Rational responses to risks:
"A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act's risk in the s...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2020]
© 2020 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | UBT01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act's risk in the sense of the volatility of its possible outcomes. The distinction is normatively significant because different general principles of rationality govern attitudes to these two types of risk. Rationality strictly regulates attitudes to the chance of a bad event and is more permissive about attitudes to an act's risk. Principles of rationality governing attitudes to risk also justify evaluating an act according to its expected utility given that the act's risk, if any, belongs to every possible outcome of the act. For a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent's preferences among the acts. Maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. This view takes an act's expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. It takes account of an agent's attitudes to an act's risk without weakening the standard of expected-utility maximization. The view extends to evaluations of combination of acts, either simultaneous or in a sequence. Applications cover hedging, return-risk evaluation, professional advice, and government regulation"-- |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (269 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780190089443 9780190089436 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Weirich, Paul 1946- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)132686112 |
| author_facet | Weirich, Paul 1946- |
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| author_sort | Weirich, Paul 1946- |
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| bvnumber | BV049366802 |
| classification_rvk | CC 4400 |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1409116252 (DE-599)BVBBV049366802 |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV049366802 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:53:22Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T10:02:44Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780190089443 9780190089436 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034626846 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (269 Seiten) |
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| publishDate | 2020 |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
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| spelling | Weirich, Paul 1946- Verfasser (DE-588)132686112 aut Rational responses to risks Paul Weirich New York, NY Oxford University Press [2020] © 2020 1 Online-Ressource (269 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier "A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act's risk in the sense of the volatility of its possible outcomes. The distinction is normatively significant because different general principles of rationality govern attitudes to these two types of risk. Rationality strictly regulates attitudes to the chance of a bad event and is more permissive about attitudes to an act's risk. Principles of rationality governing attitudes to risk also justify evaluating an act according to its expected utility given that the act's risk, if any, belongs to every possible outcome of the act. For a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent's preferences among the acts. Maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. This view takes an act's expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. It takes account of an agent's attitudes to an act's risk without weakening the standard of expected-utility maximization. The view extends to evaluations of combination of acts, either simultaneous or in a sequence. Applications cover hedging, return-risk evaluation, professional advice, and government regulation"-- Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 gnd rswk-swf Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd rswk-swf Certainty Risk Decision making Reason Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 s Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover 978-0-19-008941-2 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Weirich, Paul 1946- Rational responses to risks Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4050129-2 (DE-588)4045791-6 |
| title | Rational responses to risks |
| title_auth | Rational responses to risks |
| title_exact_search | Rational responses to risks |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Rational responses to risks |
| title_full | Rational responses to risks Paul Weirich |
| title_fullStr | Rational responses to risks Paul Weirich |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rational responses to risks Paul Weirich |
| title_short | Rational responses to risks |
| title_sort | rational responses to risks |
| topic | Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Risiko Philosophie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT weirichpaul rationalresponsestorisks |