The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions:
In the East Asian crisis, connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress for financial institutions. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely, suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. But larger institutions,...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2000
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| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the East Asian crisis, connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress for financial institutions. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely, suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, suggesting a too big to fail policy. - Politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in financial institutions' distress. East Asia's financial crisis featured many distressed and closed financial intermediaries in an environment with many links between government, politicians, supervisors, and financial institutions. This makes the East Asian financial crisis a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions' distress. Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri investigate distress and closure decisions for 186 banks and 97 nonbank financial institutions in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They find that after July 1997, 42 percent of the institutions experienced distress (were closed, merged, or recapitalized, or had their operations temporarily suspended). By July 1999, 13 percent of all institutions in existence in July 1997 had been closed. Using financial data for 1996, the authors find that: · Traditional CAMEL-type variables - returns on assets, loan growth, and the ratio of loan loss reserves to capital, of net interest income to total income, and of loans to borrowings - help predict subsequent distress and closure. · None of the foreign-controlled institutions was closed, and foreign portfolio ownership lowered an institution's probability of distress. · Connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress, suggesting that supervisors had granted forbearance from regulations. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely - suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. · But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, while (smaller) nonbank financial institutions were more likely to be closed. This suggests a too big to fail policy. · These policies, together with the fact that resolution processes were late and not necessarily comprehensive, may have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the East Asian countries, aggravating the financial crisis. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Group, Financial Sector Vice Presidency - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the causes and resolution of financial distress. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten)) |
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| 520 | 3 | |a In the East Asian crisis, connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress for financial institutions. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely, suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, suggesting a too big to fail policy. - Politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in financial institutions' distress. East Asia's financial crisis featured many distressed and closed financial intermediaries in an environment with many links between government, politicians, supervisors, and financial institutions. This makes the East Asian financial crisis a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions' distress. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri investigate distress and closure decisions for 186 banks and 97 nonbank financial institutions in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They find that after July 1997, 42 percent of the institutions experienced distress (were closed, merged, or recapitalized, or had their operations temporarily suspended). By July 1999, 13 percent of all institutions in existence in July 1997 had been closed. Using financial data for 1996, the authors find that: · Traditional CAMEL-type variables - returns on assets, loan growth, and the ratio of loan loss reserves to capital, of net interest income to total income, and of loans to borrowings - help predict subsequent distress and closure. · None of the foreign-controlled institutions was closed, and foreign portfolio ownership lowered an institution's probability of distress. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a · Connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress, suggesting that supervisors had granted forbearance from regulations. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely - suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. · But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, while (smaller) nonbank financial institutions were more likely to be closed. This suggests a too big to fail policy. · These policies, together with the fact that resolution processes were late and not necessarily comprehensive, may have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the East Asian countries, aggravating the financial crisis. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Group, Financial Sector Vice Presidency - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the causes and resolution of financial distress. | |
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| spelling | Ferri, Giovanni Verfasser aut The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions Ferri, Giovanni Washington, D.C The World Bank 2000 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier In the East Asian crisis, connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress for financial institutions. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely, suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, suggesting a too big to fail policy. - Politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in financial institutions' distress. East Asia's financial crisis featured many distressed and closed financial intermediaries in an environment with many links between government, politicians, supervisors, and financial institutions. This makes the East Asian financial crisis a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions' distress. Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri investigate distress and closure decisions for 186 banks and 97 nonbank financial institutions in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They find that after July 1997, 42 percent of the institutions experienced distress (were closed, merged, or recapitalized, or had their operations temporarily suspended). By July 1999, 13 percent of all institutions in existence in July 1997 had been closed. Using financial data for 1996, the authors find that: · Traditional CAMEL-type variables - returns on assets, loan growth, and the ratio of loan loss reserves to capital, of net interest income to total income, and of loans to borrowings - help predict subsequent distress and closure. · None of the foreign-controlled institutions was closed, and foreign portfolio ownership lowered an institution's probability of distress. · Connections - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress, suggesting that supervisors had granted forbearance from regulations. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely - suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. · But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, while (smaller) nonbank financial institutions were more likely to be closed. This suggests a too big to fail policy. · These policies, together with the fact that resolution processes were late and not necessarily comprehensive, may have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the East Asian countries, aggravating the financial crisis. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Group, Financial Sector Vice Presidency - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the causes and resolution of financial distress. Online-Ausg Balance Sheet Banking System Banks and Banking Reform Currencies and Exchange Rates Debt Markets E-Business Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance Emerging Markets Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Crisis Financial Distress Financial Institutions Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Risks Good Interest Interest Income Investors Loan Loans Loss Of Confidence Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Non Bank Financial Institutions Political Economy Portfolio Private Sector Development Prudential Regulations Public Institution Analysis and Assessment Public Sector Development Reserves Return Return On Assets Ferri, Giovanni Sonstige oth Bongini, Paola Sonstige oth Claessens, Stijn Sonstige oth Ferri, Giovanni The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2265 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Ferri, Giovanni The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions Balance Sheet Banking System Banks and Banking Reform Currencies and Exchange Rates Debt Markets E-Business Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance Emerging Markets Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Crisis Financial Distress Financial Institutions Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Risks Good Interest Interest Income Investors Loan Loans Loss Of Confidence Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Non Bank Financial Institutions Political Economy Portfolio Private Sector Development Prudential Regulations Public Institution Analysis and Assessment Public Sector Development Reserves Return Return On Assets |
| title | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions |
| title_auth | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions |
| title_exact_search | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions |
| title_full | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions Ferri, Giovanni |
| title_fullStr | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions Ferri, Giovanni |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions Ferri, Giovanni |
| title_short | The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions |
| title_sort | the political economy of distress in east asian financial institutions |
| topic | Balance Sheet Banking System Banks and Banking Reform Currencies and Exchange Rates Debt Markets E-Business Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance Emerging Markets Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Crisis Financial Distress Financial Institutions Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Risks Good Interest Interest Income Investors Loan Loans Loss Of Confidence Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Non Bank Financial Institutions Political Economy Portfolio Private Sector Development Prudential Regulations Public Institution Analysis and Assessment Public Sector Development Reserves Return Return On Assets |
| topic_facet | Balance Sheet Banking System Banks and Banking Reform Currencies and Exchange Rates Debt Markets E-Business Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance Emerging Markets Finance Finance and Financial Sector Development Financial Crisis Financial Distress Financial Institutions Financial Intermediation Financial Literacy Financial Risks Good Interest Interest Income Investors Loan Loans Loss Of Confidence Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Non Bank Financial Institutions Political Economy Portfolio Private Sector Development Prudential Regulations Public Institution Analysis and Assessment Public Sector Development Reserves Return Return On Assets |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2265 |
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