Process Realism in Physics: How Experiment and History Necessitate a Process Ontology

Science should tell us what the world is like. However, realist interpretations of physics face many problems, chief among them the pessimistic meta induction. This book seeks to develop a realist position based on process ontology that avoids the traditional problems of realism. Primarily, the core...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Penn, William (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin ; Boston De Gruyter [2023]
Series:Process Thought 28
Subjects:
Online Access:DE-1046
DE-1043
DE-858
DE-859
DE-860
DE-739
DE-473
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Summary:Science should tell us what the world is like. However, realist interpretations of physics face many problems, chief among them the pessimistic meta induction. This book seeks to develop a realist position based on process ontology that avoids the traditional problems of realism. Primarily, the core claim is that in order for a scientific model to be minimally empirically adequate, that model must describe real experimental processes and dynamics. Any additional inferences from processes to things, substances or objects are not warranted, and so these inferences are shown to represent the locus of the problems of realism. The book then examines the history of physics to show that the progress of physical research is one of successive eliminations of thing interpretations of models in favor of more explanatory and experimentally verified process interpretations. This culminates in collections of models that cannot coherently allow for thing interpretations, but still successfully describe processes
Item Description:Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Aug 2023)
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (XI, 194 pages)
ISBN:9783110782516
DOI:10.1515/9783110782516

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