Tools for legislative oversight: an empirical investigation
"Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. Pelizzo and St...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2004]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3388 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst use data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The authors find that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations, and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high-income countries, less common in low-income countries, and least common in middle-income countries, while the presence of committees of enquiry and ombudsman offices is most common in middle-income countries, less common in high-income countries, and least common in low-income countries. This paper--a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute--is part of a larger effort in the institute to strengthen parliamentary oversight of public finance in developing countries"--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/8/2004 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| spelling | Pelizzo, Riccardo Verfasser aut Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2004] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3388 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/8/2004 "Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst use data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The authors find that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations, and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high-income countries, less common in low-income countries, and least common in middle-income countries, while the presence of committees of enquiry and ombudsman offices is most common in middle-income countries, less common in high-income countries, and least common in low-income countries. This paper--a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute--is part of a larger effort in the institute to strengthen parliamentary oversight of public finance in developing countries"--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Finance, Public Developing countries Legislative oversight Developing countries Representative government and representation Developing countries Stapenhurst, Rick Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Pelizzo, Riccardo Tools for legislative oversight http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3388 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Pelizzo, Riccardo Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation Finance, Public Developing countries Legislative oversight Developing countries Representative government and representation Developing countries |
| title | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation |
| title_auth | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation |
| title_exact_search | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation |
| title_full | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst |
| title_fullStr | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst |
| title_short | Tools for legislative oversight |
| title_sort | tools for legislative oversight an empirical investigation |
| title_sub | an empirical investigation |
| topic | Finance, Public Developing countries Legislative oversight Developing countries Representative government and representation Developing countries |
| topic_facet | Finance, Public Developing countries Legislative oversight Developing countries Representative government and representation Developing countries |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3388 |
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