The substance of consciousness: a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism
"At the end of the 19th Century, substance dualism-roughly, the thesis that the human person is comprised of a substantial immaterial soul and a physical body-was widespread. Materialism was not a live option. As U.T. Place observed, [Ever] since the debate between Hobbes and Descartes ended in...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Hoboken, New Jersey
Wiley Blackwell
[2024]
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| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Summary: | "At the end of the 19th Century, substance dualism-roughly, the thesis that the human person is comprised of a substantial immaterial soul and a physical body-was widespread. Materialism was not a live option. As U.T. Place observed, [Ever] since the debate between Hobbes and Descartes ended in apparent victory for the latter, it was taken more or less for granted that whatever answer to the mind-body problem is true, materialism must be false. This sociological fact changed quickly bringing about what William James described as "the evaporation of the definite soul-substance." Arthur O. Lovejoy deemed the 20th century as "the Age of the Great Revolt against Dualism." The inevitable defeat of substance dualism was assumed a foregone conclusion. Gilbert Ryle had, in the words of Daniel Dennett, "danced quite a jig on the corpse of Cartesian dualism." |
| Physical Description: | xxii, 408 Seiten Illustrationen 25,4 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781394195480 9781394195473 |
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| adam_text | Brief Table of Contents List of Figures xxi Acknowledgments xxii PART I Ontologically Serious Philosophy of Mind 1 1 Substance Dualism in the 21st Century 2 How Staunch Naturalism Shapes the Dialectic in Philosophy of Mind 16 3 A Brief Ontological Detour: Subjects, Parts, Wholes, and Unity 43 PART II 3 Arguments from Introspection, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality 57 4 The Real Nature of Introspection Arguments for Substance Dualism 59 5 From Self-Awareness and Intentionality to the Self as Soul 74 PART III On the Fundamental Unity of Conscious Beings 117 6 From Phenomenal Unity to the Synchronic Unity of the Immaterial Self 119 7 Mereological Essentialism and the Diachronic Endurance of the Soul PART IV 144 Updated and Novel Arguments from Modality and Libertarian Freedom 189 8 Upgrading Modal Arguments for Substance Dualism 191 9 Staunch Libertarian Agency and the Simple, Enduring Soul 234 ix
Brief Table of Contents X PART V 10 Important Frequently Raised Defeaters Against Substance Dualism PART VI 11 New and Neglected Responses to Common Defeaters Against Substance Dualism 273 Charting a Future for Substance Dualism New Research Programs for 21st Century Substance Dualism 275 309 311 APPENDIX: The Soul, Mental Action, and the Conservation Laws Mihretu P. Guta 344 Bibliography 361 Index 392
Contents PARTI List of Figures xxi Acknowledgments xxii Ontologically Serious Philosophy of Mind CHAPTER 1 Substance Dualism in the 21st Century 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 CHAPTER 2 The Return of Substance Dualism 1.1.1 The Great Revolt Against Dualism 1.1.2 The Resurgence of Substance Dualism The Case Against Substance Dualism Weakens 1.2.1 Admissions to the Weakness of Standard Objections to Substance Dualism 1.2.2 Admitting the Faith of Anti-Dualism 1.2.3 Proposals of Naturalistic Substance Dualism The Revival of Substance Dualist Intuitions 1.3.1 The Return to the Self and Subject of Consciousness 1.3.2 The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and Cognitive Science 1.3.3 The Revival of Aristotelianism 1.3.4 Broad Worldview Considerations The Current Turning Away From Standard Physicalism 1.4.1 The Fundamentality of Consciousness 1.4.2 The Return of Panpsychism 1.4.3 Consciousness-First Philosophy of Mind 1.4.4 Phenomenal Transparency and the Opacity of the Physical Mere Substance Dualism 1.5.1 Delineating the View 1.5.2 The Undeniable Recalcitrance of Substance Dualism How Staunch Naturalism Shapes the Dialectic in Philosophy of Mind 2.1 Worldviews, Scientific Naturalism, and the Standard Picture 2.1.1 Philosophy of Mind and Worldview Implications 2.1.2 Two Versions of a Naturalistic Worldview 2.1.3 Naturalism and the Standard Picture 1 3 3 3 5 6 6 6 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 13 13 15 16 16 16 17 18
Contents Important EpistemicBackground Issues 2.2.1 Basicality 2.2.2 Naturalness 2.2.3 Explanatory Simplicity: Ockham’s Razor and Ontological Parsimony 2.3 Contemporary Scientific Naturalists Should Be Staunch Naturalists and Strong Physicalists 2.3.1 The Naturalist Epistemic Attitude 2.3.1.1 Epistemology and the Origin and Nature of Human Noetic Faculties 2.3.1.2 Scientism 2.3.1.3 Third-Person Ways of Knowing 2.3.1.4 Combinatorial Modes of Explanation 2.3.2 The Grand Story 2.3.2.1 Precis of the Grand Story 2.3.2.2 Four Core Elements tothe Grand Story 2.3.3 The Standard Naturalist Ontology 2.3.3.1 The Location Problem 2.3.3.2 Microphysical Priority and the Mereological Hierarchy 2.4 Naturalistic Emergence 2.4.1 Three Important Distinctions 2.4.1.1 Weak Vs. Strong Property Supervenience 2.4.1.2 Emergent Vs. Structural Supervenience 2.4.1.3 Making Precise the Notion of an Emergent Property 31 2.4.2 Additional Metaphysical Aspects of Emergent Properties 2.4.2.1 Twin Hallmarks of Emergence 2.4.2.2 Seven Characteristics of Emergent Properties 2.4.3 Confusion About the Basic Problem of Emergent Properties and Faint-Hearted Naturalism 2.4.4 Classification of Emergent Properties and a New Difficulty for Faint-Hearted Naturalism 2.4.5 Eight Additional Criticisms 2.4.5.1 Emergence” Is Just a Label 2.4.5.2 Emergence and Empirically Equivalent Theories 2.4.5.3 Emergence Ex Nihilo 2.4.5.4 Emergence as Brute Facts 2.4.5.5 Sorites Problems 2.4.5.6 The Combination Problem 2.4.5.7 Consciousness and a Bayesian Argument for Theism 2.4.5.8 Novel Properties and New Substances 2.5 Going Forward
2.2 CHAPTER 3 A Brief Ontological Detour: Subjects, Parts, Wholes, and Unity 3.1 Husserlian Parts, Wholes, and Unity 20 20 20 21 23 24 24 25 25 25 27 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 32 32 34 35 35 36 36 37 38 38 39 40 41 43 43
Contents Parthood and Simplicity: Separable and Inseparable Parts 44 3.1.2 Holistic Unity: Genuine Wholes, Relations, and Aggregates Subjects of Consciousness: A Few Metaphysical Theses 3.2.1 What Is Consciousness? 3.2.2 Realism About Substantial Subjects and the Self 3.2.3 Subject Necessity 3.2.4 Subjects, Not Mental States, Are Conscious 3.2.5 Subject Simplicity and Subject Complexity 3.1.1 3.2 PART II Arguments from Introspection, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality CHAPTER 4 57 The Real Nature of Introspection Arguments for Substance Dualism 59 Introspection Arguments for Substance Dualism The Intensional Fallacy Objection 4.2.1 Replies 4.2.1.1 Equivocating Propositional Knowledge and Knowledge by Acquaintance 62 4.2.1.2 Absurd Introspection Skepticism 4.2.1.3 Missing the Target: Why AFI Is Metaphysical 4.3 The Objection from Neurological de Dicto but Not de Re Beliefs 4.3.1 Replies 4.3.1.1 The Neuroscientific Loss of Introspective Skepticism 4.3.1.2 The Illicit Presumption of Physicalism 4.3.1.3 Dubious Analogies from the History of Science 4.3.1.4 Grahek’s Challenge to the Phenomenal Essence of Pain 4.4 Searle’s Anti-Introspection Argument 4.5 Conclusion 59 60 62 From Self-Awareness andIntentionality to the Self as Soul 74 4.1 4.2 CHAPTER 5 46 50 50 53 54 55 56 5.1 David Barnett s Simplicity Argument 5.1.1 Barnett’s Argument Stated 5.1.2 Objections to Barnett’s Argument 5.1.2.1 Elimination 5.1.2.2 Maximality 5.1.2.3 Substance 5.1.2.4 Integrity 5.1.3 Summary 5.2 The Hard Meta-Problem of Consciousness 5.2.1 Intuitions and Rational Seemings 5.2.2 The Easy and Hard Meta-
Problems of Consciousness 5.2.3 The Data: Dualist Seemings 5.2.3.1 Explanatory Gap Seemings 63 66 67 68 68 70 70 71 72 73 75 75 76 76 77 78 79 82 82 82 83 84 84
xiv Contents Unity and Simplicity Seemings The Cognitive Science of Commonsense Substance Dualism 5.2.3.4 Eighteen Distinct Dualist Seemings 5.2.3.5 Artificial Intelligence Test Seemings 5.2.3.6 Three Explanatory Conditions of Dualist Seemings 5.3 A Direct Self-Awareness Argument for Substance Dualism 5.3.1 DSA: The Direct Self-Awareness Account of Dualist Seemings 5.3.2 Knowledge by Acquaintance 5.3.3 Monadic Intentionality 5.3.4 Givenness and Directedness 5.3.5 Direct Self-Awareness as a Self-Presenting Property 5.3.6 Self-Awareness Necessity 5.3.7 The Causal-Acquaintance Principle 5.3.8 Monadic Intentionality, Direct Self-Awareness, and Dualist Seemings 5.3.9 Satisfying the Explanatory Conditions of Dualist Seemings 5.3.10 Explanatory Unity 5.4 A Direct Reflective Self-Awareness Argument for Substance Dualism 5.4.1 Husserlian Fulfillment Structures and Self-Knowledge 5.4.2 Knowledge and Intentionality 5.4.3 Fulfilled SD Seemings 5.5 Objections to Self-Awareness Arguments 5.5.1 Hume’s Phenomenological Report 5.5.2 Commonsense Materialism 5.5.3 Linguistic and Theoretical Dependence 5.5.4 Absent Dualist Seemings 5.5.5 Religious Etiology 5.5.6 Neuroscientific Defeaters 5.5.7 Self-Awareness Failure 5.5.8 The Dual-Process Defeater 5.5.8.1 Dualist Seemings and Moorean Facts 5.5.8.2 A Dualist Rival to DPA 5.5.8.3 A Generality Problem for DPA 5.5.8.4 A Superior Physicalist Account of Self-Awareness 5.6 A Crucial Implication of the Direct Self-Awareness Argument 5.2.3.2 5.2.3.3 PART III On the Fundamental Unity of Conscious Beings CHAPTER 6 85 86 88 90 90 92 92 94 96 97 98 99 100
101 101 102 103 103 103 104 105 105 106 107 107 108 108 108 110 112 113 114 115 116 117 From Phenomenal Unity to the Synchronic Unity of the Immaterial Self 119 6.1 6.2 119 121 Introduction The Datum: Phenomenally Unified Consciousness
Contents 6.2.1 Phenomenal Unity 6.2.2 Phenomenal Holism 6.2.3 Subject Phenomenal Unity 6.3 Phenomenally Unified Consciousness Contra Physicalism 6.3.1 The Anti-Distribution Argument 6.3.2 A Temporal Distribution Problem 6.3.3 The Process Argument 6.3.4 A Non-Phenomenal Processing Problem 6.3.5 A Micro-Subject Problem 6.3.6 The Function Argument 6.3.6.1 The Function Argument Against Animalism 6.3.7 An Emergentist Objection 6.3.8 Not All Simple Souls Will Do: Contra Emergent Substance Dualism 6.4 Phenomenally Unified Consciousness Contra Russellian Panpsychism 6.4.1 The Combination Problem(s) 6.4.2 The Privacy Argument Against Panpsychist Phenomenal Unity 6.4.2.1 Mental-Sharing and Subjectivity 6.4.2.2 Self-Presentation 6.4.2.3 Mine-ness Necessity 6.4.2.4 A Neo-Aristotelian Ontology of Phenomenal States 6.4.3 Objections to the Privacy Argument 6.4.3.1 Deny Mental-Sharing 6.4.3.2 Reject Privacy 6.5 General Objections to the Unity of Consciousness Argument 6.5.1 Rejecting Phenomenal Unity 6.5.2 Tim Bayne’s Explanatory Failure Objection CHAPTER 7 Mereological Essentialism and the Diachronic Endurance of the Soul Stating and Clarifying the Argument 7.1.1 The Mereological Argument 7.1.2 Simplicity 7.1.3 Clarification of the Argument 7.2 The Standard Mereological Hierarchy or Layered View of the Natural World 148 7.2.1 A General Depiction of the MereologicalHierarchy 7.2.2 The Category of Individual 7.2.3 The Category of Property/Relation 7.2.4 The Structure of the Mereological Hierarchy 7.2.5 Causation 7.2.6 Concepts and Laws 7.3 A Defense of Premise (4): Human Persons Are
Enduring Simple Spiritual Substances 7.3.1 Simple and Complex Views of DiachronicPersonal Identity 7.3.2 Our Basic Awareness of Ourselves 7.1 XV 121 122 122 123 123 125 126 127 127 128 129 131 132 133 134 135 135 136 137 137 139 139 139 141 141 142 144 145 145 146 147 149 149 149 150 153 153 155 155 156
xvi Contents 7.3.3 Plantinga’s Replacement Argument 7.3.4 Normative, Teleological Rationality, Rational Deliberation, and the Simple Enduring Spiritual Self 7.3.4.1 Reasoning Is Intrinsically Teleological 7.3.4.2 Fulfillment Structures and Teleologically Arranged Action Plans 162 7.4 Defense of Premise (1): MAs Are Mereological Inconstant Objects 7.4.1 An Ontological Assay of MAs 7.4.2 Defeaters for the Complex View of PI 7.4.2.1 The Circularity Problem 7.4.2.2 Gradualism, Transitivity, and Sorites 7.4.2.3 The Fission Problem 7.4.2.4 Immanent Causation to the Rescue? 7.4.3 Two Physicalist Alternatives to Human Persons as MAs 7.4.3.1 We Are Atomic Simples 7.4.3.1.1 Chisholm on Extended Physical Atoms or Simple Souls 7.4.3.1.2 Mental Subjects Are Simple Souls: Assessing the Case 7.4.3.1.3 The Ubiguitous Rejection of the EPA Position 7.4.3.2 We Are Homeodynamic Systems 7.4.3.2.1 Objections to the Systems Approach 7.4.3.2.1.1 What We Seem to Know About Ourselves 7.4.3.2.1.2 Avoid Spooky Entities at All Costs 7.4.3.2.1.3 Complex Systems as Synchronically Unified Wholes 7.4.3.2.1.4 Problems with Harmonizing Physicalism and Downward Causation (DC) 7.4.3.2.1.5 Complex Systems as Enduring Continuants 7.4.3.2.1.6 Versions of Staunch Hylomorphism Are Superior to Systems Theories of Organisms, Specifically, Human Persons 158 160 160 163 164 165 165 166 166 167 169 169 169 170 171 172 173 174 174 174 174 178 179
Contents PART IV Updated and Novel Arguments from Modality and Libertarian Freedom 189 CHAPTERS Upgrading Modal Arguments for Substance Dualism 191 A Modal Argument for SD 8.1.1 Statement of the Argument 8.1.2 Clarification of the Argument 8.2 Defense of the Argument 8.2.1 Contingent Physicalism and Premise (2) 8.2.1.1 Merricks on Contingent Physicalism and the Modal Argument 8.2.1.1.1 Objections to Merricks’s Argument 8.2.1.2 Contra Bailey’s Contingent Physicalism 8.2.1.2.1 Four Features of Bailey’s Position 8.2.1.2.2 Four Problems with Bailey’s Position 8.2.1.2.3 An Addition Response to Bailey’s Via Negativa 8.2.2 Clarification and Defense of Premise (3) 8.2.2.1Conceivability and Possibility 8.2.2.2 Modal Epistemology, Rational Intuitions as Seemings and Adequate Intuitive Presentation 8.2.2.2.1 Timothy O Connor 8.2.2.2.2 George Bealer 8.2.2.2.3 Edmund Husserl 8.3 Five Objections Against Modal Arguments for SD 8.3.1 The Modal Argument Is Circular 8.3.2 The Modal Argument Establishes Merely a Duality of Concepts 231 8.3.3 Physicalist and Dualism Intuitions Cancel Out Each Other 8.3.4 Problems with Dualist Thought Experiments 8.3.5 Kripke and the Confusion Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility 191 191 192 193 193 Staunch Libertarian Agency and the Simple, Enduring Soul 234 8.1 CHAPTER 9 9.1 9.2 9.3 Contemporary Recognition of the Problem SLA Raises for Naturalism and Physicalism The Argument and Its Basic Epistemic Justification 9.2.1 The SLA Argument 9.2.2 Our Fundamental Justification for Libertarian Freedom SLA and Its Metaphysical Worldview Implications 9.3.1 A
Formal Characterization of SLA 9.3.2 Six Features That Constitute SLA 9.3.2.1 Free Agents Are Substances 9.3.2.2 Free Agents Have Active Power 9.3.2.3 Free Agents Are First Movers 9.3.2.4 Free Agents Have Categorical Ability 193 194 201 201 203 211 212 212 213 213 218 223 230 230 231 232 233 235 237 237 237 240 241 241 241 243 243 245
aViiI Contents Free Agents Act for the Soke of Teleological Ends 9.3.2.6 Free Agents Exhibit Top/Down Causation 9.4 Alternatives to SLA 9.4.1 Daniel Dennett and Free Will Irrealism 9.4.2 John Searle and Creative Compatibilism 9.4.2.1 Free Will Within Naturalist Constraints 9.4.2.2 A Solution to the Naturalist Problem of Free Will 9.4.2.3 A Critique of Searle s Solution 9.4.3 Robert Kane and Faint-Hearted Libertarian Freedom 9.4.3.1 Kane and Naturalistic Constraints 9.4.3.2 Three Objections to Kane s Position 9.4.3.2.1 Kane’s Denial of a Substantial Agent 9.4.3.2.2 Two Problems with Kane’s Account of Causality 9.4.3.2.3 Kane’s Rejection of Reasons as Teleological Ends 9.4.4 Kevin Timpe and Jonathan Jacobs: Minimalist Naturalism and Libertarianism 9.5 Causal Closure of the Physical and “Top-Down” Causation 9.5.1 Kim’s Supervenience Argument 9.5.2 Kim’s Crucial Background Assumption 9.5.3 The Major Difficulty: Emergence 9.5.3.1 No Causal Overdetermination 9.5.3.1.1 Ted Sider’s Counterargument and Our Response 9.5.3.1.2 Macro-Objects Are Aggregates 9.5.3.1.3 Adapting a Defeaterfrom O’Connor and Churchill 9.6 Conclusion 9.3.2.5 PART V New and Neglected Responses to Common Defeaters Against Substance Dualism CHAPTER 10 Important Frequently Raised Defeaters Against Substance Dualism 275 10.1 The Three Problems of Causal Interaction 10.1.1 Disambiguating “How Can Mental Entities Causally Interact withPhysicalEntities?” 276 10.1.2 Causal Interaction Violates the Conservation of Energy Principle 10.1.3 Causal Interaction Falls Prey to the Problem of Causal Pairing 10.2 Nine
Neuroscientific Objections to SD 10.2.1 SD as a Soul-of-the-Gaps Argument 10.2.2 Neuroscience and the Explanatory Impotence of SD 285 10.2.3 Empirically Equivalent Theories and the Findings of Neuroscience 288 245 246 249 249 250 250 251 254 257 257 259 259 259 261 261 263 263 263 264 265 266 266 267 271 273 276 277 280 284 284
Contents xjx Neuroscience and the Nature of the Central Issues in Philosophy of Mind 10.2.5 Neuroscientific Methodology Relies on First-Person Reports 10.2.6 Scientific Explanation, Necessitation, and the Failure of the Neuroscientific Correlations 10.2.7 Neuroscientific Correlations and an Ad Hoc, Bloated Ontology 10.2.8 The Neuroscientific Parsimony Objection 10.2.9 Defeating and Turning the Tables on an SD Parsimony Argument Postulating a Substantial Soul Is Explanatorily Impotent in Explaining the Occurrence of Conscious States 10.3.1 SD and Explanatory Impotence 10.3.2 SD and the Problematic Nature of Soul Stuff 10.3.3 SD Responses to These Objections 10.3.4 Responding to a Misguided Physicalist Defeater 10.3.5 A Response to Bailey’s Magical Mystery Tour 10.2.4 10.3 PART VI Charting a Future for Substance Dualism CHAPTER 11 New Research Programs for 21st Century Substance Dualism 11.1 11.2 11.3 Conceptual Research Projects 11.1.1 Charting the Logical Space of Mere Substance Dualism 11.1.1.1 The Historical Argument 11.1.1.2 The Substance Argument 11.1.1.3 Varieties of Contemporary Substance Dualism 314 Methodological Research Projects 11.2.1 Empirically Informed and Testable SD 11.2.2 Ontologically Serious Philosophy of Mind 11.2.2.1 Properties, Powers, and Substances 11.2.2.2 Parts, Wholes, and Unity 11.2.2.3 The Return of Teleology 11.2.3 Preserving the Person/Subject 11.2.4 Preserving the First-Person 11.2.5 Consciousness-First and Analytic Phenomenology Developmental SD Research Projects 11.3.1 Charting the Logical Space of SD Embodiment 11.3.1.1 Two-Dozen or so SD
Embodiment Distinctions 322 11.3.1.2 SD Embodiment and the Unity of the Person 324 11.3.1.3 The Bodily Soul View 11.3.1.4 Staunch Hylomorphic SD 11.3.2 The Great Importance of Embodiment for SD 290 292 293 297 298 300 301 301 302 303 303 305 309 311 312 312 312 314 316 316 316 317 318 318 319 319 320 322 322 325 326 328
XX Contents 11.3.3 SD and Psychological Development 11.3.4 SD and the Nature of the Physical 11.4 Applied SD Research Projects 11.4.1 SD and New Waves in the Philosophy of Religion 11.4.2 SD and Epistemology 11.4.2.1 Internalism and Externalism 11.4.2.2 Social Epistemology 11.4.3 SD and Content Externalism 11.4.4 SD and Social Psychology 11.4.5 SD Healthcare and Mental Health 11.4.6 SD Approaches to Developing Technology 11.4.6.1 SD and Transhumanism 11.4.6.2 SD and Artificial Intelligence 11.4.6.3 SD and Virtual Reality 11.5 Conclusion 330 331 332 332 334 334 335 336 337 337 339 340 340 342 343 APPENDIX: The Soul, Mental Action, and the Conservation Laws Mihretu P. Guta 344 Bibliography 361 Index 392
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Brief Table of Contents List of Figures xxi Acknowledgments xxii PART I Ontologically Serious Philosophy of Mind 1 1 Substance Dualism in the 21st Century 2 How Staunch Naturalism Shapes the Dialectic in Philosophy of Mind 16 3 A Brief Ontological Detour: Subjects, Parts, Wholes, and Unity 43 PART II 3 Arguments from Introspection, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality 57 4 The Real Nature of Introspection Arguments for Substance Dualism 59 5 From Self-Awareness and Intentionality to the Self as Soul 74 PART III On the Fundamental Unity of Conscious Beings 117 6 From Phenomenal Unity to the Synchronic Unity of the Immaterial Self 119 7 Mereological Essentialism and the Diachronic Endurance of the Soul PART IV 144 Updated and Novel Arguments from Modality and Libertarian Freedom 189 8 Upgrading Modal Arguments for Substance Dualism 191 9 Staunch Libertarian Agency and the Simple, Enduring Soul 234 ix
Brief Table of Contents X PART V 10 Important Frequently Raised Defeaters Against Substance Dualism PART VI 11 New and Neglected Responses to Common Defeaters Against Substance Dualism 273 Charting a Future for Substance Dualism New Research Programs for 21st Century Substance Dualism 275 309 311 APPENDIX: The Soul, Mental Action, and the Conservation Laws Mihretu P. Guta 344 Bibliography 361 Index 392
Contents PARTI List of Figures xxi Acknowledgments xxii Ontologically Serious Philosophy of Mind CHAPTER 1 Substance Dualism in the 21st Century 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 CHAPTER 2 The Return of Substance Dualism 1.1.1 The Great Revolt Against Dualism 1.1.2 The Resurgence of Substance Dualism The Case Against Substance Dualism Weakens 1.2.1 Admissions to the Weakness of Standard Objections to Substance Dualism 1.2.2 Admitting the Faith of Anti-Dualism 1.2.3 Proposals of Naturalistic Substance Dualism The Revival of Substance Dualist Intuitions 1.3.1 The Return to the Self and Subject of Consciousness 1.3.2 The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and Cognitive Science 1.3.3 The Revival of Aristotelianism 1.3.4 Broad Worldview Considerations The Current Turning Away From Standard Physicalism 1.4.1 The Fundamentality of Consciousness 1.4.2 The Return of Panpsychism 1.4.3 Consciousness-First Philosophy of Mind 1.4.4 Phenomenal Transparency and the Opacity of the Physical Mere Substance Dualism 1.5.1 Delineating the View 1.5.2 The Undeniable Recalcitrance of Substance Dualism How Staunch Naturalism Shapes the Dialectic in Philosophy of Mind 2.1 Worldviews, Scientific Naturalism, and the Standard Picture 2.1.1 Philosophy of Mind and Worldview Implications 2.1.2 Two Versions of a Naturalistic Worldview 2.1.3 Naturalism and the Standard Picture 1 3 3 3 5 6 6 6 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 13 13 15 16 16 16 17 18
Contents Important EpistemicBackground Issues 2.2.1 Basicality 2.2.2 Naturalness 2.2.3 Explanatory Simplicity: Ockham’s Razor and Ontological Parsimony 2.3 Contemporary Scientific Naturalists Should Be Staunch Naturalists and Strong Physicalists 2.3.1 The Naturalist Epistemic Attitude 2.3.1.1 Epistemology and the Origin and Nature of Human Noetic Faculties 2.3.1.2 Scientism 2.3.1.3 Third-Person Ways of Knowing 2.3.1.4 Combinatorial Modes of Explanation 2.3.2 The Grand Story 2.3.2.1 Precis of the Grand Story 2.3.2.2 Four Core Elements tothe Grand Story 2.3.3 The Standard Naturalist Ontology 2.3.3.1 The Location Problem 2.3.3.2 Microphysical Priority and the Mereological Hierarchy 2.4 Naturalistic Emergence 2.4.1 Three Important Distinctions 2.4.1.1 Weak Vs. Strong Property Supervenience 2.4.1.2 Emergent Vs. Structural Supervenience 2.4.1.3 Making Precise the Notion of an Emergent Property 31 2.4.2 Additional Metaphysical Aspects of Emergent Properties 2.4.2.1 Twin Hallmarks of Emergence 2.4.2.2 Seven Characteristics of Emergent Properties 2.4.3 Confusion About the Basic Problem of Emergent Properties and Faint-Hearted Naturalism 2.4.4 Classification of Emergent Properties and a New Difficulty for Faint-Hearted Naturalism 2.4.5 Eight Additional Criticisms 2.4.5.1 "Emergence” Is Just a Label 2.4.5.2 Emergence and Empirically Equivalent Theories 2.4.5.3 Emergence Ex Nihilo 2.4.5.4 Emergence as Brute Facts 2.4.5.5 Sorites Problems 2.4.5.6 The Combination Problem 2.4.5.7 Consciousness and a Bayesian Argument for Theism 2.4.5.8 Novel Properties and New Substances 2.5 Going Forward
2.2 CHAPTER 3 A Brief Ontological Detour: Subjects, Parts, Wholes, and Unity 3.1 Husserlian Parts, Wholes, and Unity 20 20 20 21 23 24 24 25 25 25 27 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 32 32 34 35 35 36 36 37 38 38 39 40 41 43 43
Contents Parthood and Simplicity: Separable and Inseparable Parts 44 3.1.2 Holistic Unity: Genuine Wholes, Relations, and Aggregates Subjects of Consciousness: A Few Metaphysical Theses 3.2.1 What Is Consciousness? 3.2.2 Realism About Substantial Subjects and the Self 3.2.3 Subject Necessity 3.2.4 Subjects, Not Mental States, Are Conscious 3.2.5 Subject Simplicity and Subject Complexity 3.1.1 3.2 PART II Arguments from Introspection, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality CHAPTER 4 57 The Real Nature of Introspection Arguments for Substance Dualism 59 Introspection Arguments for Substance Dualism The Intensional Fallacy Objection 4.2.1 Replies 4.2.1.1 Equivocating Propositional Knowledge and Knowledge by Acquaintance 62 4.2.1.2 Absurd Introspection Skepticism 4.2.1.3 Missing the Target: Why AFI Is Metaphysical 4.3 The Objection from Neurological de Dicto but Not de Re Beliefs 4.3.1 Replies 4.3.1.1 The Neuroscientific Loss of Introspective Skepticism 4.3.1.2 The Illicit Presumption of Physicalism 4.3.1.3 Dubious Analogies from the History of Science 4.3.1.4 Grahek’s Challenge to the Phenomenal Essence of Pain 4.4 Searle’s Anti-Introspection Argument 4.5 Conclusion 59 60 62 From Self-Awareness andIntentionality to the Self as Soul 74 4.1 4.2 CHAPTER 5 46 50 50 53 54 55 56 5.1 David Barnett's Simplicity Argument 5.1.1 Barnett’s Argument Stated 5.1.2 Objections to Barnett’s Argument 5.1.2.1 Elimination 5.1.2.2 Maximality 5.1.2.3 Substance 5.1.2.4 Integrity 5.1.3 Summary 5.2 The Hard Meta-Problem of Consciousness 5.2.1 Intuitions and Rational Seemings 5.2.2 The Easy and Hard Meta-
Problems of Consciousness 5.2.3 The Data: Dualist Seemings 5.2.3.1 Explanatory Gap Seemings 63 66 67 68 68 70 70 71 72 73 75 75 76 76 77 78 79 82 82 82 83 84 84
xiv Contents Unity and Simplicity Seemings The Cognitive Science of Commonsense Substance Dualism 5.2.3.4 Eighteen Distinct Dualist Seemings 5.2.3.5 Artificial Intelligence Test Seemings 5.2.3.6 Three Explanatory Conditions of Dualist Seemings 5.3 A Direct Self-Awareness Argument for Substance Dualism 5.3.1 DSA: The Direct Self-Awareness Account of Dualist Seemings 5.3.2 Knowledge by Acquaintance 5.3.3 Monadic Intentionality 5.3.4 Givenness and Directedness 5.3.5 Direct Self-Awareness as a Self-Presenting Property 5.3.6 Self-Awareness Necessity 5.3.7 The Causal-Acquaintance Principle 5.3.8 Monadic Intentionality, Direct Self-Awareness, and Dualist Seemings 5.3.9 Satisfying the Explanatory Conditions of Dualist Seemings 5.3.10 Explanatory Unity 5.4 A Direct Reflective Self-Awareness Argument for Substance Dualism 5.4.1 Husserlian Fulfillment Structures and Self-Knowledge 5.4.2 Knowledge and Intentionality 5.4.3 Fulfilled SD Seemings 5.5 Objections to Self-Awareness Arguments 5.5.1 Hume’s Phenomenological Report 5.5.2 Commonsense Materialism 5.5.3 Linguistic and Theoretical Dependence 5.5.4 Absent Dualist Seemings 5.5.5 Religious Etiology 5.5.6 Neuroscientific Defeaters 5.5.7 Self-Awareness Failure 5.5.8 The Dual-Process Defeater 5.5.8.1 Dualist Seemings and Moorean Facts 5.5.8.2 A Dualist Rival to DPA 5.5.8.3 A Generality Problem for DPA 5.5.8.4 A Superior Physicalist Account of Self-Awareness 5.6 A Crucial Implication of the Direct Self-Awareness Argument 5.2.3.2 5.2.3.3 PART III On the Fundamental Unity of Conscious Beings CHAPTER 6 85 86 88 90 90 92 92 94 96 97 98 99 100
101 101 102 103 103 103 104 105 105 106 107 107 108 108 108 110 112 113 114 115 116 117 From Phenomenal Unity to the Synchronic Unity of the Immaterial Self 119 6.1 6.2 119 121 Introduction The Datum: Phenomenally Unified Consciousness
Contents 6.2.1 Phenomenal Unity 6.2.2 Phenomenal Holism 6.2.3 Subject Phenomenal Unity 6.3 Phenomenally Unified Consciousness Contra Physicalism 6.3.1 The Anti-Distribution Argument 6.3.2 A Temporal Distribution Problem 6.3.3 The Process Argument 6.3.4 A Non-Phenomenal Processing Problem 6.3.5 A Micro-Subject Problem 6.3.6 The Function Argument 6.3.6.1 The Function Argument Against Animalism 6.3.7 An Emergentist Objection 6.3.8 Not All Simple Souls Will Do: Contra Emergent Substance Dualism 6.4 Phenomenally Unified Consciousness Contra Russellian Panpsychism 6.4.1 The Combination Problem(s) 6.4.2 The Privacy Argument Against Panpsychist Phenomenal Unity 6.4.2.1 Mental-Sharing and Subjectivity 6.4.2.2 Self-Presentation 6.4.2.3 Mine-ness Necessity 6.4.2.4 A Neo-Aristotelian Ontology of Phenomenal States 6.4.3 Objections to the Privacy Argument 6.4.3.1 Deny Mental-Sharing 6.4.3.2 Reject Privacy 6.5 General Objections to the Unity of Consciousness Argument 6.5.1 Rejecting Phenomenal Unity 6.5.2 Tim Bayne’s Explanatory Failure Objection CHAPTER 7 Mereological Essentialism and the Diachronic Endurance of the Soul Stating and Clarifying the Argument 7.1.1 The Mereological Argument 7.1.2 Simplicity 7.1.3 Clarification of the Argument 7.2 The Standard Mereological Hierarchy or Layered View of the Natural World 148 7.2.1 A General Depiction of the MereologicalHierarchy 7.2.2 The Category of Individual 7.2.3 The Category of Property/Relation 7.2.4 The Structure of the Mereological Hierarchy 7.2.5 Causation 7.2.6 Concepts and Laws 7.3 A Defense of Premise (4): Human Persons Are
Enduring Simple Spiritual Substances 7.3.1 Simple and Complex Views of DiachronicPersonal Identity 7.3.2 Our Basic Awareness of Ourselves 7.1 XV 121 122 122 123 123 125 126 127 127 128 129 131 132 133 134 135 135 136 137 137 139 139 139 141 141 142 144 145 145 146 147 149 149 149 150 153 153 155 155 156
xvi Contents 7.3.3 Plantinga’s Replacement Argument 7.3.4 Normative, Teleological Rationality, Rational Deliberation, and the Simple Enduring Spiritual Self 7.3.4.1 Reasoning Is Intrinsically Teleological 7.3.4.2 Fulfillment Structures and Teleologically Arranged Action Plans 162 7.4 Defense of Premise (1): MAs Are Mereological Inconstant Objects 7.4.1 An Ontological Assay of MAs 7.4.2 Defeaters for the Complex View of PI 7.4.2.1 The Circularity Problem 7.4.2.2 Gradualism, Transitivity, and Sorites 7.4.2.3 The Fission Problem 7.4.2.4 Immanent Causation to the Rescue? 7.4.3 Two Physicalist Alternatives to Human Persons as MAs 7.4.3.1 We Are Atomic Simples 7.4.3.1.1 Chisholm on Extended Physical Atoms or Simple Souls 7.4.3.1.2 Mental Subjects Are Simple Souls: Assessing the Case 7.4.3.1.3 The Ubiguitous Rejection of the EPA Position 7.4.3.2 We Are Homeodynamic Systems 7.4.3.2.1 Objections to the Systems Approach 7.4.3.2.1.1 What We Seem to Know About Ourselves 7.4.3.2.1.2 Avoid Spooky Entities at All Costs 7.4.3.2.1.3 Complex Systems as Synchronically Unified Wholes 7.4.3.2.1.4 Problems with Harmonizing Physicalism and Downward Causation (DC) 7.4.3.2.1.5 Complex Systems as Enduring Continuants 7.4.3.2.1.6 Versions of Staunch Hylomorphism Are Superior to Systems Theories of Organisms, Specifically, Human Persons 158 160 160 163 164 165 165 166 166 167 169 169 169 170 171 172 173 174 174 174 174 178 179
Contents PART IV Updated and Novel Arguments from Modality and Libertarian Freedom 189 CHAPTERS Upgrading Modal Arguments for Substance Dualism 191 A Modal Argument for SD 8.1.1 Statement of the Argument 8.1.2 Clarification of the Argument 8.2 Defense of the Argument 8.2.1 Contingent Physicalism and Premise (2) 8.2.1.1 Merricks on Contingent Physicalism and the Modal Argument 8.2.1.1.1 Objections to Merricks’s Argument 8.2.1.2 Contra Bailey’s Contingent Physicalism 8.2.1.2.1 Four Features of Bailey’s Position 8.2.1.2.2 Four Problems with Bailey’s Position 8.2.1.2.3 An Addition Response to Bailey’s Via Negativa 8.2.2 Clarification and Defense of Premise (3) 8.2.2.1Conceivability and Possibility 8.2.2.2 Modal Epistemology, Rational Intuitions as Seemings and Adequate Intuitive Presentation 8.2.2.2.1 Timothy O'Connor 8.2.2.2.2 George Bealer 8.2.2.2.3 Edmund Husserl 8.3 Five Objections Against Modal Arguments for SD 8.3.1 The Modal Argument Is Circular 8.3.2 The Modal Argument Establishes Merely a Duality of Concepts 231 8.3.3 Physicalist and Dualism Intuitions Cancel Out Each Other 8.3.4 Problems with Dualist Thought Experiments 8.3.5 Kripke and the Confusion Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility 191 191 192 193 193 Staunch Libertarian Agency and the Simple, Enduring Soul 234 8.1 CHAPTER 9 9.1 9.2 9.3 Contemporary Recognition of the Problem SLA Raises for Naturalism and Physicalism The Argument and Its Basic Epistemic Justification 9.2.1 The SLA Argument 9.2.2 Our Fundamental Justification for Libertarian Freedom SLA and Its Metaphysical Worldview Implications 9.3.1 A
Formal Characterization of SLA 9.3.2 Six Features That Constitute SLA 9.3.2.1 Free Agents Are Substances 9.3.2.2 Free Agents Have Active Power 9.3.2.3 Free Agents Are First Movers 9.3.2.4 Free Agents Have Categorical Ability 193 194 201 201 203 211 212 212 213 213 218 223 230 230 231 232 233 235 237 237 237 240 241 241 241 243 243 245
aViiI Contents Free Agents Act for the Soke of Teleological Ends 9.3.2.6 Free Agents Exhibit Top/Down Causation 9.4 Alternatives to SLA 9.4.1 Daniel Dennett and Free Will Irrealism 9.4.2 John Searle and Creative Compatibilism 9.4.2.1 Free Will Within Naturalist Constraints 9.4.2.2 A Solution to the Naturalist Problem of Free Will 9.4.2.3 A Critique of Searle's Solution 9.4.3 Robert Kane and Faint-Hearted Libertarian Freedom 9.4.3.1 Kane and Naturalistic Constraints 9.4.3.2 Three Objections to Kane's Position 9.4.3.2.1 Kane’s Denial of a Substantial Agent 9.4.3.2.2 Two Problems with Kane’s Account of Causality 9.4.3.2.3 Kane’s Rejection of Reasons as Teleological Ends 9.4.4 Kevin Timpe and Jonathan Jacobs: Minimalist Naturalism and Libertarianism 9.5 Causal Closure of the Physical and “Top-Down” Causation 9.5.1 Kim’s Supervenience Argument 9.5.2 Kim’s Crucial Background Assumption 9.5.3 The Major Difficulty: Emergence 9.5.3.1 No Causal Overdetermination 9.5.3.1.1 Ted Sider’s Counterargument and Our Response 9.5.3.1.2 Macro-Objects Are Aggregates 9.5.3.1.3 Adapting a Defeaterfrom O’Connor and Churchill 9.6 Conclusion 9.3.2.5 PART V New and Neglected Responses to Common Defeaters Against Substance Dualism CHAPTER 10 Important Frequently Raised Defeaters Against Substance Dualism 275 10.1 The Three Problems of Causal Interaction 10.1.1 Disambiguating “How Can Mental Entities Causally Interact withPhysicalEntities?” 276 10.1.2 Causal Interaction Violates the Conservation of Energy Principle 10.1.3 Causal Interaction Falls Prey to the Problem of Causal Pairing 10.2 Nine
Neuroscientific Objections to SD 10.2.1 SD as a Soul-of-the-Gaps Argument 10.2.2 Neuroscience and the Explanatory Impotence of SD 285 10.2.3 Empirically Equivalent Theories and the Findings of Neuroscience 288 245 246 249 249 250 250 251 254 257 257 259 259 259 261 261 263 263 263 264 265 266 266 267 271 273 276 277 280 284 284
Contents xjx Neuroscience and the Nature of the Central Issues in Philosophy of Mind 10.2.5 Neuroscientific Methodology Relies on First-Person Reports 10.2.6 Scientific Explanation, Necessitation, and the Failure of the Neuroscientific Correlations 10.2.7 Neuroscientific Correlations and an Ad Hoc, Bloated Ontology 10.2.8 The Neuroscientific Parsimony Objection 10.2.9 Defeating and Turning the Tables on an SD Parsimony Argument Postulating a Substantial Soul Is Explanatorily Impotent in Explaining the Occurrence of Conscious States 10.3.1 SD and Explanatory Impotence 10.3.2 SD and the Problematic Nature of Soul Stuff 10.3.3 SD Responses to These Objections 10.3.4 Responding to a Misguided Physicalist Defeater 10.3.5 A Response to Bailey’s Magical Mystery Tour 10.2.4 10.3 PART VI Charting a Future for Substance Dualism CHAPTER 11 New Research Programs for 21st Century Substance Dualism 11.1 11.2 11.3 Conceptual Research Projects 11.1.1 Charting the Logical Space of Mere Substance Dualism 11.1.1.1 The Historical Argument 11.1.1.2 The Substance Argument 11.1.1.3 Varieties of Contemporary Substance Dualism 314 Methodological Research Projects 11.2.1 Empirically Informed and Testable SD 11.2.2 Ontologically Serious Philosophy of Mind 11.2.2.1 Properties, Powers, and Substances 11.2.2.2 Parts, Wholes, and Unity 11.2.2.3 The Return of Teleology 11.2.3 Preserving the Person/Subject 11.2.4 Preserving the First-Person 11.2.5 Consciousness-First and Analytic Phenomenology Developmental SD Research Projects 11.3.1 Charting the Logical Space of SD Embodiment 11.3.1.1 Two-Dozen or so SD
Embodiment Distinctions 322 11.3.1.2 SD Embodiment and the Unity of the Person 324 11.3.1.3 The Bodily Soul View 11.3.1.4 Staunch Hylomorphic SD 11.3.2 The Great Importance of Embodiment for SD 290 292 293 297 298 300 301 301 302 303 303 305 309 311 312 312 312 314 316 316 316 317 318 318 319 319 320 322 322 325 326 328
XX Contents 11.3.3 SD and Psychological Development 11.3.4 SD and the Nature of the Physical 11.4 Applied SD Research Projects 11.4.1 SD and New Waves in the Philosophy of Religion 11.4.2 SD and Epistemology 11.4.2.1 Internalism and Externalism 11.4.2.2 Social Epistemology 11.4.3 SD and Content Externalism 11.4.4 SD and Social Psychology 11.4.5 SD Healthcare and Mental Health 11.4.6 SD Approaches to Developing Technology 11.4.6.1 SD and Transhumanism 11.4.6.2 SD and Artificial Intelligence 11.4.6.3 SD and Virtual Reality 11.5 Conclusion 330 331 332 332 334 334 335 336 337 337 339 340 340 342 343 APPENDIX: The Soul, Mental Action, and the Conservation Laws Mihretu P. Guta 344 Bibliography 361 Index 392 |
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| publisher | Wiley Blackwell |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Rickabaugh, Brandon 1976- Verfasser (DE-588)1313253588 aut The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism Brandon Rickabaugh ; J.P. Moreland Hoboken, New Jersey Wiley Blackwell [2024] xxii, 408 Seiten Illustrationen 25,4 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "At the end of the 19th Century, substance dualism-roughly, the thesis that the human person is comprised of a substantial immaterial soul and a physical body-was widespread. Materialism was not a live option. As U.T. Place observed, [Ever] since the debate between Hobbes and Descartes ended in apparent victory for the latter, it was taken more or less for granted that whatever answer to the mind-body problem is true, materialism must be false. This sociological fact changed quickly bringing about what William James described as "the evaporation of the definite soul-substance." Arthur O. Lovejoy deemed the 20th century as "the Age of the Great Revolt against Dualism." The inevitable defeat of substance dualism was assumed a foregone conclusion. Gilbert Ryle had, in the words of Daniel Dennett, "danced quite a jig on the corpse of Cartesian dualism." Substanz (DE-588)4202257-5 gnd rswk-swf Leib-Seele-Problem (DE-588)4035151-8 gnd rswk-swf Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd rswk-swf Materialismus (DE-588)4127749-1 gnd rswk-swf Dualismus (DE-588)4130223-0 gnd rswk-swf Mind and body Dualism Consciousness Substanz (DE-588)4202257-5 s Dualismus (DE-588)4130223-0 s Materialismus (DE-588)4127749-1 s Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 s Leib-Seele-Problem (DE-588)4035151-8 s DE-604 Moreland, James Porter 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)124556760 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-394-19550-3 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034818050&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Rickabaugh, Brandon 1976- Moreland, James Porter 1948- The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism Substanz (DE-588)4202257-5 gnd Leib-Seele-Problem (DE-588)4035151-8 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Materialismus (DE-588)4127749-1 gnd Dualismus (DE-588)4130223-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4202257-5 (DE-588)4035151-8 (DE-588)4006349-5 (DE-588)4127749-1 (DE-588)4130223-0 |
| title | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism |
| title_auth | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism |
| title_exact_search | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism |
| title_full | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism Brandon Rickabaugh ; J.P. Moreland |
| title_fullStr | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism Brandon Rickabaugh ; J.P. Moreland |
| title_full_unstemmed | The substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism Brandon Rickabaugh ; J.P. Moreland |
| title_short | The substance of consciousness |
| title_sort | the substance of consciousness a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism |
| title_sub | a comprehensive defense of contemporary substance dualism |
| topic | Substanz (DE-588)4202257-5 gnd Leib-Seele-Problem (DE-588)4035151-8 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Materialismus (DE-588)4127749-1 gnd Dualismus (DE-588)4130223-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Substanz Leib-Seele-Problem Bewusstsein Materialismus Dualismus |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034818050&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT rickabaughbrandon thesubstanceofconsciousnessacomprehensivedefenseofcontemporarysubstancedualism AT morelandjamesporter thesubstanceofconsciousnessacomprehensivedefenseofcontemporarysubstancedualism |