Game Theory: an introduction with step-by-step examples
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Springer International Publishing
2023
Cham Palgrave Macmillan |
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| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Physical Description: | XXIII, 455 Seiten Illustrationen |
| ISBN: | 9783031375767 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game Theory |b an introduction with step-by-step examples |c Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Behavioral Economics | |
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1 Introduction to Games and Their Representation . 1.1 1.2 1.3 Introduction . What Is Game Theory? . Main Elements in a Game . 1.3.1 Players. 1.3.2 Strategies . 1.3.3 Payoffs . 1.4 Two Graphical Approaches . 1.4.1 Matrices . 1.4.2 Game Trees . 1.5 Introducing Imperfect Information in Game Trees . 1.6 Identifying Equilibrium Behavior . 1.6.1 Does an Equilibrium Exist? . 1.6.2 Is the Equilibrium Unique? . 1.6.3 Is the Equilibrium Robust to Small Payoff Changes? . 11 1.6.4 Is the Equilibrium Pareto Optimal? . References . 2 Equilibrium Dominance
. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Introduction . Strictly Dominated Strategies . Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies . 2.3.1 Does the Order of Deletion Matter inIDSDS? . 2.3.2 Deleting More Than One Strategy at a Time . 2.3.3 Multiple Equilibrium Predictions . Applying IDSDS in Common Games . 2.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game . 2.4.2 Coordination Games—The Battle of the Sexes Game . 23 2.4.3 Pareto Coordination Game—The Stag Hunt Game . 25 2.4.4 Anticoordination Game—The Game of Chicken . 2.4.5 Symmetric and Asymmetric Games. 1 1 1 3 3 3 5 5 6 7 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 15 18 18 19 20 20 26 28 11
3 4 2.5 Allowing for Randomizations to BringIDSDS Further . 2.5.1 What If IDSDS Has No Bite? . 2.6 Evaluating IDSDS as a Solution Concept. 2.7 Weakly Dominated Strategies . 2.7.1 Deletion Order Matters in IDWDS . 2.7.2 IDSDS Vs. IDWDS . 2.8 Strictly Dominant Strategies . 2.8.1 Evaluating SDE as a Solution Concept . Exercises . Reference . 30 33 33 34 36 38 39 40 41 46 Nash Equilibrium . 3.1 Introduction . 3.2 Best Response . 3.2.1 Finding Best Responses with Discrete Strategy Spaces . 3.2.2 Finding Best Responses with Continuous Strategy Spaces . 3.3 Deleting Strategies That Are Nevera Best Response . 3.4 Rationalizability . 3.4.1 Evaluating Rationalizability as a Solution
Concept. 3.5 Applications of Rationalizability . 3.5.1 Finding NBRs in the Beauty Contest . 3.5.2 Finding NBRs in the Cournot Duopoly . 3.6 Nash Equilibrium . 3.7 Finding Nash Equilibria in Common Games . 3.7.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game . 3.7.2 Coordination Game—The Battle of the Sexes Game . 61 3.7.3 Pareto Coordination Game—The Stag Hunt Game . 62 3.7.4 Anticoordination Game—The Game of Chicken . 3.7.5 Multiple Nash Equilibria . 3.8 Relationship Between NE and IDSDS . 3.9 What If We Find NoNEs? . 3.10 Evaluating NE as a Solution Concept . Appendix: Equilibrium Selection. Exercises . References . 47 47 47 Nash Equilibria inGames with Continuous Action Spaces . 4.1 Introduction
. 4.2 Quantity Competition . 4.2.1 Quantity Competition with Homogeneous Goods and Two Firms . 48 50 52 53 55 56 56 57 58 60 60 63 64 65 65 67 68 69 75 77 77 78 78
Extending Quantity Competition to N 2 Finns . 80 4.2.3 Quantity Competition with Heterogeneous Goods . 82 4.3 Price Competition . 4.3.1 Price Competition with Homogeneous Goods . 4.3.2 Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods . 4.4 Public Good Game . 4.4.1 Inefficient Equilibrium . 4.5 Electoral Competition . 4.5.1 Alternative Proof to the Electoral Competition game . 96 Exercises . References . 4.2.2 5 Mixed Strategy NashEquilibrium . Introduction . Mixed Strategy . Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium . Finding Mixed Strategy Equilibria . 5.4.1 Graphical Representation of Best Responses . 5.5 Some
Lessons . 5.6 Extensions . 5.6.1 Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Games with k 3 Pure Strategies . 117 5.6.2 Finding Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Games with N 2 Players . 119 5.7 Strictly Competitive Games . 5.7.1 Strictly Competitive Games . 5.7.2 Zero-Sum Games . 5.7.3 Security Strategies . 5.8 Security Strategies and NE . 5.9 Correlated Equilibrium. 5.9.1 Public or Private Recommendations? . 5.10 Equilibrium Refinements in Strategic-FormGames (Technical) . 5.10.1 Trembling-Hand PerfectEquilibrium . 5.10.2 Proper Equilibrium . Appendix—NE Existence Theorem (Technical) . Exercises . References
. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium . 6.1 6.2 Introduction . Tree rules . 6.2.1 Actions vs. Strategies . 84 84 87 90 93 94 97 102 105 105 107 108 109 113 115 117 121 121 123 124 126 129 131 133 133 136 138 141 148 151 151 152 155
Why Don’t We Just Find the Nash Equilibrium of the Game Tree? . 156 6.4 Subgames . 6.4.1 What If the Game Tree Has Information Sets? . 6.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium . 6.5.1 Finding SPEs in Games Without Information Sets . 6.5.2 Finding SPEs in Game Trees with Information Sets . 6.6 Evaluating SPE as a Solution Concept . 6.7 Applications . 6.7.1 Stackelberg Game of Sequential Quantity Competition. 6.7.2 Sequential Public Good Game . 6.7.3 Ultimatum Bargaining Game . 6.7.4 Two-Period Alternating-Offers Bargaining Game . 6.7.5 Some Tricks About Solving Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games . 6.7.6 Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game with Infinite Periods. Appendix—Mixed and Behavioral Strategies . Exercises
. References . 181 184 186 202 Repeated Games. 7.1 Introduction . 7.2 Repeating the Game Twice. 7.3 Repeating the Game T 2 Times . 7.4 Repeating the Game Infinitely Many Times . 7.4.1 Uncooperative Outcome . 7.4.2 Cooperative Outcome . 7.4.3 Cooperative Outcome—Extensions . 7.5 Folk Theorem . 7.5.1 Feasible and Individually Rational Payoffs . 7.5.2 Folk Theorem and Cooperation . 7.6 Application to Collusion in Oligopoly . 7.6.1 Minimal Discount Factor Supporting Collusion . 7.6.2 Other Collusive GTS . 7.7 What if the Stage Game has More than One NE?. 7.8 Modified GTSs . 7.8.1 An Eye for an Eye
. 7.8.2 Short and Nasty Punishments. 7.8.3 Imperfect Monitoring . 203 203 204 208 210 211 212 214 217 218 221 224 228 229 230 232 232 235 236 6.3 7 158 158 160 161 164 168 169 169 172 175 177 180
Exercises . References . g 240 251 253 Introduction . 253 Background . 254 8.2.1 Players’ Types and Their Associated Probability . 254 8.2.2 Strategies Under Incomplete Information . 256 8.2.3 Representing Asymmetric Information as Incomplete Information . 256 8.2.4 Best Response Under Incomplete Information . 257 8.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium . 259 8.3.1 Ex-ante and Ex-post Stability . 259 8.4 Finding BNEs—First Approach: Build the Bayesian Normal Form . 260 8.5 Finding BNEs—Second Approach: Focus on the InformedPlayer First . 263 8.6 Evaluating BNE as a Solution Concept . 267 8.7 What If Both Players Are Privately Informed? . 268 Exercises . 270 Reference
. 279 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 8Д 82 9 Auction Theory . Introduction . Auctions as Allocation Mechanisms . Second-price Auctions . 9.3.1 Case 1: Bid Equal To Her Valuation . 9.3.2 Case 2: Downward Deviations, Bidding Below Her Valuation . 285 9.3.3 Case 3: Upward Deviations, Bidding Above Her Valuation . 286 9.3.4 Discussion . 9.4 First-Price Auctions. 9.5 Efficiency in Auctions . 9.6 Seller’s Expected Revenue . 9.6.1 Expected Revenue in the FPA . 9.6.2 Expected Revenue in the SPA . 9.6.3 Revenue Equivalence Principle . 9.7 Common-Value Auctionsand the Winner’s Curse . 9.7.1 Bid Shading Is a Must! . 9.7.2 Equilibrium Bidding in Common-
Value Auctions . 301 Exercises . 9.1 9.2 9.3 281 281 282 284 284 286 287 292 293 293 297 299 300 300 303
10 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 Pooling Strategy Profile (OB, OF) . PBEs in Games with Two Information Sets . Separating Strategy Profile (EH, NEL). Pooling Strategy Profile (NEH, ΝΕΒ) . Insensible Off-the-Equilibrium Beliefs . 3231 325 1 3251 3281 3311 10.8 Evaluating PBE as a Solution Concept . 10.9 Semi-Separating PBE . 10.10 Extensions . 10.10.1 What if the Receiver has More than Two Available Responses? . 10.10.2 What if the Sender has More than Two Available Messages? . 10.10.3 What if the Sender has More than Two Types? . 10.10.4 Other Extensions . Exercises . Reference . 3321 3341 337 1 I 337 I | 338 I 342 I 346 j 348 i 358 1 10.7 11 309 Introduction . 309· Sequential-Move Games of Incomplete 1 Information—Notation
. 3101 B NE Prescribing Sequentially Irrational Behavior . 3141 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium—Definition . 3161 A Tool to Find PB Es in Signaling Games . 3201 Finding PBEs in Games with one Information Set . 3211 10.6.1 Separating Strategy Profile (OB, NF) . 3221 10.6.2 Finding 10.7.1 10.7.2 10.7.3 359 i Introduction . 359 Intuitive Criterion . 360 11.2.1 A Six-Step Tool to Apply the Intuitive Criterion . 361 11.2.2 Separating Equilibria Survive the Intuitive Criterion . 362 11.3 DI Criterion . 363 11.3.1 Applying the DI Criterion—An Example . 364 11.3.2 Discrete and Continuous Responses . 365 11.3.3 Comparing Intuitive and Divinity Criteria . 365 11.3.4 Other Refinement Criteria . 366 11.4 Sequential Equilibrium. 366 11.4.1 Finding Sequential Equilibria . 367 11.4.2 Separating PBEs that Are Also SEs. 368 11.4.3 A Pooling PBE that Is Not a SE
. 369 11.4.4 A Pooling PBE that Is Also A SE . 371 Exercises . 372 References . 378 Equilibrium Refinements . 11.1 11.2
12 Signaling Games with Continuous Messages 379 12.1 Introduction . 379 12 2 Utility Functions with Continuous Actions . 380 12 3 Complete Information . 381 ]24 Separating PBE . 382 12.4.1 Separating PBE—Applying the Intuitive Criterion . 387 12.4.2 Separating PBE—Applying the DI Criterion. 388 12.5 Pooling PBE. 390 12.5.1 Other Pooling PB Es . 393 12.5.2 Pooling PBE—Applying the Intuitive Criterion . 394 12.6 Can Signaling Be Welfare Improving? . 396 12.7 What If the Sender Has Three Types? . 397 12.7.1 Separating PBEs . 397 12.7.2 Separating PBE—Applying the Intuitive Criterion . 398 12.7.3 Separating PBE—Applying theDICriterion . 401 Appendix: Equilibrium Refinements . 402 Exercises . 405 References
. 408 13 Cheap Talk Games . 13.1 Introduction . 13.2 Cheap Talk with Discrete Messages and Responses . 13.2.1 Separating PBE . 13.2.2 Pooling PBEs . 13.3 Cheap Talk with Discrete Messages But Continuous Responses . 415 13.3.1 Separating PBE . 13.3.2 Pooling PBEs . 13.4 Cheap Talk with Continuous Messages and Responses . 13.4.1 Separating PBE . 13.4.2 Equilibrium Number of Partitions . 13.4.3 Interval Lengths in Equilibrium . 13.5 Extensions . Exercises . References . 409 409 410 411 413 Mathematical Appendix
. 435 References. 447 Index . 451 416 418 420 420 423 427 429 430 434
An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples. This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides "tools" or "recipes" to solve different classes of games. Game Theory does not require readers to have a strong mathematical background, as the book presents the information as plainly as possible. Every chapter begins with the main definitions and concepts before diving into the applications to different settings across economics, business, and other social sciences. Chapters walk readers through algebraic steps and simplifications. This makes the text accessible for undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory. Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information models as well as signaling games. |
| adam_txt |
1 Introduction to Games and Their Representation . 1.1 1.2 1.3 Introduction . What Is Game Theory? . Main Elements in a Game . 1.3.1 Players. 1.3.2 Strategies . 1.3.3 Payoffs . 1.4 Two Graphical Approaches . 1.4.1 Matrices . 1.4.2 Game Trees . 1.5 Introducing Imperfect Information in Game Trees . 1.6 Identifying Equilibrium Behavior . 1.6.1 Does an Equilibrium Exist? . 1.6.2 Is the Equilibrium Unique? . 1.6.3 Is the Equilibrium Robust to Small Payoff Changes? . 11 1.6.4 Is the Equilibrium Pareto Optimal? . References . 2 Equilibrium Dominance
. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Introduction . Strictly Dominated Strategies . Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies . 2.3.1 Does the Order of Deletion Matter inIDSDS? . 2.3.2 Deleting More Than One Strategy at a Time . 2.3.3 Multiple Equilibrium Predictions . Applying IDSDS in Common Games . 2.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game . 2.4.2 Coordination Games—The Battle of the Sexes Game . 23 2.4.3 Pareto Coordination Game—The Stag Hunt Game . 25 2.4.4 Anticoordination Game—The Game of Chicken . 2.4.5 Symmetric and Asymmetric Games. 1 1 1 3 3 3 5 5 6 7 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 15 18 18 19 20 20 26 28 11
3 4 2.5 Allowing for Randomizations to BringIDSDS Further . 2.5.1 What If IDSDS Has No Bite? . 2.6 Evaluating IDSDS as a Solution Concept. 2.7 Weakly Dominated Strategies . 2.7.1 Deletion Order Matters in IDWDS . 2.7.2 IDSDS Vs. IDWDS . 2.8 Strictly Dominant Strategies . 2.8.1 Evaluating SDE as a Solution Concept . Exercises . Reference . 30 33 33 34 36 38 39 40 41 46 Nash Equilibrium . 3.1 Introduction . 3.2 Best Response . 3.2.1 Finding Best Responses with Discrete Strategy Spaces . 3.2.2 Finding Best Responses with Continuous Strategy Spaces . 3.3 Deleting Strategies That Are Nevera Best Response . 3.4 Rationalizability . 3.4.1 Evaluating Rationalizability as a Solution
Concept. 3.5 Applications of Rationalizability . 3.5.1 Finding NBRs in the Beauty Contest . 3.5.2 Finding NBRs in the Cournot Duopoly . 3.6 Nash Equilibrium . 3.7 Finding Nash Equilibria in Common Games . 3.7.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game . 3.7.2 Coordination Game—The Battle of the Sexes Game . 61 3.7.3 Pareto Coordination Game—The Stag Hunt Game . 62 3.7.4 Anticoordination Game—The Game of Chicken . 3.7.5 Multiple Nash Equilibria . 3.8 Relationship Between NE and IDSDS . 3.9 What If We Find NoNEs? . 3.10 Evaluating NE as a Solution Concept . Appendix: Equilibrium Selection. Exercises . References . 47 47 47 Nash Equilibria inGames with Continuous Action Spaces . 4.1 Introduction
. 4.2 Quantity Competition . 4.2.1 Quantity Competition with Homogeneous Goods and Two Firms . 48 50 52 53 55 56 56 57 58 60 60 63 64 65 65 67 68 69 75 77 77 78 78
Extending Quantity Competition to N 2 Finns . 80 4.2.3 Quantity Competition with Heterogeneous Goods . 82 4.3 Price Competition . 4.3.1 Price Competition with Homogeneous Goods . 4.3.2 Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods . 4.4 Public Good Game . 4.4.1 Inefficient Equilibrium . 4.5 Electoral Competition . 4.5.1 Alternative Proof to the Electoral Competition game . 96 Exercises . References . 4.2.2 5 Mixed Strategy NashEquilibrium . Introduction . Mixed Strategy . Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium . Finding Mixed Strategy Equilibria . 5.4.1 Graphical Representation of Best Responses . 5.5 Some
Lessons . 5.6 Extensions . 5.6.1 Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Games with k 3 Pure Strategies . 117 5.6.2 Finding Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Games with N 2 Players . 119 5.7 Strictly Competitive Games . 5.7.1 Strictly Competitive Games . 5.7.2 Zero-Sum Games . 5.7.3 Security Strategies . 5.8 Security Strategies and NE . 5.9 Correlated Equilibrium. 5.9.1 Public or Private Recommendations? . 5.10 Equilibrium Refinements in Strategic-FormGames (Technical) . 5.10.1 Trembling-Hand PerfectEquilibrium . 5.10.2 Proper Equilibrium . Appendix—NE Existence Theorem (Technical) . Exercises . References
. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium . 6.1 6.2 Introduction . Tree rules . 6.2.1 Actions vs. Strategies . 84 84 87 90 93 94 97 102 105 105 107 108 109 113 115 117 121 121 123 124 126 129 131 133 133 136 138 141 148 151 151 152 155
Why Don’t We Just Find the Nash Equilibrium of the Game Tree? . 156 6.4 Subgames . 6.4.1 What If the Game Tree Has Information Sets? . 6.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium . 6.5.1 Finding SPEs in Games Without Information Sets . 6.5.2 Finding SPEs in Game Trees with Information Sets . 6.6 Evaluating SPE as a Solution Concept . 6.7 Applications . 6.7.1 Stackelberg Game of Sequential Quantity Competition. 6.7.2 Sequential Public Good Game . 6.7.3 Ultimatum Bargaining Game . 6.7.4 Two-Period Alternating-Offers Bargaining Game . 6.7.5 Some Tricks About Solving Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games . 6.7.6 Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game with Infinite Periods. Appendix—Mixed and Behavioral Strategies . Exercises
. References . 181 184 186 202 Repeated Games. 7.1 Introduction . 7.2 Repeating the Game Twice. 7.3 Repeating the Game T 2 Times . 7.4 Repeating the Game Infinitely Many Times . 7.4.1 Uncooperative Outcome . 7.4.2 Cooperative Outcome . 7.4.3 Cooperative Outcome—Extensions . 7.5 Folk Theorem . 7.5.1 Feasible and Individually Rational Payoffs . 7.5.2 Folk Theorem and Cooperation . 7.6 Application to Collusion in Oligopoly . 7.6.1 Minimal Discount Factor Supporting Collusion . 7.6.2 Other Collusive GTS . 7.7 What if the Stage Game has More than One NE?. 7.8 Modified GTSs . 7.8.1 An Eye for an Eye
. 7.8.2 Short and Nasty Punishments. 7.8.3 Imperfect Monitoring . 203 203 204 208 210 211 212 214 217 218 221 224 228 229 230 232 232 235 236 6.3 7 158 158 160 161 164 168 169 169 172 175 177 180
Exercises . References . g 240 251 253 Introduction . 253 Background . 254 8.2.1 Players’ Types and Their Associated Probability . 254 8.2.2 Strategies Under Incomplete Information . 256 8.2.3 Representing Asymmetric Information as Incomplete Information . 256 8.2.4 Best Response Under Incomplete Information . 257 8.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium . 259 8.3.1 Ex-ante and Ex-post Stability . 259 8.4 Finding BNEs—First Approach: Build the Bayesian Normal Form . 260 8.5 Finding BNEs—Second Approach: Focus on the InformedPlayer First . 263 8.6 Evaluating BNE as a Solution Concept . 267 8.7 What If Both Players Are Privately Informed? . 268 Exercises . 270 Reference
. 279 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 8Д 82 9 Auction Theory . Introduction . Auctions as Allocation Mechanisms . Second-price Auctions . 9.3.1 Case 1: Bid Equal To Her Valuation . 9.3.2 Case 2: Downward Deviations, Bidding Below Her Valuation . 285 9.3.3 Case 3: Upward Deviations, Bidding Above Her Valuation . 286 9.3.4 Discussion . 9.4 First-Price Auctions. 9.5 Efficiency in Auctions . 9.6 Seller’s Expected Revenue . 9.6.1 Expected Revenue in the FPA . 9.6.2 Expected Revenue in the SPA . 9.6.3 Revenue Equivalence Principle . 9.7 Common-Value Auctionsand the Winner’s Curse . 9.7.1 Bid Shading Is a Must! . 9.7.2 Equilibrium Bidding in Common-
Value Auctions . 301 Exercises . 9.1 9.2 9.3 281 281 282 284 284 286 287 292 293 293 297 299 300 300 303
10 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 Pooling Strategy Profile (OB, OF) . PBEs in Games with Two Information Sets . Separating Strategy Profile (EH, NEL). Pooling Strategy Profile (NEH, ΝΕΒ) . Insensible Off-the-Equilibrium Beliefs . 3231 325 1 3251 3281 3311 10.8 Evaluating PBE as a Solution Concept . 10.9 Semi-Separating PBE . 10.10 Extensions . 10.10.1 What if the Receiver has More than Two Available Responses? . 10.10.2 What if the Sender has More than Two Available Messages? . 10.10.3 What if the Sender has More than Two Types? . 10.10.4 Other Extensions . Exercises . Reference . 3321 3341 337 1 I 337 I | 338 I 342 I 346 j 348 i 358 1 10.7 11 309 Introduction . 309· Sequential-Move Games of Incomplete 1 Information—Notation
. 3101 B NE Prescribing Sequentially Irrational Behavior . 3141 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium—Definition . 3161 A Tool to Find PB Es in Signaling Games . 3201 Finding PBEs in Games with one Information Set . 3211 10.6.1 Separating Strategy Profile (OB, NF) . 3221 10.6.2 Finding 10.7.1 10.7.2 10.7.3 359 i Introduction . 359 Intuitive Criterion . 360 11.2.1 A Six-Step Tool to Apply the Intuitive Criterion . 361 11.2.2 Separating Equilibria Survive the Intuitive Criterion . 362 11.3 DI Criterion . 363 11.3.1 Applying the DI Criterion—An Example . 364 11.3.2 Discrete and Continuous Responses . 365 11.3.3 Comparing Intuitive and Divinity Criteria . 365 11.3.4 Other Refinement Criteria . 366 11.4 Sequential Equilibrium. 366 11.4.1 Finding Sequential Equilibria . 367 11.4.2 Separating PBEs that Are Also SEs. 368 11.4.3 A Pooling PBE that Is Not a SE
. 369 11.4.4 A Pooling PBE that Is Also A SE . 371 Exercises . 372 References . 378 Equilibrium Refinements . 11.1 11.2
12 Signaling Games with Continuous Messages 379 12.1 Introduction . 379 12 2 Utility Functions with Continuous Actions . 380 12 3 Complete Information . 381 ]24 Separating PBE . 382 12.4.1 Separating PBE—Applying the Intuitive Criterion . 387 12.4.2 Separating PBE—Applying the DI Criterion. 388 12.5 Pooling PBE. 390 12.5.1 Other Pooling PB Es . 393 12.5.2 Pooling PBE—Applying the Intuitive Criterion . 394 12.6 Can Signaling Be Welfare Improving? . 396 12.7 What If the Sender Has Three Types? . 397 12.7.1 Separating PBEs . 397 12.7.2 Separating PBE—Applying the Intuitive Criterion . 398 12.7.3 Separating PBE—Applying theDICriterion . 401 Appendix: Equilibrium Refinements . 402 Exercises . 405 References
. 408 13 Cheap Talk Games . 13.1 Introduction . 13.2 Cheap Talk with Discrete Messages and Responses . 13.2.1 Separating PBE . 13.2.2 Pooling PBEs . 13.3 Cheap Talk with Discrete Messages But Continuous Responses . 415 13.3.1 Separating PBE . 13.3.2 Pooling PBEs . 13.4 Cheap Talk with Continuous Messages and Responses . 13.4.1 Separating PBE . 13.4.2 Equilibrium Number of Partitions . 13.4.3 Interval Lengths in Equilibrium . 13.5 Extensions . Exercises . References . 409 409 410 411 413 Mathematical Appendix
. 435 References. 447 Index . 451 416 418 420 420 423 427 429 430 434
An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples. This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides "tools" or "recipes" to solve different classes of games. Game Theory does not require readers to have a strong mathematical background, as the book presents the information as plainly as possible. Every chapter begins with the main definitions and concepts before diving into the applications to different settings across economics, business, and other social sciences. Chapters walk readers through algebraic steps and simplifications. This makes the text accessible for undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory. Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information models as well as signaling games. |
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| author | Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Muñoz-García, Félix |
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| id | DE-604.BV049533259 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T23:27:17Z |
| indexdate | 2024-09-12T10:00:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783031375767 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034878847 |
| oclc_num | 1424568959 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 DE-N2 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-N2 |
| physical | XXIII, 455 Seiten Illustrationen |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Springer International Publishing Palgrave Macmillan |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Verfasser (DE-588)122530573X aut Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia Cham Springer International Publishing 2023 Cham Palgrave Macmillan XXIII, 455 Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Experimental Economics Game Theory Behavioral Economics Experimental economics Game theory Economics / Psychological aspects Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Muñoz-García, Félix (DE-588)111361451X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-031-37574-3 Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034878847&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034878847&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Muñoz-García, Félix Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples Experimental Economics Game Theory Behavioral Economics Experimental economics Game theory Economics / Psychological aspects Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples |
| title_auth | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples |
| title_exact_search | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples |
| title_full | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
| title_fullStr | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Theory an introduction with step-by-step examples Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
| title_short | Game Theory |
| title_sort | game theory an introduction with step by step examples |
| title_sub | an introduction with step-by-step examples |
| topic | Experimental Economics Game Theory Behavioral Economics Experimental economics Game theory Economics / Psychological aspects Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Experimental Economics Game Theory Behavioral Economics Experimental economics Game theory Economics / Psychological aspects Spieltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034878847&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034878847&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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