Responsibility for rationality: foundations of an ethics of mind
This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsi...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Routledge
2024
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in epistemology
|
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 203 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9781003382973 |
| DOI: | 10.4324/9781003382973 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV050076025 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 241209s2024 xx o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781003382973 |9 9781003382973 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV050076025 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-384 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Schmidt, Sebastian |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Responsibility for rationality |b foundations of an ethics of mind |c Sebastian Schmidt |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York |b Routledge |c 2024 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 203 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Routledge studies in epistemology | |
| 520 | |a This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology. | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781003496441 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003382973 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-7-TOA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035413367 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1817975408668180480 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| author_facet | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| author_variant | s s ss |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV050076025 |
| collection | ZDB-7-TOA |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV050076025 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.4324/9781003382973 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV050076025</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">241209s2024 xx o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781003382973</subfield><subfield code="9">9781003382973</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV050076025</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Schmidt, Sebastian</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Responsibility for rationality</subfield><subfield code="b">foundations of an ethics of mind</subfield><subfield code="c">Sebastian Schmidt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">New York</subfield><subfield code="b">Routledge</subfield><subfield code="c">2024</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (viii, 203 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Routledge studies in epistemology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781003496441</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003382973</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-7-TOA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035413367</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV050076025 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-09T15:00:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781003382973 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035413367 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-384 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 203 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-7-TOA |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publishDateSearch | 2024 |
| publishDateSort | 2024 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Routledge studies in epistemology |
| spelling | Schmidt, Sebastian Verfasser aut Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt New York Routledge 2024 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 203 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology. Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781003496441 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003382973 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Schmidt, Sebastian Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
| title | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
| title_auth | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
| title_exact_search | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
| title_full | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt |
| title_fullStr | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt |
| title_full_unstemmed | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt |
| title_short | Responsibility for rationality |
| title_sort | responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
| title_sub | foundations of an ethics of mind |
| url | https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003382973 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schmidtsebastian responsibilityforrationalityfoundationsofanethicsofmind |