Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Chicago
Hoover Institution Press
2023
|
| Edition: | 1st ed |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | DE-2070s |
| Item Description: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (388 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780817926168 |
Staff View
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Silicon Triangle |b The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semiconductor industry--Taiwan | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ellis, James O. |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Schell, Orville |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Diamond, Larry |t Silicon Triangle |d Chicago : Hoover Institution Press,c2023 |z 9780817926151 |
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Record in the Search Index
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| contents | Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index |
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| dewey-full | 338.4/7621381520973 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
| dewey-raw | 338.4/7621381520973 |
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| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1st ed |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV049873013 |
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| indexdate | 2024-09-19T05:21:47Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780817926168 |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2023 |
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| spelling | Diamond, Larry Verfasser aut Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security 1st ed Chicago Hoover Institution Press 2023 ©2023 1 Online-Ressource (388 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan Ellis, James O. Sonstige oth Schell, Orville Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Diamond, Larry Silicon Triangle Chicago : Hoover Institution Press,c2023 9780817926151 |
| spellingShingle | Diamond, Larry Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan |
| title | Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_auth | Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_exact_search | Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_full | Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_fullStr | Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_full_unstemmed | Silicon Triangle The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_short | Silicon Triangle |
| title_sort | silicon triangle the united states taiwan china and global semiconductor security |
| title_sub | The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| topic | Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan |
| topic_facet | Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan |
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