The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model
This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to m...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2009
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| Schriftenreihe: | OECD Economics Department Working Papers
no.702 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a "grand coalition" including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries' bargaining behaviour. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (73 p.) 21 x 29.7cm. |
| DOI: | 10.1787/223552487415 |
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| spelling | Bosetti, Valentina VerfasserIn aut The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] = Incitations à participer à des coalitions internationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et stabilité de ces coalitions : Une analyse en théorie des jeux à l'aide du modèle WITCH / Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] Incitations à participer à des coalitions internationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et stabilité de ces coalitions Paris OECD Publishing 2009 1 Online-Ressource (73 p.) 21 x 29.7cm. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier OECD Economics Department Working Papers no.702 This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a "grand coalition" including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries' bargaining behaviour. Economics Carraro, Carlo MitwirkendeR ctb De Cian, Enrica MitwirkendeR ctb Duval, Romain MitwirkendeR ctb Massetti, Emanuele MitwirkendeR ctb Tavoni, Massimo MitwirkendeR ctb FWS01 ZDB-13-SOC FWS_PDA_SOC https://doi.org/10.1787/223552487415 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bosetti, Valentina The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model Economics |
| title | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model |
| title_alt | Incitations à participer à des coalitions internationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et stabilité de ces coalitions |
| title_auth | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model |
| title_exact_search | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model |
| title_full | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] = Incitations à participer à des coalitions internationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et stabilité de ces coalitions : Une analyse en théorie des jeux à l'aide du modèle WITCH / Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] |
| title_fullStr | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] = Incitations à participer à des coalitions internationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et stabilité de ces coalitions : Une analyse en théorie des jeux à l'aide du modèle WITCH / Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] = Incitations à participer à des coalitions internationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et stabilité de ces coalitions : Une analyse en théorie des jeux à l'aide du modèle WITCH / Valentina, Bosetti ... [et al] |
| title_short | The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions |
| title_sort | incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions a game theoretic approach using the witch model |
| title_sub | A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model |
| topic | Economics |
| topic_facet | Economics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/223552487415 |
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