On believing and being convinced:

Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confide...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Silva, Paul (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2024
Series:Cambridge elements
Subjects:
Online Access:DE-12
DE-473
Volltext
Summary:Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This Element shows: how and why all of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this Element
Item Description:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Jan 2025)
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (68 Seiten)
ISBN:9781009524117
DOI:10.1017/9781009524117

There is no print copy available.

Interlibrary loan Place Request Caution: Not in THWS collection! Get full text