Disease, dysfunction and the brain
Disease, dysfunction and the brain:

Kapitel 1, What We Argue About When We Argue About Disease untersucht die Methodologie der gegenwärtigen Debatte über den Krankheitsbegriff. Kapitel 2, A Domino Theory of Disease, skizziert eine Theorie pathologischer Zustände als Dysfunktionen, die ein Versagen anderer Funktionen verursachen. Kapit...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Fagerberg, Harriet (Author)
Format: Thesis Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin [2022?]
Subjects:
Funktionsstörung
Hirnfunktion
Gehirn
Funktion
Krankheit
Psychiatrie
Biologie
Function
Disease
Psychiatry
Biology
Hochschulschrift
Online Access:Volltext
Summary:Kapitel 1, What We Argue About When We Argue About Disease untersucht die Methodologie der gegenwärtigen Debatte über den Krankheitsbegriff. Kapitel 2, A Domino Theory of Disease, skizziert eine Theorie pathologischer Zustände als Dysfunktionen, die ein Versagen anderer Funktionen verursachen. Kapitel 3, Against the Generalised Theory of Function, verteidigt eine auf Dysfunktionen fußende Theorie gegen einen aktuellen Einwand Justin Garsons. Kapitel 4, Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs, widerlegt ein Argument Papineaus, das psychische Erkrankung und Hirnerkrankung durch eine Analogie mit Computerhardware und Software unterscheidet. Kapitel 5, Reactive Natural Kinds and Varieties of Dependence, unterscheidet verschiedene Arten der Abhängigkeit zwischen natürlichen Arten und deren Klassifikation.
Englische Version: Ch. 1 What We Argue About When We Argue About Disease, considers some methodological oddities evident in the disease-debate – participants claim to be in the business of conceptual analysis, but fail to argue as if this were the case. I argue these strange features are best explained by the hypothesis that pathology is a real kind. On this basis, I formulate my own research question: what is the causal structure underpinning the real kind pathology in the world? This project, I contend, is distinct from, but not in conflict with, attempts at traditional conceptual analysis. In Ch. 2 A Domino Theory of Disease, I outline a theory of pathological conditions as ‘domino dysfunctions’: dysfunctions which cause failures of function in other traits. Domino dysfunctions can be distinguished on principled grounds from non-pathological, ‘trivial’ dysfunctions. In Ch. 3 Against the Generalised Theory of Function, I defend a dysfunction-based account against a recent objection mounted by Justin Garson. I show that Garson’s Generalised Selected Effects Theory implies that neurally selected disorders are both functional and dysfunctional. I argue, on this basis, that we should reject Garson’s theory outright. In Ch. 4 Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs, I refute the argument, advanced by Papineau and others, that mental disorders are metaphysically distinct from brain disorders just as software malfunctions are distinct from hardware malfunctions in a classical computer. Finally, In Ch. 5 Reactive Natural Kinds and Varieties of Dependence, I distinguish ‘simple dependence’, ‘secondary dependence’ and ‘essential dependence’ between a natural kind and its classification. On this basis, I offer a principled hypothesis as to why psychiatric kinds may be more metaphysically unstable than paradigm biomedical kinds – even if they are bona fide natural kinds constituted by brain dysfunction.
Item Description:Tag der Verteidigung: 27.09.2022
Der Text enthält eine Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache.
Veröffentlichung der elektronischen Ressource auf dem edoc-Server der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: 2024
Die Arbeit entstand im Joint-PhD Programme Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and King's College London (Cotutelle Verfahren)
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (162 Seiten) Illustrationen

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