Ostrom, Elinor |
author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n80001519 |
author_facet | Ostrom, Elinor |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Ostrom, Elinor |
author_variant | e o eo |
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callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
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callnumber-raw | HD1286 .O87 2015eb |
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callnumber-subject | HD - Industries, Land Use, Labor |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
contents | Reflections on the commons -- An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations -- Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs -- Analyzing institutional change -- Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities -- A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)933293532 |
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dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 333 - Economics of land and energy |
dewey-raw | 333.2 |
dewey-search | 333.2 |
dewey-sort | 3333.2 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
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spelling | Ostrom, Elinor, author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n80001519 Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2015 ©2015 1 online resource (xvi, 280 pages) illustrations, map text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Canto Classics Includes bibliographical references and index The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries-- Provided by publisher Reflections on the commons -- An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations -- Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs -- Analyzing institutional change -- Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities -- A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs Nobel Prize, 2009. Print version record Commons. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85029003 Commons Case studies. Social choice. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123920 Social choice Case studies. Choix collectif. Choix collectif Études de cas. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. bisacsh Commons fast Social choice fast Case studies fast Case studies. lcgft http://id.loc.gov/authorities/genreForms/gf2017026140 Études de cas. rvmgf has work: Governing the commons (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCH4CjPP6ppV9mKryhYkgPP https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the commons. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015 1107569788 (OCoLC)911061917 Canto classics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2012067172 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1077401 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Ostrom, Elinor Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / Canto classics. Reflections on the commons -- An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations -- Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs -- Analyzing institutional change -- Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities -- A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs Commons. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85029003 Commons Case studies. Social choice. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123920 Social choice Case studies. Choix collectif. Choix collectif Études de cas. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. bisacsh Commons fast Social choice fast |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85029003 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123920 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/genreForms/gf2017026140 |
title | Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / |
title_auth | Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / |
title_exact_search | Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / |
title_full | Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University |
title_fullStr | Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University |
title_full_unstemmed | Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University |
title_short | Governing the commons : |
title_sort | governing the commons the evolution of institutions for collective action |
title_sub | the evolution of institutions for collective action / |
topic | Commons. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85029003 Commons Case studies. Social choice. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123920 Social choice Case studies. Choix collectif. Choix collectif Études de cas. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. bisacsh Commons fast Social choice fast |
topic_facet | Commons. Commons Case studies. Social choice. Social choice Case studies. Choix collectif. Choix collectif Études de cas. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. Commons Social choice Case studies Case studies. Études de cas. |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1077401 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ostromelinor governingthecommonstheevolutionofinstitutionsforcollectiveaction |