Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller?: Evidence from the European Community
According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the Eu...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2006
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| Schriftenreihe: | OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers
no.41 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (41 p.) 21 x 29.7cm. |
| DOI: | 10.1787/351251420436 |
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| 520 | |a According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay. | ||
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| spelling | Bassanini, Andrea VerfasserIn aut Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community Andrea, Bassanini and Giorgio, Brunello Paris OECD Publishing 2006 1 Online-Ressource (41 p.) 21 x 29.7cm. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers no.41 According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay. Social Issues/Migration/Health European Union Brunello, Giorgio MitwirkendeR ctb FWS01 ZDB-13-SOC FWS_PDA_SOC https://doi.org/10.1787/351251420436 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bassanini, Andrea Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community Social Issues/Migration/Health European Union |
| title | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community |
| title_auth | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community |
| title_exact_search | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community |
| title_full | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community Andrea, Bassanini and Giorgio, Brunello |
| title_fullStr | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community Andrea, Bassanini and Giorgio, Brunello |
| title_full_unstemmed | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? Evidence from the European Community Andrea, Bassanini and Giorgio, Brunello |
| title_short | Is Training More Frequent When the Wage Premium is Smaller? |
| title_sort | is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller evidence from the european community |
| title_sub | Evidence from the European Community |
| topic | Social Issues/Migration/Health European Union |
| topic_facet | Social Issues/Migration/Health European Union |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/351251420436 |
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