Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems:
This paper argues that, in situations where choices are made between mutually exclusive investment projects and where there are economic rents, free allocation of tradable emission permits in emissions trading systems can weaken incentives for firms to invest in less carbon-intensive technologies co...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2017
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| Schriftenreihe: | OECD Taxation Working Papers
no.33 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper argues that, in situations where choices are made between mutually exclusive investment projects and where there are economic rents, free allocation of tradable emission permits in emissions trading systems can weaken incentives for firms to invest in less carbon-intensive technologies compared to the case where permits would be auctioned. The reason is that permit allocation rules affect economic rents differentially when different product benchmarks apply to products that are close substitutes. Examples of permit allocation rules favouring more emission-intensive technologies for outputs that are close substitutes are found in the California Cap and Trade Program and in the European Union Emissions Trading System. This lack of technology-neutrality is exacerbated in the long run as future patterns of substitutability between technologies are uncertain. Free permit allocation can broaden support for carbon pricing, but this paper shows that this carries a cost in terms of environmental effectiveness if it discourages investment in low-carbon assets. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 p.) |
| DOI: | 10.1787/c3acf05e-en |
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| spelling | Flues, Florens VerfasserIn aut Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems Florens, Flues and Kurt, van Dender Paris OECD Publishing 2017 1 Online-Ressource (39 p.) Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier OECD Taxation Working Papers no.33 This paper argues that, in situations where choices are made between mutually exclusive investment projects and where there are economic rents, free allocation of tradable emission permits in emissions trading systems can weaken incentives for firms to invest in less carbon-intensive technologies compared to the case where permits would be auctioned. The reason is that permit allocation rules affect economic rents differentially when different product benchmarks apply to products that are close substitutes. Examples of permit allocation rules favouring more emission-intensive technologies for outputs that are close substitutes are found in the California Cap and Trade Program and in the European Union Emissions Trading System. This lack of technology-neutrality is exacerbated in the long run as future patterns of substitutability between technologies are uncertain. Free permit allocation can broaden support for carbon pricing, but this paper shows that this carries a cost in terms of environmental effectiveness if it discourages investment in low-carbon assets. Taxation van Dender, Kurt MitwirkendeR ctb FWS01 ZDB-13-SOC FWS_PDA_SOC https://doi.org/10.1787/c3acf05e-en Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Flues, Florens Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems Taxation |
| title | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems |
| title_auth | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems |
| title_exact_search | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems |
| title_full | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems Florens, Flues and Kurt, van Dender |
| title_fullStr | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems Florens, Flues and Kurt, van Dender |
| title_full_unstemmed | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems Florens, Flues and Kurt, van Dender |
| title_short | Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems |
| title_sort | permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems |
| topic | Taxation |
| topic_facet | Taxation |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/c3acf05e-en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fluesflorens permitallocationrulesandinvestmentincentivesinemissionstradingsystems AT vandenderkurt permitallocationrulesandinvestmentincentivesinemissionstradingsystems |