Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance: Evidence from Mexico
Forty percent of economic activities in Mexico weighed by sales have been investigated for illegal monopolistic practices since the Federal Competition Commission was established in 1993. By exploiting some unique features of the Mexican investigative system, and using a synthetic control approach,...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2022
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| Zusammenfassung: | Forty percent of economic activities in Mexico weighed by sales have been investigated for illegal monopolistic practices since the Federal Competition Commission was established in 1993. By exploiting some unique features of the Mexican investigative system, and using a synthetic control approach, this paper examines the causal impact of antitrust sanctions on industry performance and aggregate outcomes. Sanctions cause sales and wages to increase and profit margins to fall in the sanctioned sectors, thus benefiting consumers and workers. Overall, antitrust enforcement contributes roughly half a percent of per capita gross domestic product growth. Outcomes of investigations that are closed without sanction fail to reject the hypothesis that some harmful conduct is not sanctioned because investigators lack resources to prove it conclusively. An implication is that the Commission could generate greater benefits with additional investigative resources |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (57 Seiten) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-10269 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Forty percent of economic activities in Mexico weighed by sales have been investigated for illegal monopolistic practices since the Federal Competition Commission was established in 1993. By exploiting some unique features of the Mexican investigative system, and using a synthetic control approach, this paper examines the causal impact of antitrust sanctions on industry performance and aggregate outcomes. Sanctions cause sales and wages to increase and profit margins to fall in the sanctioned sectors, thus benefiting consumers and workers. Overall, antitrust enforcement contributes roughly half a percent of per capita gross domestic product growth. Outcomes of investigations that are closed without sanction fail to reject the hypothesis that some harmful conduct is not sanctioned because investigators lack resources to prove it conclusively. An implication is that the Commission could generate greater benefits with additional investigative resources | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Abuse of Dominance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Access To Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Antitrust | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Antitrust Enforcement | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cartel | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Collusion | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition Law | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competitiveness and Competition Policy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Federal Competition Commission | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Federal Economic Competition Commission | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International Economics and Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Law and Development | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Market Power | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Monopolistic Practices | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Per Se Illegal | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Rule of Reason | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ana, Urrutia Arrieta |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Iacovone, Leonardo |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mariana, Pereira Lopez |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
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| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-10269 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:55Z |
| indexdate | 2025-02-20T07:20:17Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| spellingShingle | Reed, Tristan Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico Abuse of Dominance Access To Markets Antitrust Antitrust Enforcement Cartel Collusion Competition Law Competitiveness and Competition Policy Federal Competition Commission Federal Economic Competition Commission International Economics and Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Monopolistic Practices Per Se Illegal Rule of Reason |
| title | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico |
| title_auth | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico |
| title_exact_search | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico |
| title_full | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico Tristan Reed |
| title_fullStr | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico Tristan Reed |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance Evidence from Mexico Tristan Reed |
| title_short | Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance |
| title_sort | cartels antitrust enforcement and industry performance evidence from mexico |
| title_sub | Evidence from Mexico |
| topic | Abuse of Dominance Access To Markets Antitrust Antitrust Enforcement Cartel Collusion Competition Law Competitiveness and Competition Policy Federal Competition Commission Federal Economic Competition Commission International Economics and Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Monopolistic Practices Per Se Illegal Rule of Reason |
| topic_facet | Abuse of Dominance Access To Markets Antitrust Antitrust Enforcement Cartel Collusion Competition Law Competitiveness and Competition Policy Federal Competition Commission Federal Economic Competition Commission International Economics and Trade Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Market Power Monopolistic Practices Per Se Illegal Rule of Reason |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10269 |
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